Introduction:

In Smt. Sudha Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, CRL.REV.P. 627 of 2023, Justice Amit Mahajan of the Delhi High Court examined an important procedural question concerning who is legally entitled to challenge an acquittal in criminal cases arising out of a police report, and the Court categorically held that in such cases, the right to file an appeal against acquittal vests exclusively with the State acting through the Public Prosecutor, and that a third party cannot invoke the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless such person strictly falls within the statutory definition of a “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC. the case arose out of allegations of forgery in relation to a disputed property transaction, where the police had registered a case and filed a charge sheet, and after trial, the accused was acquitted by the trial court, following which the State chose not to file an appeal against the acquittal. the petitioner, who was not the complainant in the police case but claimed to be affected by the alleged forgery, approached the High Court by filing a criminal revision petition seeking to challenge the acquittal, contending that she was entitled to do so under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC which permits a victim to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. the High Court was therefore called upon to determine whether a person who was neither the complainant in a police report case nor the direct victim of the alleged offence could independently maintain a challenge to acquittal when the State itself had decided not to pursue an appeal, and the answer to this question required the Court to carefully examine the statutory scheme governing appeals against acquittal, the special role assigned to the State in criminal prosecutions, and the limited and specific scope of victim appeals introduced by legislative amendment.

Arguments:

On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that the proviso to Section 372 CrPC grants a substantive right to a victim to file an appeal against an order of acquittal and that this right is independent of and in addition to the State’s right to appeal under Section 378 CrPC, and therefore, even if the State chooses not to file an appeal, a person who is affected by the offence should not be left remediless. it was submitted that the alleged forgery related to a property dispute in which the petitioner had a legitimate interest and that the fraudulent acts had caused serious prejudice to her rights, thereby bringing her within the broad and purposive understanding of the term “victim”. the petitioner contended that criminal law should not be interpreted in a manner that shields an acquittal from scrutiny merely because the State has declined to act, especially when the allegations involve serious offences like forgery that undermine property rights and legal transactions. It was further urged that the amendment introducing victim appeals was intended to strengthen the position of victims in the criminal justice system and to reduce over dependence on the State, and therefore a restrictive interpretation would defeat the very purpose of legislative reform. Reliance was placed on the broader spirit of victim centric justice and on judicial precedents emphasising access to justice and participatory rights of victims in criminal proceedings. The petitioner thus argued that her revision petition should be entertained and the acquittal examined on merits, particularly when she claimed to have suffered adverse consequences from the alleged criminal acts. On the other hand, the State as well as the accused strongly opposed the maintainability of the petition and argued that the statutory framework of the CrPC clearly demarcates who can challenge an acquittal and in what circumstances, and that in cases instituted upon a police report, Section 378 CrPC vests the exclusive right of appeal against acquittal with the State Government acting through the Public Prosecutor, subject to leave of the High Court. It was submitted that the provision to Section 372 CrPC does not override Section 378 but operates within its own limited field and applies only where the person seeking to appeal qualifies as a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) CrPC. The respondents contended that the petitioner neither suffered direct loss nor injury attributable to the specific offences for which the accused was charged and therefore could not be considered a victim under the statutory definition. It was further argued that Section 378 also permits appeals by a complainant, but only in cases instituted upon a complaint, whereas the present case was clearly instituted upon a police report, and the petitioner was not the complainant in any event. The respondents cautioned that permitting third parties to challenge acquittals in police report cases would open the floodgates to litigation, undermine prosecutorial discretion, and expose acquitted persons to endless harassment despite a judicial finding of not guilty. It was thus submitted that the revision petition was not maintainable and deserved dismissal at the threshold.

Judgment:

After analysing the statutory provisions and the rival submissions, the Delhi High Court dismissed the revision petition and held that the petitioner had no locus standi to challenge the acquittal in a case instituted on a police report. Justice Amit Mahajan observed at the outset that Section 378 CrPC is the specific provision governing appeals against acquittal and that in cases instituted upon a police report, the right to prefer an appeal is vested exclusively in the State Government through the Public Prosecutor, subject to the statutory requirement of seeking leave of the High Court. The Court clarified that while Section 378 does contemplate appeals by a complainant, such right is confined to cases instituted upon a complaint and does not extend to police report cases, and since the present proceedings were not initiated on a private complaint, the petitioner could not invoke that provision. turning to the reliance placed on the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, the Court held that the proviso grants a right of appeal only to a “victim” and that such right cannot be invoked by any person who merely claims to be affected in a general or indirect sense. the Court carefully examined the definition of “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC, which requires that the person must have suffered loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused has been charged, and held that in the present case, the alleged acts of forgery were directed against another individual and not against the petitioner, and therefore the petitioner neither suffered direct loss nor injury attributable to the offences forming the subject matter of the trial. The Court rejected the argument that a broader or equitable interpretation of victimhood could be adopted in disregard of the statutory definition, and emphasised that criminal procedure must operate within clearly defined legal boundaries. The Court further observed that allowing third parties to challenge acquittals in police report cases would undermine the carefully balanced prosecutorial structure of criminal law, where the State represents the collective interest of society and exercises discretion regarding whether an acquittal should be appealed. It was also noted that once the State has consciously chosen not to file an appeal, the court cannot permit indirect challenges through private revision petitions by persons who do not satisfy the statutory requirements. The Court therefore concluded that the revision petition was not maintainable either under Section 378 or under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, and accordingly dismissed the petition, thereby reaffirming the exclusive role of the State in pursuing appeals against acquittal in police report cases and the limited and clearly defined scope of victim appeals under the criminal procedure law.