Introduction:
The Allahabad High Court is examining an important challenge to the Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) power to arrest an individual, with particular emphasis on the constitutional obligation to communicate the grounds of arrest and the allegation that criminal proceedings are being used to secure continued incarceration. Former Uttar Pradesh Minister and Samajwadi Party leader Mohd. Azam Khan has approached the High Court challenging his arrest by the ED in a money-laundering investigation, alleging that the action was politically motivated and violated his fundamental rights.
The matter came before a Division Bench comprising Justice Rajiv Gupta and Justice Devendra Singh-I pursuant to an order dated November 5 passed by the Supreme Court, which transferred Khan’s writ petition challenging his arrest to the Allahabad High Court. Apart from questioning the legality of the arrest, Khan has also sought release from custody.
The controversy arose on October 31, when Khan was released from Rampur jail after securing bail in the dual PAN card case. According to his counsel, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, Khan walked out of the jail premises at approximately 6:30 PM but was arrested by the ED at around 7:10 PM, barely 40 minutes later. Sibal alleged that ED officials were waiting outside the jail and arrested Khan almost immediately after his release.
The timing of the arrest forms a significant part of Khan’s allegation that successive criminal proceedings have been initiated whenever he appeared close to securing release. His counsel described the sequence as an attempt to keep him in custody until the 2027 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections, arguing that the proceedings amounted to persecution rather than a genuine exercise of prosecutorial authority.
The dispute also raises questions concerning the scope of the ED’s money-laundering investigation, the addition of multiple FIRs to an existing Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR), the attachment of properties associated with the Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar University, and the legality of a fresh arrest based on allegations relating to the university and its associated trust.
At the centre of the constitutional challenge is Article 22(1) of the Constitution, which protects an arrested person by requiring that they be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as may be. The corresponding statutory framework under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), particularly Section 19, also governs the exercise of the ED’s power to arrest. The proceedings therefore require the Court to consider whether the agency fulfilled the safeguards accompanying that power.
The rival submissions place two competing versions before the Court. Khan maintains that the grounds of arrest were never effectively supplied to him or communicated to an appropriate family member, whereas the ED claims that he repeatedly refused to receive the documents despite being given opportunities to do so. The Court is consequently required to examine not merely the existence of arrest-related documents, but whether the procedure followed satisfied the constitutional standard.
Arguments of the Parties:
Appearing for Mohd. Azam Khan, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal argued that the proceedings against his client formed part of a continuing pattern of criminal action intended to prevent his release. He submitted that whenever Khan approached a stage at which he could secure bail or suspension of sentence, another case was brought against him, thereby ensuring that he remained in custody.
Sibal emphasised that Khan was around 80 years old and argued that the repeated institution of criminal cases effectively threatened to keep him incarcerated for the remainder of his life. He described the conduct of the ED and the Uttar Pradesh authorities as coordinated persecution, alleging that the objective was to prevent Khan from remaining outside prison during politically significant periods, including the 2024 and 2027 elections.
To explain the background, Sibal referred to the registration of 26 FIRs between July 12 and July 20, 2019. According to him, these complaints concerned alleged incidents dating back to 2006, when Khan was not holding public office. He questioned why several complaints relating to events from the same period had been registered within such a short span.
Sibal also pointed out that some of the FIRs were registered during late-night hours, including at approximately 1:12 AM and 2 AM. He alleged that the complaints contained similar allegations, descriptions and handwriting, suggesting that they were not independent complaints arising naturally from separate incidents. Referring to the circumstances in which the FIRs were lodged, he questioned whether numerous complainants had suddenly come forward together to report events that had allegedly occurred many years earlier.
According to Sibal, the ED registered an ECIR on August 1, 2019, on the basis of these FIRs. He submitted that Khan had obtained bail in all the cases forming the original basis of the investigation, with charge-sheets filed, charges framed and trials pending. He further contended that 28 additional FIRs were subsequently brought within the same ECIR through an addendum, including complaints relating to alleged incidents from 2016.
Reading out some of the allegations contained in these complaints, Sibal referred to accusations of forcible entry into houses, threats to residents, looting of cash and jewellery, taking away livestock and demolition of houses through bulldozers. He questioned the credibility and nature of the allegations, particularly the ED’s treatment of livestock and other property as proceeds of crime.
In this context, he remarked that the investigation appeared to have reached a stage where even goats and cows were being treated as proceeds of crime. His broader submission was that the agency had expanded the scope of an old money-laundering investigation by incorporating unrelated allegations and using them to sustain proceedings against Khan.
Sibal also informed the Court that Khan had been acquitted in four of the cases. However, ED counsel Senior Advocate Zoheb Hussain clarified that the acquittal orders had been challenged through appeals and revisions. The competing submissions thus highlighted a dispute over the significance of those acquittals while the related proceedings remained under challenge.
Another major aspect of Sibal’s arguments concerned the ED’s search of the Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar University and the subsequent attachment of properties associated with it. He argued that neither the original ECIR nor the FIRs subsequently added to it established a connection with the university.
According to Sibal, the ED’s application referred to approximately 1.552 hectares of land allegedly taken from farmers, with an estimated value of Rs. 3.11 crore. However, he questioned why the agency proceeded to attach university land and buildings allegedly worth around Rs. 500 crore when the original allegation concerned a much smaller area of land.
He further submitted that the land identified as having been taken from farmers had already been restored to them by the district administration and that certain portions had subsequently been sold to third parties. On this basis, he questioned what property remained available to be treated as proceeds of crime and what material continued to justify the investigation and attachment.
Sibal also drew attention to the events leading to the registration of a fresh FIR in October 2026. He submitted that on October 10, the ED wrote to the Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, under Section 66(2) of the PMLA, requesting registration of an FIR on the basis of a valuation report. Following this communication, FIR No. 224 of 2026 was registered on October 13 at Azeem Nagar police station in Rampur.
The fresh FIR allegedly concerned diversion of government funds and misuse of official influence in favour of the university and the Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar Trust. Sibal highlighted that it was registered less than 12 hours before the High Court was scheduled to consider Khan’s application for suspension of sentence in the dual PAN card case. He relied on this timing to reinforce his allegation that the fresh proceedings were intended to prevent Khan’s release.
Turning to the legality of the arrest itself, Sibal submitted that Khan was arrested at approximately 7:10 PM on October 31, shortly after leaving Rampur jail. He questioned the manner in which the arrest was carried out and referred to the arrest memo, pointing out that the column recording the person to whom information about the arrest had been communicated was left blank.
He alleged that the ED did not supply the written grounds of arrest to Khan and did not communicate them to his son, who was present at the time. Instead, according to the petitioner, the agency sent an email and WhatsApp message to Khan’s 84-year-old sister, stating that Khan had refused to receive the grounds of arrest. Sibal argued that neither communication was accompanied by a copy of the grounds themselves.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, Sibal maintained that informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional requirement under Article 22(1). He argued that the agency could not claim compliance merely by sending an arrest-related communication to a relative, particularly when the written grounds had allegedly not been furnished to the arrested person.
The Bench also questioned the breadth of the relief sought by Khan, particularly his request that he should not be arrested or taken into custody in any other FIR, ECIR or complaint arising from facts relating to an earlier period. The Court asked how such protection could be granted when the underlying FIRs and proceedings had not themselves been challenged.
Responding to the query, Sibal clarified that he was not, at that stage, asking the Court to quash all the FIRs. Instead, he argued that the allegations in certain complaints were so inherently improbable that no reasonable person could conclude that they disclosed sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. He added that Khan intended to challenge those FIRs separately, but maintained that the present ED arrest should be set aside in the meantime. He also suggested that if the authorities wished to arrest Khan in connection with other proceedings, they should approach the Court rather than repeatedly taking him into custody.
Opposing the petition, Senior Advocate Zoheb Hussain, appearing for the ED, argued that the scope of the present proceedings was considerably narrower than the petitioner’s submissions suggested. According to him, the Court was required to examine whether Khan’s arrest violated Article 22(1) or involved procedural irregularities affecting his fundamental rights. The petition, he submitted, did not challenge the underlying predicate offences, the FIRs, the ECIR or its addendum. Nor was it a regular bail application.
On the question of communication of the grounds of arrest, Hussain relied on five contemporaneous documents, including a Panchnama and video recordings. He submitted that these materials demonstrated that Khan had repeatedly been asked to read and accept the written grounds of arrest but had refused to do so.
The ED also relied on the remand order, which recorded Khan’s signature acknowledging receipt of documents under protest. Hussain argued that the arrest order, arrest intimation memo and 12 pages containing the grounds of arrest had been received by Khan’s advocate before the remand proceedings commenced.
According to the agency, the fact that Khan accepted the documents under protest could not be treated as proof that they had never been supplied. Hussain submitted that the investigating officer had also arranged for a contemporaneous video recording and had the relevant proceedings recorded in the presence of independent witnesses.
Referring to the Panchnama, he further contended that Khan had repeatedly declined to receive the grounds of arrest and had refused to provide the name of a family member to whom the arrest information could be communicated. The ED argued that an accused could not deliberately refuse documents and subsequently claim that the authorities had violated his fundamental rights by failing to provide them.
Additional Solicitor General SV Raju, appearing for the ED, supported this position by referring to Section 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which deals with communication of information concerning an arrest to a relative, friend or nominated person. He argued that an arrested person is required to disclose or nominate the person to whom such information may be communicated.
Raju alleged that Khan had deliberately declined to cooperate with the process and was attempting to rely on the consequences of his own conduct to establish a constitutional violation. He further submitted that the allegations of political mala fides were misplaced in the present proceedings.
Referring to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, Raju argued that the decision relied upon by Sibal concerned the circumstances in which an FIR could be quashed and was therefore distinguishable. He also relied on State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma and J.A.C. Saldanha to contend that allegations of mala fides would become secondary where an investigation produced unimpeachable material disclosing the commission of an offence.
The ED further pointed out that a charge-sheet had been filed in the relevant proceedings and that cognizance had been taken. On this basis, it opposed the suggestion that the investigation was merely an instrument of political harassment.
Court’s Judgment:
The supplied account records the arguments advanced before the Allahabad High Court and the questions raised by the Bench, but does not report a final judgment deciding the legality of Khan’s arrest or granting or refusing his release. It would therefore be inaccurate to state that the Court has accepted either party’s case or finally ruled on the allegations of political vendetta.
Nevertheless, the hearing brings several significant legal questions into focus, particularly the constitutional protection available to an arrested person and the evidentiary material required to establish compliance with that protection.
Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides that a person arrested and detained in custody must be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. This safeguard is intended to ensure that an individual is not deprived of liberty without being made aware of the reasons for the State’s action. Knowledge of the grounds enables the arrested person to understand the basis of the arrest, consult legal counsel and take appropriate steps to challenge the detention.
In the context of an arrest by the ED, Section 19 of the PMLA is particularly relevant. It authorises an officer of the agency, subject to the statutory conditions, to arrest a person where the officer has reason to believe that the person is guilty of an offence punishable under the Act. The provision also requires the officer to inform the arrested person of the grounds of arrest as soon as may be. The exercise of this power is therefore not independent of the constitutional safeguards governing arrest.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised the importance of communicating the grounds of arrest in a meaningful manner. In Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, the Court held that the written grounds of arrest must be furnished to a person arrested under Section 19 of the PMLA. The requirement is intended to ensure that the arrested individual has an effective understanding of the reasons for being taken into custody and is not left to rely on vague or incomplete information.
The principle was further explained in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana. The Supreme Court treated the obligation under Article 22(1) as mandatory and held that the grounds of arrest must be communicated effectively in a language understood by the arrested person. Importantly, the Court also clarified that the burden of establishing compliance with Article 22(1), when disputed, rests on the investigating agency.
That principle is directly relevant to the rival versions presented in Khan’s case. The petitioner alleges that the written grounds were never supplied to him, while the ED relies on the Panchnama, video recordings, remand documents and the acknowledgement under protest to establish that the documents were offered and received. The Court will have to assess the reliability and legal significance of these materials rather than treating either side’s assertion as conclusive.
The distinction between communicating information about an arrest and communicating the grounds for arrest is also important. An intimation that a person has been arrested does not necessarily explain why the arrest was made. Similarly, sending a message to a relative about the fact of arrest cannot automatically be treated as equivalent to informing the arrested person of the grounds. The two requirements serve related but distinct purposes.
Section 48 of the BNSS, relied upon by the ED, concerns the obligation to inform a relative, friend or nominated person about the arrest. Its relevance must be considered separately from the constitutional duty under Article 22(1) and the requirement under Section 19 of the PMLA. The ED’s argument that Khan refused to nominate a person for arrest intimation may be relevant to the agency’s compliance with the statutory procedure. However, the Court must also examine whether that alleged refusal answers the separate allegation that the grounds of arrest were not effectively communicated to Khan himself.
The Court’s examination of the arrest memo is significant for the same reason. Sibal argued that the relevant column identifying the person to whom arrest information was communicated had been left blank. The ED, on the other hand, relied on other contemporaneous records to demonstrate that the required steps had been taken. The legal effect of the blank column, considered alongside the Panchnama, video recordings and remand order, remains a matter for judicial determination.
The wider allegation of mala fides presents another distinct issue. Khan’s counsel attempted to place the arrest within a larger sequence of FIRs, investigations and proceedings, arguing that the timing of the fresh FIR and the arrest shortly after his release demonstrated an intention to keep him in custody. The ED disputed this interpretation and maintained that the present petition was confined to the legality of the arrest procedure.
The Supreme Court’s decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal is commonly relied upon in cases involving challenges to criminal proceedings on grounds such as abuse of process and mala fides. However, as the ED pointed out, the decision principally concerns the exercise of the High Court’s jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings. Whether its principles assist Khan in the present challenge will depend on the nature of the relief sought and the material placed before the Court.
Similarly, the ED’s reliance on State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma and J.A.C. Saldanha raises the question of how allegations of mala fides should be assessed where the investigating agency claims to possess material supporting the prosecution. The existence of a charge-sheet or the taking of cognizance may be relevant to the broader criminal proceedings, but those developments do not, by themselves, answer whether the particular arrest complied with Article 22(1). The legality of the arrest and the merits of the underlying prosecution are relate but separate questions.
The Bench’s query regardi