Introduction:

The Supreme Court of India has delivered a significant judgment clarifying the interplay between the constitutional powers of the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution and the statutory remission powers exercisable by the State Government under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). In Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana and Others, a Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh held that a remission policy framed in exercise of the Governor’s constitutional powers under Article 161 cannot be overridden by a subsequent remission policy issued under the statutory provisions of the CrPC. In the process, the Court also declared its earlier decision in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021) to be per incuriam, holding that it was rendered in ignorance of the binding three-Judge Bench decision in State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216.

The appeal arose from the rejection of the appellant’s application for premature release by the Haryana Government. The appellant had been convicted in 2009 for the murder of a twelve-year-old child and sentenced to imprisonment for life. After undergoing more than fourteen years of actual imprisonment, he sought consideration for premature release under Haryana’s Remission Policy of 2002. The State, however, declined his request on the ground that the 2008 Remission Policy governed his case because it was in force on the date of his conviction. Under the 2008 policy, the appellant would become eligible for consideration only after completing twenty years of actual imprisonment and twenty-five years of total imprisonment, making him ineligible at the time of his application.

The appellant challenged the State’s decision before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, contending that the 2002 policy, being an exercise of constitutional power under Article 161, continued to operate independently and could not be superseded by the statutory policy of 2008. The High Court rejected this contention and upheld the State’s stand that the 2008 policy alone governed the appellant’s claim.

Aggrieved by the High Court’s judgment, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. The appeal presented an important constitutional issue concerning the nature and source of remission policies issued by State Governments, the distinction between constitutional and statutory executive powers, the binding effect of precedents delivered by larger Benches, and the doctrine of per incuriam. The Court was required to determine whether the 2002 Remission Policy derived its authority from Article 161 of the Constitution or merely from the statutory provisions contained in the CrPC, and whether a later statutory policy could extinguish the benefits flowing from a constitutionally rooted remission policy.

The judgment has wide-ranging implications for remission jurisprudence in India because it not only settles the legal position regarding Haryana’s remission policies but also reiterates the supremacy of constitutional powers over statutory executive action. Equally important, the Court reaffirmed the principle that decisions rendered by larger Benches constitute binding precedent and cannot be disregarded by subsequent Benches of lesser strength.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellant contended that the Haryana Government had erred in applying the 2008 Remission Policy to his case. It was argued that the 2002 policy was fundamentally different in character from the 2008 policy because it was framed in exercise of the Governor’s constitutional powers under Article 161 of the Constitution. Consequently, the appellant submitted that the subsequent statutory policy issued under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC could not override or supersede the constitutional policy.

The appellant emphasized that the 2002 policy expressly contemplated that every proposal for remission would be placed before the Governor for orders under Article 161. This feature, according to the appellant, clearly established the constitutional source of the policy. It was argued that the Governor’s power under Article 161 is an independent constitutional power that exists separately from the statutory remission powers conferred upon the State Government under the CrPC. Therefore, any policy framed under Article 161 possesses a constitutional status which cannot be diluted or displaced by ordinary statutory executive action.

The appellant further relied heavily upon the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Haryana v. Jagdish, wherein the Supreme Court had examined Haryana’s 1993 Remission Policy and held that it was an exercise of constitutional power under Article 161. The appellant submitted that the 1993 and 2002 policies were materially identical because both required remission proposals to be placed before the Governor for orders under Article 161. Accordingly, once the larger Bench had recognised the constitutional nature of the 1993 policy, the same reasoning necessarily extended to the 2002 policy as well.

The appellant also challenged the reliance placed upon State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021). It was argued that Raj Kumar incorrectly characterised the 2002 policy as a statutory policy merely because it did not expressly specify the source of power under which it had been framed. According to the appellant, such reasoning ignored the binding ratio laid down by the larger Bench in Jagdish and therefore could not govern the present dispute.

On behalf of the State of Haryana, it was contended that the appellant’s application for premature release was rightly considered under the 2008 Remission Policy because it was the policy prevailing on the date of his conviction. The State maintained that the 2002 policy did not expressly indicate that it had been issued under Article 161 of the Constitution and, therefore, should be treated as a statutory remission policy framed under the provisions of the CrPC.

The State argued that once the 2008 policy was introduced under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, it superseded the earlier policy. Since the appellant’s conviction had taken place after the 2008 policy came into force, he could not seek the benefit of the earlier, more liberal policy. According to the State, the eligibility criteria prescribed under the 2008 policy were binding, requiring the appellant to complete twenty years of actual imprisonment and twenty-five years of total imprisonment before his case could be considered.

The respondents also relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, wherein the Court had held that the 2002 policy was merely statutory in character and therefore stood superseded by the 2008 policy. It was argued that this precedent squarely covered the present controversy and justified the rejection of the appellant’s remission application.

The State further submitted that permitting life convicts to invoke earlier remission policies despite subsequent revisions would create administrative complications and undermine the State’s authority to modify remission policies in accordance with evolving penological considerations. It therefore urged the Supreme Court to affirm the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and comprehensively rejected the reasoning adopted by the State as well as by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Delivering the judgment for the Bench, Justice Sanjay Karol undertook a detailed examination of the constitutional framework governing remission, the nature of Article 161, the distinction between constitutional and statutory executive powers, and the doctrine of precedent.

At the outset, the Court reiterated the settled constitutional position that the Governor’s powers under Article 161 are distinct from the statutory powers exercised under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While the statutory provisions empower the State Government to suspend, remit or commute sentences in accordance with legislative provisions, Article 161 confers an independent constitutional authority upon the Governor to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, remissions or commutations. This constitutional power exists independently of statutory enactments and cannot be curtailed or overridden by ordinary legislation or executive instructions issued under statutory provisions.

The Court observed that it was unnecessary to labour the point because the constitutional hierarchy itself makes the answer evident. It categorically held that a statutory remission policy cannot override a policy framed pursuant to Article 161. In the words of the Court:

“It need not be said that a statutory policy… cannot override an exercise of power under Article 161, for that power is distinct and independent, uninfluenced by any other power, more so statutory in nature.”

The Bench then compared Haryana’s 1993 and 2002 Remission Policies. It noted that both policies contained substantially identical provisions requiring remission cases to be placed before the Governor for orders under Article 161. This common feature demonstrated that both policies emanated from the same constitutional source. Consequently, the constitutional character attributed to the 1993 policy by the three-Judge Bench in State of Haryana v. Jagdish necessarily extended to the 2002 policy as well.

The Court emphasised that the three-Judge Bench decision in Jagdish constituted binding precedent. Once the larger Bench had recognised the constitutional basis of the 1993 policy, a Bench of lesser strength could not adopt a contrary interpretation while dealing with a materially identical policy. The principle of judicial discipline required subsequent Benches to faithfully follow the ratio laid down by the larger Bench.

Turning to State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021), the Supreme Court found that the decision had proceeded on an erroneous premise by holding that the 2002 policy was merely statutory because it did not expressly specify its constitutional source. According to the present Bench, this reasoning failed to appreciate the larger Bench’s analysis in Jagdish, which had already examined an almost identical remission policy and recognised its constitutional foundation under Article 161.

The Court observed that once Jagdish had authoritatively declared the constitutional nature of Haryana’s remission framework, the conclusion reached in Raj Kumar could not survive. The Bench therefore held that Raj Kumar had been decided in ignorance of binding precedent and consequently attracted the doctrine of per incuriam. The Court explained that a decision rendered contrary to an existing binding judgment of a larger Bench loses its precedential authority because it violates the settled hierarchy of judicial precedents.

Importantly, the Bench also clarified that there was no necessity to refer the matter to a larger Bench. Such a reference becomes necessary only when there exists uncertainty regarding the governing legal position. In the present case, however, the issue had already been conclusively determined by the larger Bench in Jagdish. The task before the Court was merely to restore fidelity to the binding precedent rather than reopen an issue that already stood settled.

Having concluded that the 2002 policy continued to remain operative as a constitutional remission policy, the Court held that the State Government had wrongly rejected the appellant’s claim by applying the 2008 statutory policy. The appellant’s application for premature release ought to have been examined under the more liberal eligibility criteria contained in the 2002 policy.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and directed the Haryana Government to reconsider the appellant’s remission application strictly under the 2002 Remission Policy. The Court directed that this exercise be completed within four weeks from the date of the judgment.

While granting relief to the appellant, the Bench consciously limited the broader consequences of its ruling. Recognising the administrative implications of reopening previously decided remission matters, the Court held that the judgment would operate prospectively. It expressly clarified that remission applications which had already been finally decided would not be reopened merely because Raj Kumar had now been declared per incuriam. This clarification reflects the Court’s effort to balance doctrinal correctness with considerations of legal certainty and administrative stability.

The Court also acknowledged the practical consequence of its interpretation, observing that Haryana would effectively have two remission policies operating simultaneously—the constitutionally rooted 2002 policy and the later statutory policy of 2008. It left it open to the State Government to determine the appropriate course of action for future cases while ensuring compliance with the constitutional principles declared in the judgment.

The decision represents an important reaffirmation of constitutional supremacy and judicial discipline. It underscores that constitutional powers exercised under Article 161 cannot be displaced by statutory executive action and reinforces the principle that binding precedents delivered by larger Benches must be faithfully followed. Equally significant is the Court’s willingness to declare an earlier Supreme Court decision per incuriam where it was found to have disregarded an authoritative larger Bench ruling. The judgment is therefore likely to serve as a landmark precedent governing remission policies, the doctrine of precedent, and the relationship between constitutional and statutory executive powers in India.