Introduction:

In the case of Vijay Uraon v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. [CRMP No. 1108 of 2022], the Chhattisgarh High Court, in a judgment dated June 17, 2025, has reinforced the legal principle that secondary evidence cannot be accepted in judicial proceedings unless the party seeking to introduce such evidence establishes compelling reasons for the non-production of the original document. A Division Bench consisting of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru was called upon to examine whether the trial court erred in accepting a photocopy of an agreement (Ikrarnama) produced by the complainant during her cross-examination, despite its absence from the charge-sheet and without compliance with the procedural safeguards under Sections 65 and 66 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The petitioner had challenged this procedural lapse, contending that the photocopy was admitted without proving that the original was lost, destroyed, or deliberately withheld, and that no prior notice was issued, making the acceptance of such secondary evidence grossly illegal. The High Court agreed with the petitioner, setting aside the trial court’s acceptance of the document and reiterating the foundational principle that secondary evidence can only be admitted in exceptional circumstances backed by legally sound justification.

Arguments by the Petitioner:

The petitioner, represented by Advocate Mr. Ravindra Sharma, strongly objected to the trial court’s decision to admit a photocopy of the Ikrarnama during the complainant’s cross-examination. He argued that the complainant had never produced or even referred to the document during any earlier stage of the investigation, including her statements under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC. Moreover, the document was not part of the charge-sheet submitted by the police. The petitioner emphasized that this photocopy surfaced for the first time during the cross-examination and that the complainant failed to follow due process by not filing an application to bring the document on record. There was no notice served under Section 66 of the Evidence Act requiring the petitioner to produce the original document, nor was there any justification offered for its absence. He contended that this action was a violation of Sections 65 and 66 of the Indian Evidence Act, which regulate the admissibility of secondary evidence. According to the petitioner, the trial court overlooked fundamental evidentiary rules by admitting the photocopy as an exhibit, thereby causing grave prejudice to his right to a fair trial. The petitioner urged the High Court to quash the trial court’s order accepting the secondary evidence, calling it legally untenable, procedurally flawed, and contrary to well-established legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court.

Arguments by the Respondents:

The State, represented by Panel Lawyer Mr. Malay Jain, along with the complainant’s counsel Mr. Vivek Bhakta, defended the trial court’s order. They argued that the Ikrarnama was a relevant document and that its contents were material to the adjudication of the case. They contended that the photocopy carried the signature of the petitioner and had probative value, thus justifying its inclusion in the record. The respondents submitted that procedural lapses, if any, were not grave enough to warrant the exclusion of the document, especially when the purpose was to establish the truth. It was argued that the principles of justice required that all relevant facts, including such documentary evidence, be considered by the court during trial. Furthermore, they suggested that the petitioner could cross-examine the complainant on the contents of the Ikrarnama, thereby addressing any prejudice. According to the respondents, the document’s admission was within the discretionary power of the trial court and should not be interfered with unless a gross miscarriage of justice was demonstrated.

Court’s Judgment:

The High Court, after thoroughly analyzing the facts and applicable legal provisions, found merit in the petitioner’s arguments. Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha, authoring the judgment, carefully examined Sections 65 and 66 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 65 lays down the exceptions under which secondary evidence may be admitted, such as when the original is lost, destroyed, or in the possession of a person who fails to produce it after notice. Section 66 mandates that a notice must be served to the person in possession of the original document before secondary evidence can be introduced. The Court clarified that secondary evidence is a legal exception and cannot be introduced merely at the convenience of the party seeking to do so. Instead, a ‘foundational fact’ must be established—such as loss, destruction, or deliberate withholding of the original document.

In this case, the complainant did not provide any explanation for the non-production of the original Ikrarnama. It was neither part of the investigation nor disclosed in her earlier statements to the police. The document was suddenly produced during cross-examination without any supporting application or procedural compliance, and most importantly, without notice to the petitioner. The trial court, in admitting the photocopy without examining the legality or the foundational basis of its introduction, had clearly acted in contravention of settled law.

The Court also relied on binding precedents of the Supreme Court, including Ashok Dulichand v. Madhavlal Dube & Anr. (1975 AIR 123), where it was held that mere production of a photocopy without showing the unavailability of the original document is not enough to permit its admission as evidence. Similarly, in Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri & Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 479, the Supreme Court reiterated that unless the original is proven to be lost, destroyed, or deliberately withheld by the opposite party, secondary evidence is inadmissible. The High Court found that the ratio in both these cases applied squarely to the facts at hand.

The bench categorically stated that introducing a document at the stage of cross-examination without having laid a foundational basis during the investigation or filing of the charge-sheet not only circumvents the rules of evidence but also severely undermines the rights of the accused. The complainant’s sudden production of the document in court, without establishing why the original could not be presented or even disclosed earlier, amounted to procedural ambush. Moreover, the trial court failed to record any findings regarding the document’s authenticity, origin, or admissibility before treating it as an exhibit. The High Court characterized this judicial oversight as “per se illegal, improper, and contrary to law,” ultimately concluding that the trial court had committed a serious procedural error.

Accordingly, the High Court allowed the criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the petitioner and quashed the trial court’s order that had admitted the photocopy of the Ikrarnama into evidence and marked it as an exhibit. The judgment serves as a powerful reaffirmation of evidentiary discipline in criminal trials and the importance of procedural safeguards in ensuring a fair trial. It clarifies that secondary evidence is not a matter of convenience but an exception that comes into play only after foundational facts are judicially established. The Court thus protected the integrity of the trial process by preventing the admission of unverified and potentially prejudicial documentary evidence without legal justification.