Introduction:
In an important ruling delineating the boundaries between criminal jurisdiction and civil adjudication, the Calcutta High Court reaffirmed that criminal courts cannot determine possessory or proprietary rights over immovable property while exercising powers under the Police Act, 1861. The judgment was delivered by Justice Kausik Chanda in Kalinath Sasmal v. The State of West Bengal and Another, C.R.R. No. 3752 of 2025.
The dispute arose from a prolonged conflict concerning a residential premises situated at 159, S.P. Mukherjee Road, Kolkata, following the death of one Nirmalya Sasmal in 2012. After the deceased was found unconscious in his residence and later declared dead at SSKM Hospital, the Tollygunge Police Station took preventive custody of the premises by locking the house and retaining its keys. The police justified this action on the ground that valuables remained unattended inside the property and there existed a possibility of theft, trespass, or breach of peace.
Over the years, rival claims emerged regarding succession and possessory rights over the premises. The petitioner, Kalinath Sasmal, asserted that he was the step-brother of the deceased and had performed the cremation and last rites. Opposite party no. 2, however, claimed to be the biological son of the deceased and sought custody of the keys and access to the property.
The controversy escalated when the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, relying on police verification reports and documentary materials such as Election Commission records, Aadhaar details, PAN records, and birth certificates, directed that the keys of the premises be handed over to opposite party no. 2 “for use.” The order was subsequently affirmed by the appellate court in June 2025.
Aggrieved by these directions, the petitioner approached the Calcutta High Court, contending that the criminal courts had acted wholly without jurisdiction in effectively conferring interim possession of immovable property under Sections 25 and 26 of the Police Act, 1861.
The case presented significant legal questions regarding the scope of powers available to police authorities and criminal courts under the colonial-era Police Act, the distinction between executive and judicial magistracy, and the limits of criminal jurisdiction in matters involving civil disputes over title, inheritance, and possession of immovable property.
In deciding the matter, the High Court not only interpreted the relevant provisions of the Police Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure but also relied upon established precedents concerning seizure powers and property disputes. The ruling ultimately reinforces the longstanding principle that questions relating to title, succession, and possession of immovable property fall squarely within the exclusive domain of civil courts and cannot be indirectly decided through criminal proceedings or police custody arrangements.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner, Kalinath Sasmal, challenged the orders passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the appellate court primarily on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He contended that the criminal courts had exceeded the limited authority available under Sections 25 and 26 of the Police Act by effectively determining interim possessory rights over immovable property.
The petitioner argued that the Police Act, 1861 was never intended to empower criminal courts or police authorities to adjudicate disputes concerning title, inheritance, or possession of immovable property. According to him, the purpose of the relevant provisions was merely preventive and administrative in nature, enabling police authorities to preserve public order and secure unattended property temporarily until competent forums decide rival claims.
It was further argued that the expression “property” occurring in Sections 25 and 26 of the Police Act must be interpreted contextually to refer only to movable property, money, or valuable securities capable of being physically seized and preserved by police authorities. The petitioner maintained that extending these provisions to immovable property would fundamentally distort the statutory framework and create serious jurisdictional conflicts with civil courts.
The petitioner also challenged the competence of the Chief Judicial Magistrate to exercise powers under the Police Act. Referring to the interpretation clause within the statute, it was argued that the expression “Magistrate of the district” refers to the executive head of district administration and not to a Judicial Magistrate functioning under the criminal justice system. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the Chief Judicial Magistrate lacked statutory authority to entertain or decide such an application.
Another major grievance raised by the petitioner concerned the nature of the order itself. Although the Magistrate’s direction formally referred to handing over the keys “for use,” the petitioner argued that the practical effect of the order was to place opposite party no. 2 in interim possession and control of the premises. Such an order, according to the petitioner, amounted to an indirect adjudication of possessory rights without any civil trial, succession proceedings, or evidentiary adjudication.
The petitioner further submitted that serious disputes existed regarding the legal heirs of the deceased and the lawful ownership and possession of the premises. These disputes, involving inheritance and succession, required adjudication through properly constituted civil proceedings such as probate, letters of administration, partition suits, declarations, or injunctions.
Reliance was placed upon judicial precedents including Chhutanlal v. State and K.V. Krishna Murthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh, wherein courts had held that criminal courts cannot invoke the Police Act to divest persons from possession of immovable property or confer such possession upon others.
The petitioner also argued that Sections 457 to 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not justify the impugned orders because those provisions concern custody and disposal of property seized during investigation of offences. In the present case, no criminal offence involving seizure of the premises had been established.
Opposite party no. 2 defended the impugned orders by asserting his status as the son of the deceased. He relied upon various official documents, including Election Commission records, PAN details, UIDAI records, and birth certificates, which allegedly established his relationship with the deceased owner.
It was contended that the Magistrate had merely acted upon the police verification report and had not conclusively determined ownership or title. According to opposite party no. 2, the order granting access to the premises “for use” was a temporary arrangement intended to preserve the property and ensure that a lawful heir was not denied access indefinitely.
The State and police authorities argued that the initial locking of the premises by Tollygunge Police Station was a preventive measure aimed at maintaining peace and protecting unattended valuables lying inside the house. Following the death of the occupant, the police apprehended unlawful trespass, theft, or disputes among rival claimants and therefore retained custody of the keys in exercise of preventive powers.
The respondents further argued that the police and Magistrate had acted in good faith to avoid deterioration of the property and maintain law and order. According to them, the impugned arrangement did not conclusively settle proprietary rights and therefore should not be viewed as civil adjudication.
It was also suggested that the Magistrate possessed incidental authority to pass interim custodial directions in order to preserve property and avoid further disputes pending resolution of claims by competent authorities.
Court’s Judgment:
The Calcutta High Court allowed the revision petition and set aside both the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate dated January 18, 2024 and the appellate order dated June 23, 2025. Justice Kausik Chanda held that the criminal courts had acted beyond their jurisdiction in effectively conferring interim possessory rights over immovable property under the guise of exercising powers under the Police Act, 1861.
At the outset, the Court examined the statutory scheme of Sections 25, 26, and 27 of the Police Act. The Court observed that these provisions are essentially preventive in nature and are intended to assist police authorities in preserving property and maintaining public order. However, they do not authorise adjudication of rival civil claims regarding ownership, succession, or possession of immovable property.
A central aspect of the judgment concerned the interpretation of the expression “Magistrate of the district” under the Police Act. Justice Chanda noted that the interpretation clause within the statute refers to “the chief officer charged with the executive administration of a district,” thereby clearly indicating the executive magistracy rather than the judicial magistracy.
The Court categorically held that a Judicial Magistrate does not perform executive administration nor function as the head of district administration. Consequently, construing a Chief Judicial Magistrate as the “Magistrate of the district” would obliterate the statutory distinction between executive and judicial magistracy recognised under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Court therefore concluded that the Chief Judicial Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to exercise powers contemplated under the relevant provisions of the Police Act.
The High Court further examined the scope of the term “property” appearing in Sections 25 and 26 of the Police Act. Relying upon earlier judicial precedents, including Chhutanlal v. State and K.V. Krishna Murthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court reiterated that these provisions concern only movable property, money, or valuable securities and do not extend to immovable property.
Justice Chanda emphasised that immovable property disputes inherently involve complicated questions relating to title, inheritance, succession, and possession, which require comprehensive adjudication through civil proceedings. Criminal courts exercising preventive jurisdiction cannot assume the role of civil courts under the pretext of preserving property.
The Court observed that the impugned direction handing over the keys “for use” effectively conferred interim possessory control of the premises upon opposite party no. 2. Such a direction, according to the Court, directly affected competing civil claims and therefore transgressed jurisdictional boundaries.
In a significant observation, the Court held that the duty of police authorities to maintain law and order cannot be expanded into adjudicatory authority over civil rights. The Court stated that preserving peace does not authorise police or criminal courts to decide who should enjoy possession of disputed immovable property.
The Bench also rejected reliance on Sections 457 to 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court clarified that these provisions apply in cases involving seizure of property connected with criminal offences. Since the present matter did not arise from criminal seizure linked to commission of an offence, those provisions were held inapplicable.
The Court drew support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Nevada Properties Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra, wherein the apex court had clarified that criminal seizure powers concerning immovable properties are contextually limited and cannot be expanded indiscriminately.
Having found the impugned orders unsustainable, the High Court directed opposite party no. 2 to restore the keys and possession of the premises to the Officer-in-Charge of Tollygunge Police Station within seven days.
Importantly, however, the Court clarified that the police would continue merely as neutral custodians of the premises for the limited purpose of maintaining peace and safeguarding the property. The police were specifically restrained from recognising possessory or proprietary rights of either party.
The Court further directed preparation of an inventory of articles lying inside the premises in the presence of both parties to ensure transparency and protection of valuables.
In its concluding observations, the Court expressly kept open all questions relating to title, succession, inheritance, and lawful possession for adjudication before competent civil forums. It clarified that the parties remain free to institute appropriate civil proceedings, including suits for declaration, injunction, partition, probate, or letters of administration.
The judgment stands as a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional and procedural separation between civil and criminal jurisdictions. By refusing to permit criminal courts to indirectly determine possessory rights over immovable property, the Calcutta High Court reinforced the principle that civil disputes must be resolved through proper civil adjudication and not through preventive or custodial mechanisms under criminal law.