Introduction:

The case titled MABRB v. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Application 1128 of 2025) came before the Bombay High Court where the critical issue revolved around the applicability of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act when a minor girl allegedly falls in love with an adult man, their families consent to marriage, and a child is born as a consequence of such union. The matter involved a 29-year-old accused and his parents, who were booked under the POCSO Act and the Child Marriage Prohibition Act. The petitioners sought to quash the FIR lodged against them, contending that the minor girl had consented to the relationship, the marriage had been solemnized with acceptance of both families according to Muslim rites on June 2, 2024, and that she had subsequently delivered a child. The Bombay High Court, however, took a firm view that mere familial consent or marriage after the fact does not absolve the accused of criminal liability under statutory provisions designed to protect minors. The bench comprising Justices Urmila Joshi-Phalke and Nandesh Deshpande underscored that offences under POCSO and the Child Marriage Prohibition Act are made out irrespective of the minor’s consent, and the criminal law’s mandate is protective in nature, designed for the benefit of society and the vulnerable child, not merely individual preferences.

Arguments:

The arguments advanced by the applicants revolved around two main points: first, that the minor had willingly entered into a relationship and therefore no offence under POCSO could be made out; and second, that the marriage being solemnized with familial consent, the resultant sexual relationship should be deemed lawful. Advocate SV Sirpurkar, appearing for the accused and his parents, submitted that the girl’s consent, though she was below 18 years of age, should be considered as a mitigating factor and that their conduct was driven by mutual love and family acceptance rather than criminal intent. Sirpurkar contended that the FIR amounted to an interference in the personal life of the couple and that the statutory provisions should not be construed rigidly to penalize consensual relationships where both families were complicit and the parties had voluntarily entered into marriage according to their religious customs. The applicants also contended that the girl had delivered a child and was now in a marital relationship with the accused, which would render the prosecution and FIR redundant in practical terms, calling for exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR as an exceptional circumstance to prevent abuse of process of law.

In response, the State, represented by Additional Public Prosecutor Sneha Dhote, and the victim’s counsel, Advocate Yash Venkatraman, argued that statutory provisions under POCSO and the Child Marriage Prohibition Act are protective in nature and mandatory. They emphasized that the age of the victim at the time of alleged sexual acts and marriage was below 18 years, which automatically triggers offences under POCSO and child marriage laws. They submitted that the consent of a minor is legally irrelevant under the POCSO Act, and the age of majority is the threshold for lawful sexual consent and marriage. The State further highlighted that the law seeks to protect children from exploitation, abuse, and manipulation by adults, and any attempt to bypass these protections under the guise of familial consent or religious sanction would directly contravene the purpose of the legislation. Counsel pointed to ongoing Supreme Court considerations in the suo motu public interest litigation concerning the Right to Privacy of Adolescents (Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2023), noting that even the Central Government had resisted reducing the age of consent on policy grounds, emphasizing that protecting minors is paramount and cannot be subordinated to individual circumstances or familial arrangements.

Judgement:

The Bombay High Court, after examining the submissions and materials on record, categorically rejected the arguments of the applicants. The Court noted that although the girl had allegedly fallen in love with the accused and their families had facilitated the marriage, she was under 18 years of age both at the time of marriage and when she gave birth. The bench emphasized that the accused, then aged approximately 27 years, should have understood that he must wait until the girl attained legal majority before entering into sexual relations or marriage. Taking her away from the lawful custody of her parents and engaging in sexual acts at that stage constituted a clear violation of Sections 6, 17, and 21 of the POCSO Act and the provisions of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act. The bench clarified that the mere occurrence of marriage post-facto or the birth of a child does not legitimize acts that are otherwise criminal at the time of commission. Justice Joshi-Phalke and Justice Deshpande relied on the principle that the consent of a minor is legally irrelevant under POCSO, and the primary object of the legislation is to protect children from sexual exploitation. The Court referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in the ongoing public interest litigation, as well as the stand taken by the Union Government against reducing the age of consent, to reinforce that the law is designed to serve society at large, not merely the desires or arrangements of individual parties.

The bench further underscored that while personal circumstances, such as consensual relationships or family involvement, may be relevant during sentencing or in mitigation, they cannot nullify the offences themselves. The Court emphasized that it was not a fit case to exercise the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR, as doing so would undermine the protective framework of POCSO and child marriage laws. The judges explained that statutory protection must be maintained irrespective of the perceived maturity or willingness of the minor involved. The Court concluded that any relaxation in applying these provisions would set a dangerous precedent, eroding the safeguards intended for minors and potentially encouraging adults to circumvent the law under claims of mutual consent or familial approval. Accordingly, the petition filed by the accused and his parents seeking quashing of the FIR was dismissed, and the Court directed that the investigation and judicial process proceed in accordance with law.

In its detailed 18-page order, the bench highlighted that protection of children from sexual exploitation is a constitutional and statutory mandate. It affirmed that the POCSO Act operates on a principle of strict liability for adult offenders engaging in sexual acts with minors, and that the child’s welfare and protection supersede any familial arrangements, religious customs, or post-marriage occurrences such as childbirth. The Court observed that allowing a quashing of the FIR would compromise the rule of law and the preventive purpose of the statutory framework. It stressed that justice in such cases is not determined solely by personal or social considerations but by adherence to legal mandates designed to safeguard vulnerable children. This judgment not only reinforced the supremacy of statutory protection for minors but also clarified that adult offenders cannot evade responsibility by relying on consent of minors, familial acceptance, or subsequent marriage. The Court’s ruling is a significant precedent reaffirming that child protection laws in India are absolute in nature and cannot be diluted by individual or familial claims of mutual agreement or love.