Introduction:

The case titled Abhishek Singh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others came before the Allahabad High Court where a significant legal question was raised regarding whether an application under Sections 125 and 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking maintenance, could be maintained against a minor husband. The matter involved peculiar circumstances where the revisionist-husband was only 13 years old at the time of marriage, a union that itself was voidable as per child marriage laws, but nevertheless produced a child. Two years after marriage, when the revisionist was still a minor of around 16 years of age, his wife filed an application under Section 125 CrPC claiming maintenance for herself and their child. The Family Court at Bareilly, after considering the evidence, awarded maintenance of ₹5000 per month for the wife and ₹4000 per month for the child, making it a total of ₹9000 per month payable by the minor husband. The revisionist, challenging this decision, approached the High Court with the contention that since he was a minor at the time of application, such proceedings were not maintainable and further argued that his wife was not entitled to maintenance as she had refused to live with him without reasonable cause, attracting the disqualification under Section 125(4) CrPC. The matter was heard by Justice Madan Pal Singh, who dealt with both legal and moral questions regarding the rights and obligations arising from child marriages, the scope of maintenance under Chapter IX of the CrPC, and the duties imposed upon husbands, even minors, once they reach the age of majority.

Arguments:

The arguments on behalf of the revisionist were rooted in two primary grounds: first, that the law did not envisage maintenance claims directly against minors since minors lack legal capacity, and therefore, any such application should have been made through his guardian; and second, that the wife had disentitled herself to maintenance since she had refused to live with the revisionist without reasonable cause, particularly when her grounds of cruelty and dowry demands were not sufficiently substantiated. Counsel for the revisionist also relied upon the High School certificate, which established that the revisionist was below 18 years of age at the time of filing of the application, and stressed that a person who is himself dependent on his parents and without independent means cannot be expected to discharge obligations of maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. They submitted that the trial court’s award of ₹9000 was excessive, impractical, and beyond the minor’s capacity, thereby warranting interference by the High Court. On the other hand, the arguments advanced by the wife and the State respondents emphasized that the welfare of the wife and child, both of whom were legally entitled to maintenance, could not be compromised on the ground of the husband’s minority. They contended that the object of Section 125 CrPC was to prevent destitution and vagrancy, and that the law imposed a duty on every husband, irrespective of age, to maintain his wife and child. They further pointed out that the marriage, though involving a minor, was not annulled by either party, and a child was born from the union, which undeniably fastened responsibility upon the husband. The wife’s counsel argued that the Family Court had rightly assessed the evidence of cruelty and dowry demand, thereby justifying her decision not to reside with the husband. They also relied on Supreme Court precedent, especially Rajnesh v. Neha, to assert that maintenance must be fair, proportionate, and adequate for survival.

Judgement:

In addressing the issues, the Allahabad High Court undertook a close examination of the provisions of Chapter IX of the CrPC, particularly Sections 125 and 128. Justice Madan Pal Singh observed that Section 125 broadly provides that if any person with sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife, legitimate or illegitimate child, or parents, a Magistrate may order such person to make a monthly allowance. Nowhere in the provision is there a bar that proceedings cannot be initiated against minors or that they must necessarily be represented through guardians. Similarly, Section 128 CrPC, which deals with enforcement of such orders, does not provide any distinction between major or minor respondents. The Court highlighted that the intent of the legislature was not to create exceptions but to secure the sustenance of dependents. However, while affirming the maintainability of proceedings against minors, the Court also exercised caution in appreciating the realities of the case. It noted that at the time of filing, the revisionist was indeed a minor, and therefore, it could not reasonably be presumed that he had sufficient means to maintain his wife and daughter. The Court remarked that a minor himself dependent upon his parents cannot practically bear maintenance obligations until he attains majority. Yet, upon attaining the age of 18, he was legally bound to assume such responsibilities.

The Court also dealt with the issue of whether the wife had refused to live with the husband without reasonable cause. It upheld the findings of the Family Court that her refusal was justified on account of cruelty and dowry demands, which were proved on record. The Court dismissed the plea under Section 125(4), holding that the wife was legally entitled to maintenance despite separation. At the same time, the High Court found the quantum awarded by the Family Court—₹9000 in total—to be disproportionate considering the socio-economic background of the revisionist. Assuming that after attaining majority he would be working as a laborer with a monthly income of about ₹18,000, the Court applied the principle laid down in Rajnesh v. Neha that around 25% of the husband’s income can be a reasonable contribution towards maintenance. Accordingly, it recalibrated the amount to ₹2500 per month for the wife and ₹2000 per month for the child, totaling ₹4500 per month. The Court also directed that arrears of maintenance be recalculated on this reduced amount, taking into account the date from which maintenance was ordered. Importantly, the Court refrained from remanding the matter back to the trial court to avoid prolonging the litigation and increasing pendency, instead giving a final determination itself.

Thus, the High Court judgment clarified an important aspect of law: applications under Sections 125 and 128 CrPC are maintainable even against minors, but the capacity to pay depends on the factual realities of each case. It emphasized that while minors may not practically have means during minority, they cannot escape liability altogether and must fulfill their responsibilities once they attain majority. By reducing the amount of maintenance while simultaneously affirming the entitlement of wife and child, the Court balanced the rights of dependents with the capacity of the young husband. The ruling also reaffirmed the principle that child marriage, even though voidable, does not negate obligations of maintenance once the relationship has been consummated and a child is born, thereby protecting the rights of women and children arising out of such circumstances. This decision stands as a vital precedent ensuring that vulnerable dependents are not left destitute merely because the husband is a minor at the time of marriage, while also protecting the practical realities of minors who may not yet have independent earning capacity.