Introduction:
The Bombay High Court has set aside a Government Resolution that sought to reduce the maximum permissible age for Anganwadi Sevikas seeking promotion to the post of Supervisor from 55 years to 50 years. The Court held that the earlier Government Resolution dated 17 November 2001, read with the corrigendum dated 7 December 2001, had created a legitimate expectation among eligible Anganwadi Sevikas that they would continue to be considered for promotional appointment up to the age of 55 years. The State Government could not, without sufficient justification, take away that benefit through a subsequent Government Resolution.
The judgment was delivered by a Division Bench comprising Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh and Justice Neeraj P. Dhote while hearing Writ Petition No. 4045 of 2026, Farida Mustak Mulla v. State of Maharashtra. The challenge was directed against the Government Resolution dated 3 July 2026, which prescribed 50 years as the maximum age for appointment to the post of Supervisor from among Anganwadi Sevikas.
The dispute arose against the backdrop of an earlier attempt by the State Government to alter the promotional eligibility conditions applicable to Anganwadi Sevikas. Under the Service Entry Rules framed by the Government, Rule 7(1)(c) had reduced the maximum age for promotion to the post of Supervisor from the previously applicable 55 years to 45 years. The validity of that provision was challenged before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court.
The Nagpur Bench, in its decision dated 8 May 2026, declared Rule 7(1)(c) unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court found that the earlier Government Resolutions dated 17 November 2001 and 7 December 2001 had generated a legitimate expectation among Anganwadi Sevikas that they would remain eligible for consideration for promotion to the post of Supervisor until they attained the age of 55 years.
The earlier judgment assumed significance in the present proceedings because there was no material placed before the Court to demonstrate that the said decision had been challenged or stayed. Consequently, the legal position declared by the Nagpur Bench continued to operate, and the Government Resolutions of 2001 remained relevant to the promotional framework.
Despite that position, the State Government subsequently issued the impugned Government Resolution dated 3 July 2026, prescribing 50 years as the maximum permissible age for appointment as Supervisor. The petitioners challenged the fresh restriction, contending that the State had once again attempted to deprive Anganwadi Sevikas of a promotional opportunity that had been recognised under the existing legal framework.
The controversy was therefore not simply about whether the Government possessed the administrative power to prescribe an age criterion for promotion. The more important issue was whether the State could introduce a fresh age restriction after an earlier judicial determination had recognised the rights and legitimate expectations arising from the 2001 Government Resolutions.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation occupies an important place in administrative law. It generally arises where a public authority, through an established representation, consistent past practice or express policy, creates an expectation that a particular benefit or procedure will continue to be available. Such an expectation does not invariably amount to an absolute substantive right, but a public authority cannot ordinarily frustrate it arbitrarily, particularly when the affected persons have arranged their affairs on the basis of the existing policy.
In the present case, the Court found that the Government Resolutions of 2001 were not merely isolated administrative instructions. They had governed the field for a considerable period and had established the eligibility framework under which Anganwadi Sevikas could seek promotion up to the age of 55 years.
The petitioners therefore contended that the subsequent reduction to 50 years was not only inconsistent with the earlier policy but also discriminatory in its consequences. Older Anganwadi Sevikas who had otherwise remained eligible for promotion would suddenly lose the opportunity solely because of the newly introduced age restriction. This could also result in juniors being promoted while seniors were excluded from consideration.
The State Government defended the new age limit, asserting that the restriction had been introduced with a legitimate administrative objective. According to the State, fixing 50 years as the maximum age would ensure that persons appointed as Supervisors would receive the maximum possible benefit of the supervisory post during their remaining service period.
The State also pointed to the difference in retirement ages applicable to the two categories. It submitted that Anganwadi Sevikas could continue up to the age of 65 years, whereas Supervisors had a retirement age of 58 years. The State’s position was that the age restriction therefore served a rational administrative purpose by ensuring that persons promoted as Supervisors had sufficient remaining tenure.
The High Court, however, was required to examine whether that justification could overcome the earlier judicial declaration and the legitimate expectation that had arisen from the 2001 Government Resolutions.
The Court ultimately answered the question in favour of the petitioners. It held that the impugned Government Resolution could not deprive Anganwadi Sevikas of the benefit of seeking promotion up to 55 years merely by introducing a fresh administrative restriction. The Court therefore quashed the Government Resolution dated 3 July 2026 and directed the authorities to issue a fresh advertisement with 55 years as the maximum permissible age.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioners challenged the Government Resolution dated 3 July 2026 principally on the ground that it was contrary to the legal position already declared by the Bombay High Court. Their contention was that the State Government had previously recognised 55 years as the maximum age for Anganwadi Sevikas seeking promotion to the post of Supervisor. That position had been reflected in the Government Resolution dated 17 November 2001 and the corrigendum dated 7 December 2001.
According to the petitioners, Anganwadi Sevikas had been working under that framework for years and had a reasonable and legitimate expectation that those who fulfilled the other eligibility requirements would continue to be considered for promotion until they reached 55 years of age. The State could not arbitrarily withdraw that opportunity by subsequently reducing the age limit.
The petitioners relied heavily on the decision of the Nagpur Bench dated 8 May 2026. In that case, the High Court had already examined the validity of Rule 7(1)(c) of the Service Entry Rules, which had attempted to reduce the maximum age for promotion even further, to 45 years. The provision had been declared unconstitutional and violative of Article 14.
The petitioners argued that once the earlier Division Bench had found the restriction unconstitutional and had recognised the legitimate expectation arising from the 2001 Government Resolutions, the State could not achieve substantially the same result through another administrative instrument. Reducing the age limit first to 45 years and then, after the judicial intervention, to 50 years would effectively undermine the protection already recognised by the Court.
They submitted that the Government Resolution dated 3 July 2026 was particularly problematic because it did not provide a convincing basis for departing from the earlier policy. The petitioners contended that the State had not demonstrated any compelling change in circumstances that would justify depriving Anganwadi Sevikas between 50 and 55 years of an established promotional opportunity.
Another significant argument was based on Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioners contended that the fresh age restriction operated unfairly against Anganwadi Sevikas who were otherwise qualified and experienced enough to be considered for the supervisory position. An arbitrary age cut-off would result in eligible senior employees being excluded while comparatively junior employees continued to remain eligible.
Such a consequence, according to the petitioners, could create an anomalous situation in which a senior Anganwadi Sevika, despite having greater experience and having previously been eligible for promotion, would be denied consideration while a younger employee with fewer years of service could obtain the promotional opportunity.
The petitioners also relied on the principle of legitimate expectation. They argued that the 2001 Government Resolutions had created more than a fleeting expectation because they had governed eligibility for a substantial period. Anganwadi Sevikas had therefore been entitled to expect that the promotional framework would continue unless lawfully and reasonably altered.
The State Government, on the other hand, defended the impugned Government Resolution and sought to justify the 50-year age limit on administrative grounds. Its principal submission was that promotion to the post of Supervisor should be structured in a manner that ensured the appointee derived meaningful benefit from the supervisory position during the remaining period of service.
The State pointed out that Anganwadi Sevikas had a retirement age of 65 years, whereas Supervisors retired at 58 years. It submitted that if an Anganwadi Sevika were promoted at an advanced age, the remaining tenure available in the supervisory position could be comparatively short. Prescribing 50 years as the maximum age was therefore presented as a policy decision designed to ensure that the maximum benefit of the post was available to those appointed as Supervisors.
The State’s position was that age criteria in service matters fall within the domain of administrative policy and that courts should ordinarily exercise restraint in interfering with such policy decisions unless they are shown to be manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory or otherwise contrary to law.
However, the petitioners countered that the issue could not be viewed as an ordinary challenge to a fresh service policy. They emphasised that the State’s earlier attempt to alter the age limit had already been judicially invalidated. In their submission, the subsequent Government Resolution had to be examined in light of that binding judicial determination and the rights and legitimate expectations flowing from the 2001 framework.
The dispute thus presented a conflict between administrative policy-making on one hand and the requirement of consistency, fairness and non-arbitrariness in governmental action on the other. The High Court was called upon to determine whether the State’s stated objective was sufficient to justify the withdrawal of a promotional opportunity that had previously been recognised.
Court’s Judgment:
The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed and set aside the Government Resolution dated 3 July 2026. The Division Bench held that Anganwadi Sevikas seeking promotion to the post of Supervisor would continue to be governed by the Government Resolution dated 17 November 2001 and the corrigendum dated 7 December 2001, under which the maximum permissible age for promotional appointment was 55 years.
A significant factor in the Court’s reasoning was the earlier judgment of the Nagpur Bench dated 8 May 2026. The Court noted that the earlier Division Bench had already considered the validity of Rule 7(1)(c) of the Service Entry Rules and had declared the provision unconstitutional and violative of Article 14.
The Court further noted that there was no material before it demonstrating that the earlier judgment had been challenged. Consequently, the declaration made by the Nagpur Bench continued to hold the field. The Government Resolutions of 17 November 2001 and 7 December 2001 therefore continued to govern the eligibility framework concerning promotion to the post of Supervisor.
The Court treated this previous judicial determination as central to the present dispute. The State could not simply introduce a new Government Resolution and thereby bypass the consequences of the earlier judgment. The Court examined the impugned Resolution in the context of the legitimate expectation that had already arisen from the 2001 Government Resolutions.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation was therefore once again applied. The Court observed that the rights created by the Government Resolution dated 17 November 2001, read with the corrigendum dated 7 December 2001, had generated a legitimate expectation among the petitioners and similarly situated Anganwadi Sevikas.
The Court specifically observed that “even in this case, the doctrine of legitimate expectation would arise” because of the rights created by the earlier Government Resolutions. It held that the petitioners could not be deprived of the benefit of seeking promotion to the post of Supervisor simply through the introduction of the fresh Government Circular dated 3 July 2026.
The Court’s reasoning reflects an important administrative-law principle: governmental policy may be altered, but the exercise of that power must remain consistent with constitutional standards of fairness and non-arbitrariness. Where an existing policy has generated a legitimate expectation and the policy has already been considered by a constitutional court, a subsequent administrative decision seeking to take away the same benefit requires particularly careful justification.
The Court found that no sufficient justification had been provided for fixing the maximum permissible age at 50 years. The State’s explanation concerning the remaining period of service did not persuade the Court that the established 55-year eligibility limit could lawfully be curtailed.
The Court was also concerned about the discriminatory consequences of the new age restriction. Anganwadi Sevikas who had previously been eligible for promotion could suddenly become ineligible merely because they had crossed the newly prescribed age of 50 years. This would deprive them of a promotional benefit that had been available under the earlier framework.
The Court further recognised the possibility of juniors superseding seniors as a consequence of the restriction. An experienced Anganwadi Sevika between 50 and 55 years could be excluded from consideration, while a younger and comparatively junior employee could remain eligible for promotion. Such an outcome required a compelling and legally sustainable justification.
The Court found no adequate justification capable of overcoming the constitutional concerns. The restriction therefore could not survive when tested against the earlier judicial determination and the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
The decision is also significant because it demonstrates that legitimate expectation cannot be examined in isolation from Article 14. While legitimate expectation does not invariably create an enforceable substantive right to a particular benefit, arbitrary frustration of such an expectation by the State can invite judicial review. Governmental authorities must act fairly, particularly where their previous conduct has created a settled expectation among a class of employees.
The Court effectively held that the State’s administrative discretion was not unlimited. The Government could regulate recruitment and promotion and could frame service conditions, but those powers had to be exercised within the boundaries of constitutional reasonableness and the binding effect of judicial decisions.
The earlier Nagpur Bench ruling was therefore not treated as an incidental background circumstance. It established the legal position concerning the validity of the restrictive age provision and recognised the significance of the 2001 Government Resolutions. Since that ruling remained unchallenged, the State was required to act consistently with it.
The Court consequently applied the same criteria that had been applied by the Nagpur Bench in its decision dated 8 May 2026. On that basis, the Government Resolution dated 3 July 2026 was quashed and set aside.
The practical consequence of the judgment is that Anganwadi Sevikas desirous of applying for the post of Supervisor will be governed by the earlier eligibility framework. The maximum permissible age for promotional appointment will remain 55 years, subject to fulfilment of the other prescribed qualifying conditions.
The Court also issued a consequential direction to respondent No. 2 to issue a fresh advertisement inviting applications for the post of Supervisor. The advertisement must prescribe 55 years as the maximum permissible age and must otherwise comply with the applicable qualifying criteria.
The judgment therefore restores the position that existed under the 2001 Government Resolutions. Anganwadi Sevikas who fall within the 50-to-55 age bracket cannot be excluded merely because of the subsequently introduced age restriction.
The ruling also carries broader implications for public employment and administrative decision-making. Government policies concerning recruitment and promotion are not immune from judicial review. Where an administrative decision has the effect of taking away an established benefit, the State must demonstrate that the change is legally sustainable, rational and consistent with constitutional guarantees.
The case also illustrates the protective role of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Employees do not necessarily acquire an immutable right that a governmental policy will never change. However, where a policy has operated for years and has created a reasonable expectation of continued eligibility, an abrupt departure from that framework cannot be arbitrary.
In the present matter, the High Court found that the 55-year promotional age limit had a sufficiently established foundation in the 2001 Government Resolutions. More importantly, the earlier attempt to alter that position had already been struck down by the High Court. Against that background, the subsequent reduction to 50 years could not be sustained merely on the basis of the State’s general administrative rationale.
Ultimately, the judgment places emphasis on consistency, fairness and constitutional discipline in public administration. The State may formulate service policies, but such policies must operate within the framework of Article 14 and cannot disregard binding judicial determinations or defeat legitimate expectations without adequate justification.
By quashing the Government Resolution dated 3 July 2026 and restoring the 55-year eligibility limit, the Bombay High Court has protected the promotional opportunity of Anganwadi Sevikas who would otherwise have been excluded by the new age restriction. The judgment makes clear that administrative convenience cannot, by itself, justify taking away an established promotional avenue where the resulting classification is discriminatory and inconsistent with the legal position already declared by the Court.
The decision in Farida Mustak Mulla v. State of Maharashtra thus reinforces an important principle of administrative law: when government action creates a legitimate expectation and a court has already recognised the legal protection surrounding that expectation, the State cannot defeat it through an unexplained or inadequately justified change in policy. For Anganwadi Sevikas, the immediate consequence is clear—the maximum permissible age for promotional appointment as Supervisor remains 55 years, and the authorities must issue a fresh advertisement accordingly.