Introduction:
In a significant ruling reinforcing judicial discipline and the sanctity of court and tribunal proceedings, the Bombay High Court dismissed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking the mandatory audio-video recording of proceedings before the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission (MERC), observing that such recordings cannot be treated or used as evidence in any court of law. The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Shree Chandrashekhar and Justice Gautam Ankhad delivered this decision while hearing a PIL filed by businessman and activist Kamlakar Ratnakar Shenoy, who challenged a 2018 resolution of MERC that prohibited the audio-video recording of its proceedings. The petitioner had argued that recordings would ensure transparency and expose alleged inconsistencies in the conduct of MERC’s proceedings. However, the Bench found the PIL to be misplaced and motivated, holding that such petitions misuse the process of law under the guise of public interest. The Court emphasized that there already exists a prohibition on recording judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and even where such recordings exist, they cannot be introduced as evidence in any court. The judgment reaffirms the established principle that public trials and open hearings are sufficient to ensure transparency, and audio-video recordings cannot substitute or supplement judicial evidence.
Arguments by the Petitioner:
The petitioner, Kamlakar Shenoy, who identified himself as a public-spirited individual and consumer rights activist, approached the High Court challenging MERC’s resolution dated September 4, 2018, which decided against audio-video recording of its proceedings. He argued that such recordings are vital for transparency, accountability, and the protection of public interest. According to him, the proceedings before the MERC were allegedly not being conducted in a fair and proper manner, and there were serious procedural lapses, irregularities, and inconsistencies in the Commission’s functioning. Shenoy submitted that the absence of recording enabled officials and lawyers to manipulate submissions and orders, thereby eroding public faith in the regulatory process.
He further contended that allowing the recording of such proceedings would help maintain an accurate and true record of events, preventing possible distortion or misrepresentation. The petitioner argued that in the digital age, recording proceedings should not be seen as a violation but as a tool for transparency and accountability. He asserted that the principle of open justice, as recognized by the Supreme Court, supports the concept of public access and transparency in the administration of justice, which could be effectively achieved through recording and dissemination of proceedings.
The petitioner went a step further to suggest that the recorded proceedings could serve as valid material or evidence in other judicial or quasi-judicial forums, helping to establish facts and procedural propriety. He emphasized that public confidence in regulatory authorities like MERC could only be ensured if their functioning was subject to public scrutiny through such recordings. The petitioner claimed that his PIL was in the interest of consumers and the public at large, as MERC regulates essential services such as electricity, which directly affect citizens. He argued that the refusal to record proceedings amounted to opacity and was contrary to the spirit of democratic governance.
Arguments by the Respondent (MERC and State Authorities):
Opposing the PIL, the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission and the State authorities strongly objected to the petitioner’s plea, arguing that the petition was not a genuine public interest litigation but one motivated by personal grievances and publicity concerns. The respondents highlighted that the Commission’s decision not to permit audio-video recording was consistent with established judicial and administrative practices across India, which prohibit unauthorized recording of proceedings in courts, tribunals, and quasi-judicial forums. They emphasized that the purpose of open hearings is already fulfilled through public access to proceedings and official records, ensuring transparency and accountability.
The respondents further submitted that the petitioner’s claim that such recordings could be used as “evidence” in other courts was legally untenable and contrary to established principles of evidence law. Allowing such use, they argued, would set a dangerous precedent where litigants could manipulate or selectively present portions of recordings to support their cases. They also pointed out that the petitioner had misconstrued the Supreme Court’s observations in earlier judgments that emphasized open courts. Those judgments, the respondents explained, were never intended to suggest that judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings should be recorded and used as evidence.
Furthermore, the MERC argued that the Commission operates transparently, publishing its orders, regulations, and proceedings on its official website, and the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any concrete instance of misconduct or bias that justified the extraordinary intervention sought. The State authorities also supported MERC’s stand, noting that permitting recordings could jeopardize the integrity of the adjudicatory process, discourage open submissions by parties, and potentially lead to misuse and manipulation of the proceedings. They urged the Court to dismiss the PIL with costs to discourage the filing of similar petitions lacking public purpose.
Court’s Observations and Judgment:
After hearing both sides and perusing the records, the Division Bench of Chief Justice Shree Chandrashekhar and Justice Gautam Ankhad categorically dismissed the PIL, holding that the petitioner’s plea was without merit and contrary to established legal norms. The Court began by reaffirming the fundamental principle that there exists a well-recognized prohibition on recording judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, including those conducted by tribunals such as the MERC. The Bench observed that the petitioner had misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s remarks about open and public trials, mistaking them as a license to demand the recording and production of proceedings as evidence.
Quoting from its order, the Court stated: “A litigant is not permitted to use the true record of the court proceedings and use the same as evidence. There is in fact a prohibition not to record the court proceedings much less to be used as evidence in a court of law.” The Bench clarified that the right to a public hearing ensures openness and accountability in judicial and quasi-judicial processes, but that does not extend to allowing or mandating the recording of such proceedings.
The Court noted that the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that trials and hearings must be conducted openly to promote public confidence in justice administration, but the principle of open courts must not be misconstrued as an endorsement of recording proceedings. The purpose of open justice, the Bench observed, is already served by the public’s ability to attend hearings and access orders and judgments through official channels.
Addressing the petitioner’s argument that recordings would expose inconsistencies in MERC’s conduct, the Court remarked that such reasoning was misplaced and contrary to law. “Certainly it is against the settled principles of law that the video recordings of the proceedings of tribunals or courts cannot be used as evidence,” Chief Justice Chandrashekhar observed. The Bench found the petitioner’s submissions speculative, lacking factual basis, and motivated by personal grievances rather than genuine public interest. The Court sternly criticized the filing of PILs motivated by personal vendetta or self-publicity, describing them as a misuse of judicial time and process.
The Bench observed that the instant PIL “seems to be in the nature of private interest litigation,” pointing out that the petitioner appeared to be pursuing his own agenda rather than serving the public good. It further stated that “filing of such PILs is an abuse of the process of the law and must be deprecated.” The Court, therefore, refused to interfere with MERC’s 2018 resolution prohibiting audio-video recordings of its proceedings and upheld the Commission’s autonomy in regulating its procedural conduct.
In conclusion, the High Court categorically held that recordings of tribunal or court proceedings, even if permitted, cannot be used as evidence in any judicial forum, as doing so would undermine procedural sanctity, invite misuse, and disrupt the orderly functioning of judicial institutions. Finding no merit in the PIL and identifying it as an instance of frivolous litigation, the Court dismissed the petition outright, cautioning against similar misuse of the PIL mechanism in the future.