Introduction:

The Bombay High Court has reaffirmed that its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised not only to protect legal rights but also to prevent unnecessary and prolonged litigation where the facts and law are clear. In Suka Mahadu Khade v. Bababai Tukaram Shevre [Writ Petition No. 7542 of 2026; 2026 LiveLaw (Bom) 312], a Division Bench comprising Justice A.S. Gadkari and Justice Kamal Khata dismissed a writ petition challenging the orders of the Additional Divisional Commissioner and the Circle Officer concerning a dispute over tribal land.

The petitioners also sought a direction requiring the Revenue Minister to decide a revision application pending before the State Government. They claimed rights over the disputed property on the basis of an alleged 99-year lease agreement executed by the tribal landowner for a consideration of ₹90,000. According to them, they had remained in possession of the property for several decades and the respondents had never questioned the transaction. However, the High Court found that the petitioners had failed to establish any lawful right over the land and concluded that remanding the matter for further consideration would only prolong litigation unnecessarily.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioners contended that the disputed property was ancestral property jointly belonging to them and the respondents. They relied upon a notarised agreement under which respondent No. 1 had allegedly leased the land to them for a period of 99 years after receiving consideration of ₹90,000. They argued that they had been in continuous possession of the property since before 1991 and had invested in and cultivated the land without interruption. According to the petitioners, since neither the lease transaction nor the subsequent sale deed had been challenged for several years, their possession and rights deserved legal protection.

The petitioners further submitted that their revision application against the order of the Additional Divisional Commissioner had remained pending before the Revenue Minister without any decision. They therefore requested the High Court to direct the Minister to dispose of the revision within a fixed time frame.

The respondents opposed the petition, asserting that the land belonged to a member of the Scheduled Tribe and that any transfer or lease of such land required prior permission from the competent authority under the applicable law. It was argued that no such permission had ever been obtained. The respondents further submitted that the document relied upon by the petitioners was merely a notarised agreement that neither created legal rights nor proved payment of the alleged consideration. They contended that the petitioners had failed to produce any independent evidence supporting their claim of ownership or lawful possession.

Court’s Judgment:

The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition after finding no merit in the petitioners’ claims. The Court observed that the principal document relied upon by the petitioners was only a notarised agreement, which by itself did not create any legal interest in immovable property. The Bench held that such a document had little evidentiary value, particularly when it was unsupported by reliable evidence establishing the alleged transaction.

The Court also noted that although the agreement referred to payment of ₹90,000, it merely recorded that the amount had been received “from time to time.” No receipts, bank records, or other documentary evidence were produced to prove that the consideration had actually been paid. The absence of such evidence substantially weakened the petitioners’ claim.

The Bench further found that the petitioners had failed to place any independent material before the Court establishing a lawful right over the disputed property. Mere assertions of long possession, without legally admissible evidence, were insufficient to confer enforceable rights, particularly in a dispute concerning tribal land protected by statutory safeguards.

The Court upheld the findings of the Additional Divisional Commissioner, observing that the authority had carefully examined the evidence and correctly concluded that the land belonged to respondent No. 1, who was an Adivasi. Since the alleged transfer had been undertaken without obtaining prior permission from the competent authority, the transaction could not be recognised in law. The Commissioner had therefore rightly rejected the petitioners’ claim.

While considering the request to direct the Revenue Minister to decide the pending revision application, the High Court held that such a direction would serve no useful purpose. Exercising its wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that where the controversy had already been fully examined and no legal merit existed in the challenge, it could itself bring the litigation to an end rather than permitting further unnecessary proceedings before another authority.

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the pending revision application itself, upheld the order of the Additional Divisional Commissioner, and directed that the order be implemented within four weeks. The judgment underscores that Article 226 empowers constitutional courts to ensure complete justice and avoid prolonged litigation where further proceedings would be futile. It also reiterates the importance of protecting tribal land from unauthorized transfers and emphasizes that claims based on unsupported or legally ineffective documents cannot defeat statutory safeguards enacted for the benefit of Scheduled Tribes.