Introduction:

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in State of Rajasthan v. Jabhra Ram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1097, has brought renewed attention to the constitutional requirement governing communication of the grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. The Court held that the absence of a separately furnished written document containing the grounds of arrest would not, by itself, invalidate an arrest where there had been substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate and no prejudice had been caused to the accused. The ruling has revived an important debate concerning whether written communication of the grounds of arrest is an indispensable constitutional safeguard or whether the requirement can be satisfied through other forms of effective communication, depending on the circumstances of each case.

The judgment assumes significance because several earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, including Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, Mihir Rajesh Shah and Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, have dealt with the nature and extent of the obligation imposed on investigating agencies to communicate the grounds of arrest. While these decisions have emphasised the importance of informing an arrested person of the reasons for curtailing their liberty, they have also examined whether written communication should be treated as a mandatory requirement in every situation.

The controversy primarily arises from the interpretation of Article 22(1), which guarantees that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of such arrest. It further provides that an arrested person cannot be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice.

The constitutional provision is intended to ensure that an individual is not left unaware of the reasons for which personal liberty has been curtailed. Knowledge of the grounds of arrest enables the arrested person to understand the allegations, seek appropriate legal advice and effectively challenge the legality of the arrest or apply for bail.

The central question, therefore, is not merely whether the investigating agency has recorded the reasons for arrest somewhere in its official records, but whether those reasons have actually been communicated to the arrested person in a meaningful and understandable manner.

In Pankaj Bansal, the Supreme Court had emphasised that merely reading out the grounds of arrest would not satisfy the constitutional requirement in the context of the PMLA. The Court directed that a copy of the written grounds of arrest must be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. This approach was subsequently extended to arrests under the UAPA in Prabir Purkayastha.

The legal position, however, underwent further examination in Vihaan Kumar and Kasireddy Upender Reddy, where the Court distinguished between the constitutional obligation to communicate the grounds of arrest and the particular form in which that obligation must be discharged. Subsequently, Mihir Rajesh Shah and Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol adopted a stronger formulation, treating written communication as a mandatory safeguard.

Against this background, the ruling in Jabhra Ram raises an important question about the extent to which procedural compliance can be evaluated through the test of actual prejudice. Although the judgment does not expressly overrule the earlier decisions, its reasoning appears to introduce a more flexible approach towards the mode of communicating the grounds of arrest.

Arguments of the Parties:

The principal legal controversy before the Supreme Court concerned whether the failure to furnish a separate written document containing the grounds of arrest necessarily renders the arrest unconstitutional, or whether compliance with Article 22(1) can be established through other contemporaneous records and circumstances demonstrating that the arrested person was adequately informed of the reasons for their arrest.

From the standpoint of the accused, the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(1) cannot be reduced to a mere procedural formality. The obligation to communicate the grounds of arrest is intended to protect personal liberty and ensure that an individual understands why the State has exercised its power of arrest. Consequently, the requirement must be interpreted in a manner that gives practical effect to the constitutional guarantee rather than permitting investigating agencies to rely on internal documentation.

The accused’s position finds support in the principles laid down in Pankaj Bansal and subsequently reinforced in Prabir Purkayastha. These decisions recognised that furnishing written grounds of arrest serves an important purpose beyond simply informing an individual of the allegations. A written document provides certainty regarding the information communicated and prevents disputes between the arrested person and the investigating agency about whether the grounds were actually conveyed.

It also enables the accused to consult a lawyer with a clear understanding of the allegations and prepare an effective challenge to the arrest or seek bail. Merely recording the grounds in an arrest memo or case diary does not necessarily establish that the accused received and understood that information.

Reliance can also be placed on Vihaan Kumar, wherein the Supreme Court clarified that the burden of establishing compliance with Article 22(1) rests upon the police authorities when an arrested person alleges that the grounds of arrest were not communicated. The investigating agency cannot expect the accused to establish the negative proposition that the grounds were never conveyed.

A further concern arises when the State relies upon entries in the case diary to demonstrate compliance. Section 192(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to Section 172(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, restricts the ordinary right of an accused or their representative to call for or inspect the case diary. Therefore, treating an internal police record as sufficient compliance could create practical difficulties for an accused challenging the legality of an arrest.

The accused may have to approach the court to verify whether the grounds recorded in the case diary were actually communicated. Such a process could result in additional litigation and delay consideration of the challenge to the arrest, particularly when the accused continues to remain in custody.

The constitutional protection, therefore, should not depend upon the arrested person overcoming restrictions on access to internal investigative documents. The State must demonstrate actual and effective communication through reliable material.

On the other hand, the reasoning supporting the State’s position in Jabhra Ram proceeds on the distinction between the constitutional obligation itself and the form in which it must be fulfilled. Article 22(1) expressly requires that the grounds of arrest be communicated to the arrested person, but the provision does not expressly prescribe that a separate written document must invariably be handed over in every case.

Accordingly, the State’s approach, as reflected in the judgment, emphasises that the legality of an arrest should be examined by considering the complete circumstances rather than treating the absence of a separately furnished written document as automatically fatal.

In the present case, the accused had allegedly been informed of the reasons for his arrest through an arrest notice, while the relevant allegations were also recorded in the case diary and arrest memo. The arrest memo contained details of the allegations and bore the accused’s signature. His brother had also been informed of the arrest, and the accused was represented by counsel during the remand proceedings.

These circumstances were relied upon to demonstrate that the accused was not kept unaware of the reasons for his arrest. Further, no objection regarding non-communication of the grounds of arrest was raised during the remand proceedings.

The State’s position, therefore, favoured a substantive assessment of compliance, under which the court would examine whether the arrested person had received sufficient information to understand the basis of the arrest and whether any procedural omission had caused actual prejudice.

The broader argument supporting this approach is that constitutional safeguards must be effectively implemented, but procedural requirements should not be interpreted in isolation from the facts of an individual case. Where the purpose of the constitutional provision has been substantially achieved, the absence of a particular form of documentation should not automatically invalidate the entire arrest process.

Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court, in State of Rajasthan v. Jabhra Ram, adopted a substantive approach towards examining compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution. The Court held that furnishing written grounds of arrest separately is not indispensable in every situation where the circumstances demonstrate substantial compliance with the constitutional requirement and the accused has suffered no prejudice.

The accused in the case had been booked under the Official Secrets Act on allegations of spying for Pakistan. While examining the legality of the arrest, the Court considered the manner in which the reasons for arrest had been communicated and the contemporaneous records maintained by the investigating agency.

The Court noted that an arrest notice had been served upon the accused and that he had been informed of the reasons for his arrest immediately thereafter. The relevant information was also recorded in the case diary. Further, the arrest memo contained details of the allegations and carried the accused’s signature.

The Court also took note of the fact that the accused’s brother had been informed about the arrest and that the accused was represented by a lawyer during the remand proceedings. Significantly, no objection concerning the non-communication of the grounds of arrest was raised at that stage.

Considering these circumstances collectively, the Court concluded that there had been substantial compliance with Article 22(1). It found no demonstrable prejudice to the accused and held that the arrest could not be declared illegal merely because a separate written document containing the grounds of arrest had not been furnished.

The decision places considerable emphasis on the distinction between a complete failure to communicate the grounds of arrest and a procedural deficiency in the manner of such communication. According to the approach adopted in the judgment, the legality of an arrest must be examined by considering whether the constitutional objective was substantially achieved and whether the alleged procedural defect adversely affected the rights of the arrested person.

Earlier jurisprudence on written communication of grounds of arrest

The ruling must be examined against the background of the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions, which progressively developed the jurisprudence concerning Article 22(1).

In Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2023), the Supreme Court examined the requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The Court held that merely reading out the grounds of arrest to an accused would not satisfy the constitutional requirement. It directed that a copy of the written grounds of arrest must be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception.

The Court identified important practical reasons for adopting this requirement. Written communication eliminates unnecessary disputes regarding whether the investigating agency actually informed the accused of the reasons for arrest. It also enables the arrested person to understand the allegations, consult legal counsel and effectively exercise the right to seek bail.

The principle was subsequently extended in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) to arrests made under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

The Court emphasised that communicating the grounds of arrest or detention in writing under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) is a sacrosanct constitutional requirement. It further held that non-compliance with the constitutional safeguard and the applicable statutory mandate would render the custody or detention illegal.

An important development followed in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2025). The Supreme Court clarified that the constitutional obligation to communicate the grounds of arrest must be taken seriously and that the burden of proving compliance rests upon the police authorities.

The Court, however, made an important distinction regarding the mode of communication. While recognising that Article 22(1) does not expressly prescribe written communication in every case, it observed that furnishing written grounds of arrest was the proper and ideal course.

The Court noted that there was no harm in communicating the grounds in writing because the investigating officer would necessarily have to formulate those grounds before informing the arrested person. Following this approach would also prevent disputes regarding compliance.

Significantly, Vihaan Kumar further clarified that statutory restrictions on the grant of bail cannot prevent a court from granting relief where violations of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution have been established.

The decision in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 628, subsequently examined the issue in the context of an arrest effected pursuant to a warrant.

The Supreme Court held that a separate written communication of the grounds of arrest was not necessary in the circumstances because the warrant itself communicated the basis of the arrest. The decision reinforced the distinction between the mandatory constitutional obligation and the mode through which it could be fulfilled.

However, a stronger position emerged in Mihir Rajesh Shah, wherein the Supreme Court held that the grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing, in a language understood by the arrested person, in every case without exception.

The Court treated written communication not merely as an ideal practice but as a mandatory requirement necessary to achieve the constitutional objective of Article 22(1).

This position was subsequently endorsed in Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967. The Court expressly recognised Mihir Rajesh Shah as laying down the correct legal position and held that written grounds of arrest must be furnished to an arrested person as a matter of course and without exception.

It further observed that failure to comply with this requirement would vitiate the arrest and remand proceedings. Such an arrested person would be entitled to immediate release because the custody would be unconstitutional, rather than merely a situation warranting release on bail.

The Court also emphasised that disciplinary proceedings should be initiated against police officers responsible for making arrests without furnishing written grounds of arrest.

The prejudice-oriented approach and its implications

The reasoning in Jabhra Ram appears to move towards a more flexible interpretation of the constitutional safeguard by giving importance to substantial compliance and the absence of demonstrable prejudice.

A similar approach had previously been adopted by the same bench, led by Justice M.M. Sundresh, in Sonam Raghuvanshi. The Court distinguished between complete non-communication of written grounds of arrest and deficiencies in the adequacy of the reasons communicated.

While recognising that complete non-supply of written grounds could vitiate the arrest, the Court indicated that deficiencies in the adequacy of the grounds should be examined by assessing the prejudice caused to the accused.

The difficulty, however, arises when this approach is compared with the reasoning in Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol. In that decision, a bench led by Justice Ujjal Bhuyan rejected the suggestion that procedural lapses in furnishing written grounds of arrest could be treated as harmless merely because they had not resulted in demonstrable prejudice.

The Court explained that the safeguards under Article 22(1) are not ordinary procedural requirements but fundamental constitutional protections that must be observed whenever the State seeks to curtail an individual’s liberty.

It further clarified that when a person is released because their fundamental rights have been violated, the relief is not equivalent to enlargement on bail. Rather, it is release from illegal and unconstitutional detention.

This distinction is particularly important because a prejudice-based assessment may shift the focus away from the State’s constitutional obligation and towards the accused’s ability to establish the consequences of its breach.

The constitutional question should primarily be whether the investigating agency effectively communicated the grounds of arrest. The absence of demonstrable prejudice cannot, by itself, establish that the State discharged this obligation.

The problem with relying on internal police records

One of the significant concerns emerging from Jabhra Ram is the extent to which internal police documents, particularly entries in the case diary, can be relied upon to establish compliance with Article 22(1).

Section 192(5) of the BNSS restricts the ordinary right of an accused or their representative to inspect the case diary. Therefore, if the investigating agency relies upon an entry in the case diary to establish that the grounds of arrest were communicated, the accused may not ordinarily have access to the very material being used against their challenge.

This creates an obvious difficulty in proceedings concerning the legality of an arrest. An accused may have to request judicial examination of the case diary to determine whether the investigating officer’s claim of communication is supported by the record.

More importantly, an entry made by a police officer recording the grounds of arrest does not necessarily establish that those grounds were actually communicated to the arrested person. Recording information internally and communicating it to the individual are two different acts.

The distinction must remain clear. Article 22(1) protects the arrested person’s right to be informed, not merely the investigating agency’s obligation to maintain records.

The concern also reinforces the principle laid down in Vihaan Kumar that the burden of proving compliance with Article 22(1) rests upon the police authorities. Once an arrested person raises a specific objection regarding non-communication, the investigating agency must establish that the constitutional obligation was fulfilled.

Allowing internal documentation alone to establish compliance could weaken the practical effectiveness of the safeguard, particularly where the accused has no ordinary right to inspect the relevant records.

Need for clarification by a larger bench

The decision in Jabhra Ram does not expressly overrule Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha, Vihaan Kumar, Mihir Rajesh Shah or Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol. Nevertheless, its reasoning raises questions concerning the precise scope of the requirement to furnish written grounds of arrest.

The difficulty is particularly significant because the Supreme Court has expressed different formulations regarding whether written communication is an indispensable constitutional requirement or the ideal method of satisfyng the obligation under Article 22(1).

While Vihaan Kumar and Kasire