Introduction:
The Allahabad High Court, in Faimuddeen and 2 Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and 7 Others (2026 LiveLaw (AB) 442), delivered a significant split verdict examining the legality of demolishing residential properties of persons accused of criminal offences under the guise of municipal law enforcement. The case was heard by a Division Bench comprising Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Siddharth Nandan. While both judges considered the legality of the State’s actions, Justice Sreedharan authored a detailed and strongly worded opinion addressing not only the issue of “bulldozer justice” but also the broader concerns of institutional corruption, abuse of executive power and erosion of the rule of law.
The petitioners approached the High Court challenging the demolition of their residential properties by authorities in Uttar Pradesh. According to them, the demolitions were carried out immediately after the registration of criminal cases, although the official justification relied upon alleged violations of municipal and development laws. The petitioners contended that these actions were punitive in nature and intended to punish accused persons even before the conclusion of criminal proceedings.
The matter arose against the backdrop of repeated judicial scrutiny of so-called “bulldozer actions” undertaken in several parts of the country. The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that demolition of private property cannot become an instrument of punishment and that executive authorities must strictly comply with constitutional guarantees of due process before depriving any individual of property. It was within this legal framework that the Allahabad High Court examined whether the impugned demolitions represented lawful enforcement of planning regulations or amounted to arbitrary executive action violating constitutional protections.
Justice Sreedharan’s opinion extended beyond the facts of the case and examined the systemic causes behind illegal constructions, official complicity, widespread corruption, and the increasing tendency to employ demolition as an immediate response to allegations of crime. His observations have generated considerable attention because they underscore the importance of preserving the rule of law while simultaneously expressing concern over the normalization of corruption within public institutions.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioners argued that the demolition proceedings were arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 21 and 300A of the Constitution. They contended that the authorities had invoked municipal regulations merely as a pretext to demolish their homes immediately after criminal allegations surfaced against them. According to the petitioners, the demolitions were not genuine town-planning measures but punitive actions intended to publicly punish accused persons without the benefit of a criminal trial.
It was submitted that due process had been ignored and that the authorities had acted with undue haste. The petitioners argued that executive agencies cannot substitute themselves for criminal courts by imposing punishment through demolition while investigations or criminal proceedings remain pending. Such actions, they contended, undermine the presumption of innocence, which remains one of the foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence.
The petitioners further submitted that if unauthorized constructions existed, the authorities were legally obliged to initiate proceedings strictly in accordance with municipal statutes, issue notices, grant reasonable opportunities of hearing, and pass speaking orders before undertaking demolition. They asserted that selective enforcement immediately after the registration of criminal cases revealed the punitive nature of the exercise.
The State defended its actions by contending that the demolitions were undertaken strictly under applicable municipal and development laws. It argued that unauthorized constructions cannot claim constitutional protection merely because criminal proceedings are pending against their occupants. According to the State, illegal structures remain liable for demolition irrespective of the criminal background of the persons occupying them.
The respondents submitted that planning authorities possess statutory powers to remove unauthorized constructions in the larger public interest. They argued that where violations of building regulations are established, enforcement action cannot be indefinitely postponed simply because criminal proceedings have also been initiated against the property owner or occupant. The State maintained that the impugned actions constituted legitimate enforcement of municipal law and not extra-judicial punishment.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Atul Sreedharan delivered an extensive opinion expressing deep concern over what has come to be popularly described as “bulldozer justice.” According to the learned Judge, the demolition of residential properties immediately after the registration of criminal cases creates the impression that executive authorities are imposing punishment before the criminal justice system has determined guilt.
The Court observed that such demolitions frequently appear designed to satisfy the public demand for immediate retribution rather than to genuinely enforce municipal laws. Justice Sreedharan remarked that the practice tends to cater to what he described as the “perceived blood lust” of a society increasingly accustomed to swift executive action against accused persons. He cautioned that criminal justice in a constitutional democracy cannot be administered through bulldozers but only through lawful judicial processes.
The judgment noted that despite repeated pronouncements of the Supreme Court emphasizing adherence to due process before demolition, similar actions continue to be undertaken by authorities. Justice Sreedharan expressed concern that these constitutional safeguards appear to be ignored, observing that executive authorities often act as though the law declared by the Supreme Court carries no practical consequence.
While discussing unauthorized constructions, the Court shifted attention to the role of public authorities responsible for regulating urban development. Justice Sreedharan observed that no unauthorized building comes into existence overnight. Illegal constructions, according to the Court, are frequently the product of prolonged administrative inaction or deliberate connivance. Authorities entrusted with preventing such violations often fail to discharge their statutory duties because of political influence, bureaucratic pressure or dishonest conduct.
The Court further remarked that builders who violate planning laws are frequently assisted by corrupt officials who ignore illegal construction in exchange for unlawful gratification. Such structures eventually receive public utilities including electricity and water connections, thereby creating an appearance of legitimacy. Years later, innocent purchasers who acquire these properties become the ultimate victims when authorities suddenly initiate demolition proceedings.
In one of the strongest observations contained in the judgment, Justice Sreedharan held that the State itself becomes particeps criminis, or an accomplice, when its officials knowingly facilitate unauthorized construction through deliberate inaction and later provide sovereign services to those very structures. The judgment reasoned that executive authorities cannot escape responsibility for illegal constructions that flourish under their supervision for years before selective enforcement is undertaken.
The Court also expressed grave concern regarding the wider problem of corruption within public institutions. Justice Sreedharan observed that corruption has become so deeply embedded in public life that many individuals no longer regard it as morally unacceptable unless the offender is caught. Referring to India’s position in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the Court remarked that such rankings have failed to generate meaningful public introspection regarding declining institutional integrity.
Justice Sreedharan referred to the controversy surrounding the alleged theft of donations from the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, describing it as a disturbing illustration of how deeply corruption has penetrated society. According to the learned Judge, such incidents demonstrate that dishonesty now affects even institutions traditionally regarded as deserving the highest degree of public trust. These observations formed part of a broader discussion on the normalization of corruption across governmental and social institutions.
The judgment warned that unchecked corruption would inevitably lead to increasing concentration of wealth among a small section of society while widening socio-economic inequality. Justice Sreedharan cautioned that this growing disparity between the privileged and the marginalized carries the potential to generate future civil unrest if institutional reforms are not undertaken.
Against this backdrop, Justice Sreedharan suggested that the State may consider adopting stronger legislative measures to combat corruption. In a significant observation, he opined that if the Government is genuinely committed to eradicating corruption, it should consider amending the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to introduce the death penalty for persons convicted of corruption. This observation formed part of the Judge’s broader discussion on the seriousness of institutional corruption and did not constitute a binding judicial direction.
With respect to the relief sought by the petitioners, Justice Sreedharan proposed that the State should ordinarily refrain from initiating demolition proceedings against the property of an accused person for a period of two years from the date of registration of the FIR. The object of such a safeguard, according to the learned Judge, was to prevent demolition from becoming a substitute for criminal punishment before judicial determination of guilt.
However, the Division Bench delivered a split verdict on this aspect. Justice Siddharth Nandan did not concur with the proposed two-year embargo on demolition proceedings. Consequently, while Justice Sreedharan’s observations constitute an important judicial opinion emphasizing constitutional safeguards and due process, there was no unanimous agreement within the Bench regarding the specific direction imposing a mandatory waiting period.
The judgment nevertheless reinforces the constitutional principle that executive authorities cannot employ municipal laws as instruments of punishment against accused persons. It reiterates that the rule of law requires every action affecting life, liberty or property to conform to statutory procedure, constitutional guarantees and principles of natural justice. At the same time, Justice Sreedharan’s extensive observations serve as a broader reminder that meaningful governance requires not only lawful enforcement but also institutional integrity, administrative accountability and an uncompromising commitment to combating corruption at every level of public administration.