Introduction:
The Allahabad High Court has reiterated that courts must exercise caution before recording findings on disputed facts, particularly where such findings directly affect the eligibility or rights of a third party who has not been given an opportunity to present his or her version. It held that when the outcome of a writ petition depends upon factual assertions that have not been verified through pleadings or supporting documents, the Court should ordinarily call for a counter-affidavit before reaching an adverse conclusion.
The Division Bench of Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary made these observations while partly allowing a Special Appeal filed by Ashok Kumar, an Executive Engineer in the Department of Town and Country Planning, Uttar Pradesh. The appeal arose from a Single Judge’s decision dismissing his challenge to the State Government’s order entrusting the officiating charge of Chief Town and Country Planner to respondent no. 4, an Architect Planner.
The dispute primarily concerned the qualifications prescribed for appointment to the post of Chief Town and Country Planner under the Uttar Pradesh Town and Country Planning Service Rules, 1987. The relevant service rules provide for filling the post through promotion from the cadre of Senior Planners. Appendix ‘B’ to the Rules prescribes the educational qualification of a degree or post-graduate diploma in Town and Country Planning.
The controversy arose because the appellant questioned whether respondent no. 4 possessed the precise qualification required under the Rules. The Single Judge had dismissed the appellant’s challenge, reasoning that Appendix ‘B’ did not provide for equivalence between different qualifications and that the Court could not introduce an additional condition that the rule-making authority had not incorporated. The Single Judge also considered a clarification issued by the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), which equated the Associateship Examination of the Institute of Town Planners, India, with a Master’s Degree in Planning, but observed that the clarification related to Central Government service.
However, the Division Bench found that the Single Judge’s conclusion regarding respondent no. 4’s eligibility had rested on an oral submission made by the Additional Advocate General, without a supporting affidavit or verified documentary material. A certificate produced for the first time during the appeal indicated that respondent no. 4 possessed a Master’s Degree in Urban Development Planning from Barkatullah University. The appellant contended that this was not the qualification specifically prescribed by Appendix ‘B’.
The High Court held that the question could not have been conclusively decided on the basis of an unverified statement from the Bar, particularly when the eligibility of an officer whose appointment was under challenge was directly involved. The Court emphasised that procedural fairness requires disputed factual questions to be examined on properly placed material, with the affected parties being afforded an opportunity to respond.
The decision is significant because it addresses the limits of deciding service-related disputes at the threshold when the factual foundation of the controversy has not been adequately established. It also highlights the importance of applying qualification requirements consistently, rather than subjecting one candidate’s credentials to strict scrutiny while accepting another’s eligibility on an unsupported oral assertion.
Arguments of the Parties:
Ashok Kumar, the appellant, challenged the order dated November 4, 2025, by which the State Government had entrusted the officiating charge of Chief Town and Country Planner to respondent no. 4. His principal grievance was that the appointment arrangement had been made without properly examining whether respondent no. 4 satisfied the educational qualifications prescribed under the Uttar Pradesh Town and Country Planning Service Rules, 1987.
The appellant’s challenge was based on the qualification requirement contained in Appendix ‘B’. Since the post of Chief Town and Country Planner was to be filled by promotion from among Senior Planners, the prescribed educational qualification was material to determining whether an officer could legitimately be considered eligible for the post. According to the appellant, the requirement could not be diluted or treated as satisfied merely because an officer possessed a qualification that appeared to be related to town planning or urban development.
Before the Division Bench, the appellant specifically questioned the manner in which the Single Judge had decided the writ petition. He argued that the petition had been dismissed in limine without calling for a counter-affidavit from the State or obtaining a proper response concerning respondent no. 4’s educational credentials. In his submission, the finding that respondent no. 4 possessed the prescribed qualification was based solely on an oral statement made by the Additional Advocate General.
The appellant contended that such a statement could not substitute for documentary proof, particularly when the question involved the interpretation and application of a statutory service qualification. The eligibility of respondent no. 4 was not a peripheral issue; it was central to the challenge against the officiating arrangement. Therefore, the Court was required to examine the actual qualification held by respondent no. 4 and determine whether it corresponded with the requirement under Appendix ‘B’.
To substantiate this objection, the appellant relied upon a certificate produced for the first time during the appeal. The certificate showed that respondent no. 4 held a Master’s Degree in Urban Development Planning from Barkatullah University. The appellant argued that this qualification was not the same as the degree or post-graduate diploma in Town and Country Planning expressly contemplated by Appendix ‘B’. Consequently, the appellant questioned the basis on which respondent no. 4 had been treated as eligible.
The appellant’s case was also founded on the principle that eligibility conditions prescribed by statutory service rules must be applied uniformly. If the Court had rejected the possibility of treating different qualifications as equivalent while examining the appellant’s case, it could not, according to the appellant, accept respondent no. 4’s qualification without examining whether it met the prescribed standard.
The State, on the other hand, had defended the officiating arrangement before the Single Judge. The position accepted in the earlier proceedings was that respondent no. 4 possessed the necessary qualification. The Single Judge had also considered the AICTE clarification concerning the Associateship Examination of the Institute of Town Planners, India, and observed that the clarification equating it with a Master’s Degree in Planning was applicable to Central Government service.
However, before the Division Bench, the State did not seriously dispute the appellant’s contention that the premise on which the Single Judge had proceeded stood falsified by the certificate produced in appeal. The Division Bench accordingly found that the factual basis supporting the earlier conclusion required reconsideration.
The available case summary does not set out any detailed independent submission by respondent no. 4 concerning the precise nature or equivalence of his qualification. The central issue before the appellate court was therefore not whether respondent no. 4 was conclusively ineligible, but whether his eligibility could properly have been accepted without verified material and without an opportunity for the appellant to address the factual basis of that conclusion.
Court’s Judgment:
The Division Bench partly allowed the Special Appeal, holding that the Single Judge’s finding concerning respondent no. 4’s eligibility could not be sustained in the absence of properly verified material. The Court considered the failure to call for a counter-affidavit particularly significant because the controversy involved disputed facts directly affecting the eligibility of a third party.
At the outset, the Bench emphasised that a court dealing with a writ petition is not expected to record findings on disputed or unverified factual assertions without giving the affected parties an appropriate opportunity to respond. Where the resolution of the controversy depends upon facts that have not been established through pleadings or supporting documents, the Court should ordinarily seek a counter-affidavit before reaching a conclusion that may prejudice the rights or interests of another person.
The Bench observed:
“..where the resolution of the controversy turns upon disputed or unverified facts, particularly facts going to the eligibility of a third party whose interest is directly affected by the decision, the Court ought ordinarily to have the benefit of a counter-affidavit before recording a finding of fact adverse to a party who has had no opportunity to place his version on record..”
The Court found that the Single Judge’s conclusion regarding respondent no. 4’s qualification had been founded on an oral submission made by the Additional Advocate General. No affidavit or certificate had been placed on record at that stage to establish that respondent no. 4 possessed the qualification prescribed by the service rules.
The certificate produced during the appeal materially altered the factual position. It disclosed that respondent no. 4 held a Master’s Degree in Urban Development Planning from Barkatullah University. The appellant disputed whether this qualification satisfied the specific requirement of a degree or post-graduate diploma in Town and Country Planning under Appendix ‘B’.
The Division Bench noted that the State did not seriously dispute the appellant’s contention regarding the factual premise of the Single Judge’s decision. In these circumstances, the Court held that the foundation on which the earlier judgment rested had been shown to be erroneous. A finding based on an incorrect or unverified factual premise could not be permitted to conclusively determine the rights of the parties.
The Bench stated:
“..a finding resting on a foundation now shown to be erroneous cannot be allowed to conclude the rights of the parties, and the least that fairness demands is that the matter be re-examined on verified material..”
The Court’s reasoning was rooted in the basic requirement of procedural fairness. The appellant had not been given an opportunity to examine or rebut the assertion that respondent no. 4 possessed the prescribed qualification because the relevant material had not been formally placed before the Single Judge. At the same time, respondent no. 4’s eligibility had been accepted without an examination of the actual qualification reflected in the certificate.
The Bench considered this approach inconsistent with the elementary principle that a person’s substantive case should not be defeated by a factual finding based on material that the affected party has had no opportunity to address. It observed:
“offends the elementary requirement that no person (nor a party’s substantive case) should be condemned or defeated on a factual finding without being heard on the material said to support it”
This observation reinforces the distinction between a legal conclusion based on established facts and a factual assumption accepted without adequate verification. While courts may decide questions of law at an early stage where the relevant facts are undisputed, a controversy involving the actual educational credentials of an officer ordinarily requires the relevant documents and the parties’ responses to be placed on record.
The Court also examined the issue in light of the principles governing eligibility under statutory service rules. It relied upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and Bedanga Talukdar v. Saifudaullah Khan, which were cited in connection with the requirement that eligibility must be tested against the qualifications prescribed by the governing rules.
The underlying principle is that when a statutory rule specifies a particular educational qualification, the prescribed requirement must be applied as it stands. Courts cannot casually substitute a different qualification or presume equivalence merely because two courses or degrees may appear similar in subject matter. Equivalence must be considered in accordance with the applicable rules and legally relevant material.
The Division Bench applied this principle to the manner in which the Single Judge had assessed the competing qualifications. The Single Judge had rejected the appellant’s challenge by holding that Appendix ‘B’ did not provide for equivalence and that the Court could not read into the Rules a condition that the rule-making authority had omitted. Having adopted this strict approach, the Court was required to examine respondent no. 4’s qualification with the same degree of scrutiny.
The Bench found it inconsistent to insist upon strict compliance with the prescribed qualification in the appellant’s case while accepting respondent no. 4’s eligibility through an unverified oral submission. It observed:
“it would be wholly incongruous for the very rigour applied to the appellant’s qualification to be relaxed, in the same judgment, into an unverified oral acceptance where respondent no. 4’s qualification was concerned.”
Thus, the Court did not hold that respondent no. 4 was necessarily ineligible. Instead, it held that his eligibility had not been established through a proper examination of the relevant material. The distinction was important: the appellate court was concerned with the fairness and reliability of the process through which the finding had been reached, rather than finally determining the equivalence or legal acceptability of the qualification.
The Bench also considered the effect of the Single Judge’s direction requiring the State to constitute a Departmental Promotion Committee for the post of Senior Planner within six months. It found no reason to interfere with that direction and accordingly left it undisturbed.
As a result, the Special Appeal was allowed in part. The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge’s order dated December 9, 2025, insofar as it dismissed prayer nos. 1 and 2 of the writ petition. The writ petition was restored to the file of the Single Judge to that limited extent for fresh consideration.
The Court directed that counter-affidavits be filed within three weeks and that the appellant would be entitled to submit a rejoinder within one week thereafter. This would ensure that the question of respondent no. 4’s eligibility was considered on the basis of verified pleadings and supporting material, rather than an oral statement unsupported by an affidavit or certificate.
The Bench also clarified that the existing officiating arrangement could continue until the writ petition was decided. However, its continuation would remain subject to the outcome of the proceedings and would not confer any equity in favour of respondent no. 4. In other words, the temporary continuation of the arrangement could not be treated as creating a vested right or strengthening respondent no. 4’s claim to the post.
Another relevant consideration was the appellant’s impending superannuation on December 31, 2026. Recognising that the passage of time could affect the practical value of the proceedings, the Division Bench requested the Single Judge to decide the remanded matter preferably within two months.
The judgment ultimately underscores that judicial decisions concerning service eligibility must rest on verified facts and a consistent application of statutory qualifications. An officer’s eligibility cannot be presumed merely on the basis of an oral assertion, particularly when the relevant qualification is disputed and the outcome may affect another person’s substantive claim.
By restoring the limited portion of the writ petition for fresh consideration, the Allahabad High Court did not pronounce a final verdict on respondent no. 4’s eligibility. Instead, it ensured that the question would be decided through a fair process, after the necessary affidavits and supporting documents had been placed on record. The ruling therefore reiterates an important principle of judicial adjudication: where disputed facts are central to the decision, procedural fairness requires verification of the material and a meaningful opportunity for the affected parties to be heard.