Introduction:
In a landmark step towards substantive equality in legal education and professional entry, the Supreme Court of India has clarified and expanded the scope of assistance available to visually impaired candidates appearing for the All India Bar Examination and the Common Law Admission Test. The case, Yash Dodani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2026 LiveLaw (SC) 150), was heard by a three-judge Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice N.V. Anjaria. At its core, the petition questioned the rationality and legality of a restrictive policy that limited scribes for visually impaired candidates to those possessing only up to a 10+2 qualification. The petitioners argued that such a limitation, though ostensibly neutral, operated harshly against candidates with visual disabilities by significantly narrowing the pool of competent scribes. Accepting these submissions, the Supreme Court permitted visually impaired candidates to engage scribes with qualifications higher than 10+2, subject only to the condition that such scribes must not be law graduates or pursuing legal or allied humanities education. The Court directed the Bar Council of India and the Consortium of National Law Universities to implement and formally notify these changes well before the next examinations, marking a decisive shift from formal equality to meaningful access.
Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioners:
The petitioners, represented by learned counsel, framed their challenge around the lived realities of visually impaired candidates navigating high-stakes competitive examinations. It was argued that the earlier policy restricting scribes to those with a maximum qualification of 10+2 was arbitrary, outdated, and disconnected from the functional needs of candidates appearing for examinations as complex as AIBE and CLAT. According to the petitioners, the task of a scribe in law examinations is not merely mechanical dictation, but one that requires comprehension of nuanced instructions, structured answering formats, and sustained concentration over long durations. Limiting eligibility to 10+2 pass candidates, they contended, drastically reduced the availability of suitable scribes and often forced candidates to rely on underprepared or unavailable assistance, thereby undermining the very purpose of providing a scribe.
The petitioners emphasized that disability jurisprudence has evolved beyond token accommodation and now requires reasonable accommodation that is effective and enabling. They relied heavily on guidelines issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, which recognize that rigid qualification caps on scribes may defeat the objective of inclusivity. These guidelines, it was pointed out, do not prescribe an upper educational limit for scribes, but instead focus on preventing conflicts of interest, particularly in competitive or professional examinations. The petitioners therefore suggested a balanced approach: scribes should not be law graduates or students of law or humanities disciplines, but there should be no bar on higher general educational qualifications.
It was further argued that the existing restriction was disproportionate and lacked a rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved. If the concern was to prevent unfair advantage or academic assistance, that concern could be adequately addressed by excluding scribes with legal training, rather than by imposing a blanket ceiling of 10+2. The petitioners highlighted that for visually impaired candidates, the right to equality under Article 14 and the right to dignity under Article 21 are deeply intertwined with access to education and professional qualifications. Denial of effective scribe assistance, they argued, amounted to indirect discrimination.
Importantly, the petitioners clarified that they were not seeking preferential treatment or dilution of examination standards. On the contrary, their suggestions aimed to place visually impaired candidates on an equal footing with others by ensuring that the scribe facility is practically usable. They urged the Court to direct regulatory bodies to revisit and revise their circulars in light of constitutional principles and statutory mandates under disability law.
Arguments on Behalf of the Respondents:
The respondents, including the Union of India, the Bar Council of India, and the Consortium of National Law Universities, defended the existing policy by pointing to concerns of fairness, standardization, and examination integrity. It was submitted that the restriction of scribes to a 10+2 qualification was introduced to prevent the possibility of candidates gaining indirect academic assistance through more highly qualified scribes. In professional examinations like AIBE and CLAT, the respondents argued, even subtle assistance could tilt the balance and compromise the level playing field.
The respondents further contended that examination authorities are entitled to frame policies that balance accessibility with integrity, and courts should exercise restraint in interfering with such academic and administrative decisions. It was argued that a uniform qualification ceiling ensures clarity and avoids subjective assessments of scribe competence, thereby simplifying implementation. The respondents also expressed apprehension that permitting graduates as scribes could lead to disputes, allegations of unfair assistance, and increased administrative burden.
However, during the course of hearing, the respondents did not seriously dispute the applicability of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment guidelines. They acknowledged that disability accommodation norms have evolved and that regulatory frameworks may require periodic reassessment. The Additional Solicitor General and other counsel appearing for the respondents indicated willingness to consider the petitioners’ suggestions, subject to safeguards ensuring that scribes do not possess legal knowledge that could influence examination outcomes.
Significantly, the respondents did not place material before the Court to demonstrate that candidates using scribes with higher qualifications had, in practice, undermined examination fairness. Nor was there empirical data to show that the 10+2 cap was essential to prevent misuse. This lack of concrete justification became relevant when the Court weighed the competing considerations of access and integrity.
Court’s Judgment and Reasoning:
After hearing the parties, the Supreme Court adopted a purposive and rights-oriented approach. The Bench noted at the outset that the issue was not about granting an advantage, but about removing an unnecessary barrier faced by a specific class of candidates. Endorsing the petitioners’ suggestions in clear terms, the Court held that specially-abled candidates with visual impairment appearing for AIBE and CLAT are entitled to engage scribes who are undergraduates or otherwise possess qualifications higher than 10+2, so long as such scribes are not law graduates and are not pursuing studies in law or other humanities courses.
The Court expressly observed that once the exclusion of legally trained scribes is ensured, there is no rational basis to prohibit scribes with higher general education. The earlier policy, the Bench implied, was rooted more in administrative convenience than in constitutional necessity. By focusing on functional impact rather than formal categories, the Court aligned its reasoning with contemporary disability rights jurisprudence, which emphasizes effective accommodation.
A key factor in the Court’s decision was the alignment of the petitioners’ suggestions with the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment. The Bench recorded that these guidelines are intended to enable, not hinder, the participation of persons with disabilities in examinations. Finding “no reason to take a different view” from the petitioners’ proposals, the Court effectively harmonized examination policy with executive disability norms.
The judgment also underscored that equality is not achieved by treating unequals alike. For visually impaired candidates, the availability of a competent scribe is not a luxury but a necessity. A policy that appears neutral on paper may still be discriminatory in effect if it disproportionately burdens a vulnerable group. By removing the arbitrary qualification ceiling, the Court ensured that the accommodation provided is meaningful rather than illusory.
In terms of directions, the Supreme Court ordered the Bar Council of India and the Consortium of National Law Universities to implement the revised scribe eligibility criteria at the earliest and to formally notify the same well before the next examination cycle. To ensure accountability, the Court directed the respondents to file a compliance affidavit within two weeks. The matter was listed for further consideration on March 20, 2026, signalling the Court’s intent to monitor implementation rather than leaving the judgment as a mere declaration.