Introduction:

The Karnataka High Court on September 24, 2026, declined to grant interim protection to former BJP MP Pratap Simha in proceedings challenging an FIR registered against him under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, arising from remarks allegedly made during a Ganesha immersion procession at T. Narasipura in Mysuru district. Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde directed the State to file its response to the petition and posted the matter for further hearing on September 28.

The proceedings in Prathap Simha v. State of Karnataka & Anr., Criminal Petition No. 14747 of 2026, concern allegations that Simha made derogatory remarks about members of the Dalit community and Dalit activists during the procession held on September 18. A separate petition, Criminal Petition No. 14769 of 2026, challenges another suo motu FIR registered in relation to the same procession. The two proceedings involve distinct allegations and statutory provisions, although both arise from the events of September 18.

The first FIR, which forms the subject matter of the SC/ST Act challenge, was registered on September 22 following a complaint by the president of a local association. It invokes Sections 352 and 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, along with Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The allegations relate to remarks allegedly directed at Dalit activists and persons wearing blue shawls, with the complaint alleging that Simha referred to them as coming for their livelihood and asked them to read Dr. B.R. Ambedkar first. The FIR also contains allegations concerning references to the caste of a police officer.

The second proceeding arises from a suo motu FIR registered by T. Narasipura Police Station on September 20. According to the petition, the FIR was based upon social media videos of the speech and a transcript prepared by a police constable. It invokes Sections 132, 191, 194, 196 and 353 of the BNS, concerning allegations including assault or use of criminal force against a public servant, rioting, affray, promoting enmity between groups and public mischief.

Simha has challenged the legality of both FIRs and contends that the criminal proceedings are politically motivated. His petitions maintain that the speech occurred in the course of a lawfully permitted annual Gowri-Ganesha procession and that his remarks were directed towards the conduct of a police officer rather than towards any religion, caste or community.

The controversy reportedly began after a police officer allegedly made remarks concerning the procession passing in front of a mosque. According to Simha’s petition, the remarks agitated devotees participating in the procession. Simha thereafter addressed the gathering from a procession vehicle and criticised the conduct of the police officer. His petition maintains that the speech was not directed against any religious community and that the procession itself concluded peacefully under police supervision. (Kannada Bar & Bench)

The State has taken a different position. During the September 24 hearing, the State Public Prosecutor opposed immediate protection and submitted that the allegations required investigation. The State indicated that the entire investigation could be placed before the Court and that, if the investigation ultimately revealed that no offence had been committed, an appropriate B-report could be submitted. In relation to the suo motu FIR, the State also undertook that no charge sheet would be filed without the Court’s permission until the next hearing. (Kannada Bar & Bench)

The High Court’s order at this stage is therefore interlocutory in nature. The Court has not adjudicated whether the alleged statements were in fact made in the manner asserted by the complainant, whether they amount to offences under the SC/ST Act or BNS, or whether the FIRs should ultimately be quashed. The Court has merely declined to grant interim protection for the time being and has sought the State’s response before considering the petitions further.

The proceedings are particularly significant because they involve the threshold requirements for invoking the SC/ST Act against speech allegedly made in a public gathering. Section 3(1)(r) penalises intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view, while Section 3(1)(u) concerns promoting or attempting to promote, on grounds of untouchability, enmity, hatred or ill-will against members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Whether the allegations in the FIR satisfy these statutory ingredients is a question that remains to be considered by the High Court after hearing both sides.

The case also raises a separate procedural question concerning defamation. The petitioner relies upon Section 222 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to contend that cognizance of certain defamation offences can be taken only upon a complaint by an aggrieved person. The petitioner’s argument is that an allegation directed against an indeterminate body such as “Dalit organisations” cannot automatically constitute defamation of an identifiable individual.

Thus, the proceedings presently before the Karnataka High Court involve several overlapping questions: the ingredients of offences under the SC/ST Act, the distinction between criticism of individuals or organisations and statements directed at a protected community, the scope of police investigation at the FIR stage, and the circumstances in which the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings or grant interim protection.

Arguments of the Parties:

On behalf of Pratap Simha, it was argued that both FIRs were legally unsustainable and had been initiated because of political pressure arising from the controversy surrounding the Ganesha immersion procession. Counsel submitted that the petitioner had participated in an annual religious procession which had been conducted with police permission and adequate police bandobast. The procession, according to the petition, was therefore a lawful public assembly and did not possess any unlawful common object contemplated under criminal law.

The petitioner contended that the first FIR, registered suo motu on September 20, was based principally on social media material and a transcript allegedly prepared by a police constable. According to the petition, the transcript itself did not contain the alleged reference to the “blue shawl”, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar or Dalit organisations which subsequently became central to the second FIR.

The petitioner argued that this discrepancy was significant because the criminal allegations had to be assessed on the actual words spoken rather than on an interpretation subsequently attributed to the speech. The petition therefore questioned the foundation upon which the offences had been invoked.

With respect to the suo motu FIR, Simha argued that the ingredients of Section 132 of the BNS were absent. That provision concerns assault or use of criminal force against a public servant in the execution of his duty, or with intent to prevent or deter him from performing such duty. According to the petitioner, there was no allegation of any physical assault, use of criminal force or gesture against the police officer.

The petition further maintained that mere words do not constitute “assault” in the statutory sense. It was argued that the procession concluded peacefully and that the presence of police personnel throughout the event demonstrated that there had been no physical confrontation of the kind contemplated by the relevant penal provision.

The petitioner also disputed the allegations of rioting and unlawful assembly. Since the Ganesha procession had been conducted with police permission, it was contended that the mere presence of a large number of people could not transform the gathering into an unlawful assembly. The petition argued that there was no common object to commit an offence and no evidence of force or violence.

On the allegation under Section 196 of the BNS concerning promotion of enmity between communities, the petitioner argued that the speech did not name or target any religion or community. According to his case, the remarks were directed towards a particular police officer and the manner in which the officer had dealt with the devotees. The petitioner therefore sought to distinguish criticism of an individual public servant from speech promoting hostility between communities. (Kannada Bar & Bench)

The challenge to the second FIR proceeded on a different legal footing. The petitioner argued that Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act requires intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe with the requisite intent to humiliate that person on the ground of caste, and that the act must occur in a place within public view.

According to the petition, the complaint did not identify any particular member of a Scheduled Caste who had been intentionally insulted on the ground of caste. It was further argued that the complainant did not claim to be the person who had been personally subjected to such an insult.

The petitioner also disputed the significance attributed to the “blue shawl”. The plea stated that blue is associated with the Ambedkarite movement and cannot, by itself, be treated as a caste identifier. Consequently, the presence of a person wearing a blue shawl would not establish that the person belonged to a Scheduled Caste or that any statement directed towards persons wearing blue shawls constituted an offence under Section 3(1)(r).

The petitioner further argued that the words attributed to him did not contain the name of any caste or a caste slur. His case was that he had criticised a group of activists and questioned their conduct, rather than making an attack against Scheduled Castes as a class.

On Section 3(1)(u), the petition argued that criticism of certain activists or organisations cannot automatically be equated with promoting hatred or ill-will against the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a whole. The petitioner therefore maintained that the necessary statutory nexus between the alleged speech and the protected community was absent.

The defamation allegation was challenged separately. Relying upon Section 222 of the BNSS, the petitioner argued that cognizance of an offence of defamation requires a complaint by the person aggrieved in the manner prescribed by law. The petition further contended that a statement concerning an indeterminate group such as “Dalit organisations” cannot ordinarily constitute defamation of an identifiable individual because the law of defamation requires the allegedly defamed person or persons to be identifiable.

The State opposed the request for interim protection. During the hearing, the State Public Prosecutor submitted that the allegations were serious enough to warrant investigation and that the Court should not prevent the investigating agency from examining the available material at this preliminary stage.

The State’s position was that the allegations could not be conclusively rejected merely by examining the petitioner’s interpretation of the speech. The investigation could examine the complete video recordings, the circumstances in which the speech was delivered, the persons present and the context in which the allegedly objectionable statements were made.

The State also indicated that the investigation would be placed before the Court. Importantly, the State Public Prosecutor stated that if the investigation disclosed that the petitioner had not committed any offence, the police could submit a B-report. This submission was intended to address the petitioner’s concern that allowing the FIR to continue would result in unjustified criminal proceedings. (Kannada Bar & Bench)

With respect to the second FIR, the State also resisted an immediate direction restraining further proceedings. However, the State made a specific undertaking concerning the filing of the charge sheet. It informed the Court that until the next date of hearing, no charge sheet would be filed in the suo motu case. The High Court recorded this submission while posting that petition for further hearing on September 29.

The State’s opposition therefore focused on preserving the investigating agency’s ability to examine the allegations before the High Court undertook a final assessment of whether the FIRs disclosed the commission of cognizable offences. The State maintained that the appropriate course at this stage was to permit investigation rather than prematurely terminate the proceedings.

The competing submissions consequently presented the High Court with two different approaches to the FIRs. The petitioner urged the Court to examine the allegations at their face value and conclude that the statutory ingredients were absent, while the State contended that the allegations and surrounding material required investigation before any final conclusion could be reached.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde considered both petitions on September 24, 2026. The Court did not finally decide the challenge to either FIR. Instead, it considered the immediate request for interim protection and the State’s request for an opportunity to respond to the allegations raised in the petitions.

In relation to Criminal Petition No. 14747 of 2026, concerning the FIR registered under the SC/ST Act, the Court declined to grant interim protection at this stage. The petition was directed to be listed on September 28 after the State files its response.

The Court’s approach is significant because proceedings seeking quashing of an FIR are ordinarily considered by examining whether the allegations, taken at their face value, disclose the ingredients of a cognizable offence and whether there are circumstances warranting interference at the threshold. At an interim stage, however, the Court may also consider whether immediate protection is warranted while the State places its response on record.

In the present case, the Court chose not to make a final determination on the petitioner’s interpretation of the alleged remarks. The Bench indicated during the hearing that the petitioner’s description of his remarks as merely asking people to read Ambedkar did not exhaust the allegations contained in the complaint. The Bench orally observed that the petitioner had said more than merely asking people to read Ambedkar. (Kannada Bar & Bench)

This observation is important to understand in its proper procedural context. It was made during an interlocutory hearing and does not constitute a final finding that the alleged remarks amount to an offence under the SC/ST Act. The question whether the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) or 3(1)(u) are actually satisfied remains open for consideration after the State’s response and further hearing.

The Court also referred to the legal position governing interim protection in cases registered under the SC/ST Act. According to the report of the proceedings, the Bench observed that the Supreme Court has cautioned against granting certain forms of interim protection in proceedings involving offences under the SC/ST Act. The High Court therefore declined to issue the protective direction sought by the petitioner at this stage. (Kannada Bar & Bench)

The SC/ST Act contains a special statutory framework concerning offences against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and provides for specific procedural provisions concerning investigation, arrest and bail. Judicial consideration of requests for protection in such matters therefore has to take account of the statutory scheme and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of those provisions.

The Court did not, however, conclude that the allegations against Simha were proved. Nor did it hold that the alleged reference to the blue shawl necessarily constitutes caste-based insult. Those are substantive issues which remain to be considered in the proceedings.

The petitioner’s contention concerning Section 3(1)(r) raises an important statutory question. The provision does not criminalise every insult directed at a member of a Scheduled Caste. It requires intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate such person on the ground of caste or Scheduled Tribe status, and the act must occur in a place within public view. Whether those elements can be established from the allegations in the present case will require examination of the precise words attributed to the petitioner, the context in which they were allegedly spoken and the persons to whom the remarks were directed.

Similarly, Section 3(1)(u) is concerned with conduct that promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of untouchability, enmity, hatred or ill-will against members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. The provision therefore raises a distinct question from an allegation of an individual caste-based insult. Whether criticism of particular activists can be characterised as promotion of hostility against the protected community as a whole will depend upon the factual and legal assessment made by the Court.

At the present stage, the Karnataka High Court has not answered either question. The State has been directed to file its response, after which the petitioner will have an opportunity to address the State’s case.

The second petition, Criminal Petition No. 14769 of 2026, concerns the suo motu FIR registered on September 20. The Court recorded the submission of the State Public Prosecutor that no charge sheet would be filed until the next date of hearing. The matter has consequently been listed for September 29.

The second FIR invokes Sections 132, 191, 194, 196 and 353 of the BNS. The petitioner disputes the applicability of these provisions, particularly on the ground that there was no physical assault on a public servant, no unlawful assembly or violence, and no promotion of enmity between communities.

The Court did not finally decide these submissions on September 24. Instead, by recording the State’s undertaking regarding the charge sheet, the Court preserved the position until it could hear the matter further.

The procedural distinction between the two petitions is therefore noteworthy. In the SC/ST Act matter, the Court sought the State’s response and listed the petition for September 28. In the suo motu FIR matter, the Court recorded the State’s assurance that no charge sheet would be filed until the next hearing and listed the petition for September 29.

The proceedings also demonstrate the importance of distinguishing allegations contained in an FIR from findings established after investigation or trial. An FIR represents the initial version of the alleged occurrence and is not itself proof of the commission of an offence. Conversely, the mere assertion by an accused that the allegations are politically motivated does not by itself establish that the FIR is legally invalid. The Court must examine the statutory ingredients and the material placed before it within the applicable procedural framework.

The petitioner’s allegation of political pressure is therefore yet to be adjudicated. The State has opposed interim protection and sought an opportunity to investigate. The High Court has not accepted either side’s substantive position at this stage.

The controversy concerning the “blue shawl” illustrates why context can become important in cases involving alleged caste-based speech. The petitioner contends that the blue shawl is a symbol associated with the Ambedkarite movement and does not itself identify an individual as belonging to a Scheduled Caste. The complaint, on the other hand, treats the reference to ble shawls and Dalit activists as part of the alleged