Introduction:

The Calcutta High Court has set aside an interim protection granted by a Single Judge to Congress candidate Milan Pradhan in connection with a criminal case dating back to 2007, holding that the accused must pursue the ordinary legal remedy of seeking bail before the competent court. The Division Bench, led by Chief Justice R.V. Ghuge, questioned the legal basis on which protection had been extended to Pradhan and observed that, if he required protection from custody, the appropriate course was to approach the bail court in accordance with law.

The proceedings arise against the backdrop of several criminal cases registered in connection with incidents during the 2007 Nandigram land-acquisition agitation. Pradhan, who is contesting the forthcoming Nandigram Assembly by-election, had approached the Calcutta High Court after being arrested in connection with one of the old cases. The Single Judge had granted him protection in the proceedings, leading the State of West Bengal to challenge that order before the Division Bench in State of West Bengal v. Milan Pradhan.

The legal controversy before the Division Bench was not whether Pradhan was guilty of the allegations arising from the 2007 case. The Court was concerned with the narrower question of whether the Single Judge could grant the kind of protection extended to him without requiring him to pursue the ordinary statutory procedure for bail. The Division Bench ultimately concluded that the protection could not be sustained and directed Pradhan to proceed in accordance with law and seek regular bail before the appropriate court.

The case assumes additional significance because the criminal proceedings have arisen almost two decades after the incidents in question and at a time when Pradhan is a candidate in the Nandigram by-election scheduled for October 6, 2026. Recent proceedings before the Calcutta High Court have involved multiple 2007 cases concerning Pradhan, with the State maintaining that warrants in the cases had been pending and were being executed as part of the process of enforcing outstanding warrants. Pradhan’s side, meanwhile, has questioned the circumstances and timing of the arrests. These competing positions remain matters for adjudication and should not be treated as findings of fact against either side. (The Indian Express)

The latest Division Bench proceedings therefore have to be understood separately from the political context surrounding the by-election. The Court’s order concerns the legal procedure governing arrest and bail. It does not determine Pradhan’s guilt or innocence in the underlying 2007 prosecution, nor does it adjudicate the political merits of his candidature.

The controversy developed after Pradhan was arrested in connection with old criminal proceedings and was subsequently required to face judicial custody in cases arising from the Nandigram and Khejuri police station areas. Reports indicate that the cases concern allegations including murder, attempt to murder, abduction and other offences arising from the events of 2007. Pradhan has disputed the circumstances in which the old cases were being acted upon, while the State has stated that the proceedings involved pending warrants and that the cases had been revived after earlier withdrawal. (The Indian Express)

In an earlier proceeding before Justice Saugata Bhattacharyya, the State had made submissions concerning the status of various cases against Pradhan. The Single Judge subsequently passed an order concerning another 2007 case in which Pradhan was shown arrested, directing that he not be treated as arrested in that prosecution and that the police take no further steps for a specified period. The State challenged that protection before the Division Bench headed by the Chief Justice. (The Indian Express)

It was against this procedural background that the Division Bench examined whether such protection could substitute the statutory remedy of bail. The Bench expressed surprise that protection had been granted and questioned the legal source of the order. According to the material available concerning the proceedings, the Bench’s position was that the case was one in which the petitioner could seek bail and that any request for release from custody had to be dealt with by the competent bail court under the applicable legal framework.

The Division Bench consequently set aside the protection granted by the Single Judge and directed Pradhan to approach the appropriate court for regular bail. The order thus emphasises the distinction between judicial protection granted in writ proceedings and the statutory process by which an accused seeks release from custody.

The decision also demonstrates the importance of maintaining procedural consistency in criminal matters. Where an accused is required to seek bail, the ordinary bail jurisdiction is ordinarily the forum in which the relevant factors concerning custody, allegations, investigation and other circumstances can be considered. The Division Bench’s intervention was directed towards ensuring that the statutory process was followed rather than creating a separate route through a protection order.

Arguments of the Parties:

The State of West Bengal challenged the Single Judge’s order granting protection to Milan Pradhan. The State’s principal objection was that the Single Judge had extended protection without following the ordinary procedure applicable to an accused seeking release from custody. According to the State, if Pradhan required relief from arrest or continued custody, he was required to approach the competent court for bail and satisfy the requirements applicable to such an application.

The State’s challenge also arose in the context of the status of the 2007 criminal proceedings. According to submissions made in the connected proceedings, the State maintained that the criminal cases were not newly instituted proceedings created because of the by-election. Rather, they arose from incidents dating back to 2007 and involved warrants which the authorities stated had remained pending. The State had previously informed the Court that the cases had been revived after earlier proceedings concerning their withdrawal. (The Indian Express)

The State’s position was therefore that the mere passage of time did not extinguish an existing criminal proceeding or a pending warrant. Where a competent criminal court had issued a warrant, the police were entitled, subject to compliance with law, to execute it. The State had also submitted in earlier proceedings that warrants were being executed as part of a process concerning election candidates and that Pradhan was not the only person against whom outstanding warrants were acted upon. (Live Law)

The State thus opposed the continuation of the Single Judge’s protection and urged the Division Bench to restore the ordinary legal process. Its position was that the High Court should not create an exceptional protection mechanism when the criminal procedure already provides a specific remedy through a bail application.

Pradhan’s side, on the other hand, challenged the manner in which the old criminal proceedings had been activated against him. His counsel had argued in the connected proceedings that Pradhan was unaware of at least one of the cases in which he was subsequently shown arrested and that the development occurred despite earlier submissions made before the High Court regarding the status of the pending cases.

Senior Advocate Ayan Bhattacharya, representing Pradhan, had previously questioned why Pradhan was shown arrested in another 2007 case after the State had made submissions regarding the cases in which he was already in custody. The defence also questioned why a case from 2007 had resulted in a fresh arrest at this stage and pointed to the absence of material showing that the relevant production warrant had been properly served. (The Indian Express)

The defence had also raised the timing of the execution of the warrants in the context of the October 6 by-election. Pradhan’s side pointed out that the arrests occurred shortly before the election and argued that the timing had practical consequences for his ability to participate in the electoral process. Those submissions were made in the connected proceedings concerning protection from further coercive action.

The State disputed any suggestion that the criminal process was selectively directed against Pradhan because of the election. It maintained that the warrants were pre-existing and that the authorities were required to act upon them. The State also stated that the execution of pending warrants was not confined to Pradhan. (Live Law)

These rival submissions placed two distinct issues before the Court. The first concerned the legality and circumstances of the arrest and execution of warrants in the old cases. The second, which was directly relevant to the Division Bench’s present consideration, concerned the legal basis for the Single Judge’s protection order.

The defence position was that judicial protection was necessary in view of the circumstances surrounding the old case and the proximity of the election. The State’s position was that such relief could not replace the ordinary bail process. The Division Bench ultimately accepted the State’s procedural objection insofar as the protection order was concerned, without adjudicating the underlying allegations against Pradhan.

The Court’s approach is significant because the question of bail ordinarily requires the competent court to examine the accusation, the stage of the case, the custody of the accused, the possibility of interference with the investigation or trial, the likelihood of absconding and other legally relevant circumstances. A general protection order in a writ proceeding is not ordinarily a substitute for this statutory assessment.

The State therefore urged the Division Bench to restore the normal criminal procedure. Rather than allowing the protection to continue, Pradhan could approach the competent court and seek regular bail, where his request could be considered on the basis of the relevant facts and legal parameters.

Pradhan’s side, in turn, sought protection from the consequences of the old prosecution and the manner in which the arrest had taken place. However, the Division Bench made clear that whatever relief was legally available to Pradhan had to be sought through the appropriate procedural mechanism.

It is important to distinguish this conclusion from any determination on the merits of the allegations. The Division Bench did not hold that the allegations in the 2007 case were proved. Nor did it determine whether Pradhan had committed any offence. The question was one of procedure: whether the protection granted by the Single Judge could stand when the accused had an ordinary remedy of applying for bail.

The proceedings therefore illustrate a familiar principle of criminal procedure: where the legislature has provided a specific statutory mechanism for obtaining relief from custody, the Court must ordinarily ensure that the mechanism is followed, particularly where the relief sought directly concerns arrest and detention.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, led by Chief Justice R.V. Ghuge, examined the Single Judge’s order granting protection to Milan Pradhan and found the protection difficult to sustain. The Bench expressed surprise at the nature of the relief granted and questioned the legal basis under which the Single Judge had extended such protection.

The Division Bench’s central concern was that the matter was essentially one involving bail. If Pradhan was facing arrest or custody pursuant to a criminal case and required release from custody, the appropriate course was to approach the court exercising jurisdiction over bail. The Court therefore emphasised that the ordinary statutory procedure could not be bypassed by seeking a general protective order.

The Bench questioned, in substance, under which law the Single Judge had granted the protection. The observation reflected the Court’s concern that an order affecting the operation of a criminal proceeding and the custody of an accused must have a clear legal foundation.

The Court did not accept the proposition that the existence of circumstances surrounding the case could, by itself, justify an order which effectively replaced the ordinary bail mechanism. If Pradhan desired relief, the Court held that he would have to approach the bail court in accordance with law.

The distinction between protection from coercive action and regular bail is particularly important in this context. A person who has not yet been arrested may, in appropriate circumstances, invoke the jurisdiction available for anticipatory protection against arrest. Once a person is arrested and is in custody, however, the legal framework concerning regular bail becomes relevant. The appropriate court must then assess whether release on bail should be granted.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that bail orders must be founded upon judicial consideration of the circumstances of the individual case rather than blanket or indefinite protection. The same procedural discipline applies to the High Courts when exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction. The relevant question is not merely whether an accused faces an old or serious allegation, but whether the statutory conditions for the relief sought are satisfied.

In the present matter, the Division Bench considered the appropriate remedy to be regular bail. The Bench therefore did not itself conduct a detailed adjudication of whether Pradhan should be released on bail. Instead, it directed him to approach the competent court and seek the relief available to him under law.

This approach also preserves the jurisdiction of the court ordinarily entrusted with bail applications. Such a court is equipped to examine the case materials and the circumstances relevant to custody. It can impose appropriate conditions if bail is granted and can consider the prosecution’s objections before deciding the application.

The Division Bench accordingly set aside the protection granted by the Single Judge. The order did not amount to a finding of guilt against Pradhan and did not determine the truth or otherwise of the allegations arising from the 2007 case. It merely removed the protection which the Division Bench found had been granted without the appropriate statutory basis.

The Court then directed Pradhan to proceed in accordance with law and apply for regular bail. In other words, the High Court did not close the door on relief. Rather, it directed that any such relief must be sought before the court having the appropriate bail jurisdiction.

The significance of this direction lies in the Court’s insistence on procedural regularity. Criminal proceedings operate through defined statutory stages. Arrest, remand, custody and bail are governed by specific provisions and judicial safeguards. When a person is arrested pursuant to a criminal case, the question of continued custody or release is ordinarily to be determined through the established bail process.

The ruling therefore does not say that an accused in an old case cannot obtain bail. Nor does it suggest that the age of the criminal case is irrelevant. Those matters can be placed before the appropriate bail court and considered in accordance with law. What the Division Bench has held is that such considerations cannot be used to sustain an undefined form of protection where the accused can invoke the ordinary bail remedy.

The Court’s approach also separates the criminal process from the electoral consequences of the proceedings. Pradhan’s status as a candidate in the October 6 Nandigram by-election formed part of the broader factual context, but it did not alter the legal requirement that an accused seeking release from custody must follow the applicable procedure. Earlier proceedings had themselves reflected the Court’s awareness of the election schedule, with the Single Judge dealing with questions concerning further coercive action and Pradhan’s ability to participate in the election. (Live Law)

The election context, however, does not determine whether the underlying criminal allegations are proved. Nor does the Court’s decision on the protection order amount to a conclusion about the legitimacy or otherwise of Pradhan’s candidature. Those are separate matters.

The case also highlights the procedural complexity created by the existence of several old criminal cases. Pradhan had been arrested in multiple cases arising from the 2007 Nandigram events. In the connected proceedings, the State stated that certain cases had been withdrawn while others remained pending and that warrants had been issued. Pradhan’s side questioned why further arrests were being made after earlier submissions concerning the status of the cases. The Court’s orders in those proceedings addressed the immediate procedural questions without finally adjudicating the merits of the underlying allegations. (The Indian Express)

In particular, Justice Saugata Bhattacharyya had earlier questioned why Pradhan was shown arrested in another 2007 case after the State had informed the Court about the status of other proceedings. The Single Judge had directed that Pradhan not be treated as arrested in that particular Khejuri case for the time being and had restrained further steps until October 12. The State’s challenge to that direction resulted in the Division Bench proceedings now under consideration. (The Indian Express)

The Division Bench’s decision consequently brings the focus back to the established criminal process. Instead of continuing the protection granted by the Single Judge, Pradhan has been directed to approach the competent bail court. The bail court will then have to consider the application independently in accordance with the applicable law and the material placed before it.

The order also reflects an important institutional distinction between writ jurisdiction and ordinary criminal jurisdiction. High Courts possess broad constitutional powers, but the exercise of those powers does not necessarily displace the statutory remedies specifically created by criminal procedure. Where a criminal court is competent to consider bail, the existence of that remedy is an important consideration before extraordinary protective jurisdiction is exercised.

At the same time, the decision should not be read as preventing the High Court from exercising constitutional or inherent jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances. Courts retain their powers to intervene where there is a demonstrated violation of law, abuse of process or other exceptional circumstance warranting judicial intervention. The present ruling simply holds that the protection granted in this particular case could not be sustained when the ordinary remedy of regular bail was available.

The outcome therefore is procedural rather than substantive. The Division Bench has not adjudicated upon the allegations arising from 2007, has not pronounced upon Pradhan’s guilt or innocence and has not determined the merits of the criminal prosecution. It has only determined that the protection granted by the Single Judge cannot continue in the form granted and that Pradhan must pursue the statutory bail remedy.

The decision is also relevant for understanding the relationship between personal liberty and procedural safeguards. Article 21 of the Constitution protects personal liberty, while the criminal procedure framework provides mechanisms through which that liberty may be protected when a person is arrested. Bail jurisdiction is one such mechanism. The judicial task is to ensure that custody is regulated by law and tat an accused has access to the remedies prescrib