Introduction:
The Delhi High Court has directed the Delhi Police to provide complete police protection to a woman who alleged that her photographs were morphed using artificial intelligence and circulated in an allegedly obscene and derogatory manner alongside Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The woman, who has been referred to as “X” in the proceedings, approached the High Court in X v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., alleging that leaders of the Cockroach Janta Party, namely Saurav Das, Abhijit Dipke, Ashutosh Ranka and Ratna Singh, were responsible for displaying and circulating the alleged morphed material.
Justice Girish Kathpalia, while dealing with the petition on Friday, issued notice to the four CJP leaders as well as Meta Platforms and directed the Delhi Police to ensure the petitioner’s safety. The Court specifically directed the investigating officer to obtain the petitioner’s exact residential address in confidence and immediately transmit it to the concerned Station House Officer, along with a copy of the Court’s order, so that appropriate protection could be provided to her. The Court simultaneously directed the police to submit a status report within one week setting out the action taken in the matter.
The proceedings arise against the backdrop of allegations concerning the use of artificial intelligence and face-swapping technology to create fabricated images of individuals. The petitioner claimed that an image of her face had been superimposed on what she described as a highly vulgar and compromising image featuring her alongside the Prime Minister. According to her petition, the alleged image was displayed on physical banners during a demonstration and subsequently circulated through social media platforms.
Reports concerning the litigation state that an FIR had already been registered by the Delhi Police in connection with the allegations. The petitioner nevertheless approached the High Court contending that registration of the FIR had not resulted in effective steps to prevent continued circulation of the alleged material or to address the threats she claimed to have received. (Live Law)
The case therefore raised two connected concerns before the Court. The first concerned the immediate safety and dignity of the petitioner, who claimed that she was receiving threats after the alleged circulation of the images. The second concerned the continued availability of the allegedly objectionable material online and the legal mechanism through which such content could be removed from social media platforms.
The petitioner’s grievance also involved the jurisdictional question of whether the reliefs concerning removal of online material could be sought in a criminal writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, or whether the petitioner ought to approach the civil side of the High Court. The Court noted that ordinarily the relief concerning takedown of online content would fall for consideration before the Bench exercising civil jurisdiction. However, given the sensitivity of the allegations and the immediate concern regarding the petitioner’s safety and dignity, the Court proceeded to grant protection while directing the matter concerning removal of online content to the appropriate jurisdiction.
The legal framework surrounding the dispute is significant because Indian law specifically recognises the problem of artificially morphed images. Rule 3(2)(b) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 requires an intermediary, upon receiving a complaint concerning specified non-consensual intimate or impersonating material, including artificially morphed images, to take reasonable and practicable measures to remove or disable access to such material within the prescribed period. The Delhi High Court itself has previously dealt with this provision in X v. Union of India, where it noted the 24-hour mechanism applicable to complaints concerning artificially morphed images. (Indian Kanoon)
The broader constitutional context is equally important. The Supreme Court has recognised privacy as an intrinsic part of Article 21 and has linked privacy with personal autonomy and human dignity. In K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, the Constitution Bench held that privacy is constitutionally protected and that dignity and privacy are closely intertwined. (Indian Kanoon)
Against this background, the High Court was required to balance the petitioner’s allegations concerning privacy, dignity and personal security with the procedural and jurisdictional questions arising from the reliefs sought against the police and an intermediary platform.
Arguments of the Parties:
Appearing for the petitioner, Advocate Umesh Sharma submitted that the case involved more than an ordinary dispute concerning an allegedly defamatory social media post. According to the petitioner, her personal photograph had been taken and manipulated without her consent through AI-based face-swapping technology and placed in an allegedly explicit and compromising context with the Prime Minister.
Counsel submitted that the alleged material was not confined to a private communication or an isolated online post. It was allegedly displayed publicly through banners during a demonstration and subsequently circulated on social media. The petitioner alleged that derogatory and sexually suggestive slogans were used in connection with the images and that videos containing the alleged material were uploaded to social media platforms.
The petition further alleged that the images had subsequently been distributed through other online channels, including websites described by the petitioner as pornographic websites. According to her case, the continued availability of the material had exposed her to threats and intimidation and had caused serious injury to her dignity and privacy.
Counsel argued that the petitioner had not consented either to the creation of the images or to their publication and circulation. The central grievance was therefore not merely that an unflattering or allegedly defamatory representation had been made of her, but that her identity had allegedly been appropriated and digitally manipulated to create material depicting her in a sexualised context.
The petitioner’s counsel further submitted that the authorities had not taken sufficiently effective steps despite the registration of an FIR. He urged the Court to direct the police and the concerned online platforms to act immediately rather than requiring the petitioner to approach different forums while the allegedly objectionable material continued to circulate.
The petitioner also relied upon the urgency of the situation to explain why the reliefs concerning removal of online material had been sought in a criminal writ petition. Counsel fairly acknowledged before the Court that some of the reliefs might ordinarily have been raised through a civil writ petition. However, it was argued that Article 226 does not create an absolute distinction between “civil” and “criminal” writ jurisdiction when the factual circumstances are interconnected and immediate protection of a person’s dignity and safety is involved.
According to the petitioner, requiring her to institute another proceeding merely for obtaining directions concerning the online material would result in delay at a time when the alleged content was being continuously circulated. The petitioner therefore sought immediate intervention to protect her identity and safety and to prevent further dissemination of the allegedly fabricated material.
Counsel also submitted that the Delhi Police had mechanisms, including specialised cyber units, capable of responding to such complaints and that effective steps ought to have been taken promptly after registration of the FIR. The argument was that the existence of an FIR could not by itself be treated as sufficient if the alleged victim continued to face threats and the disputed content remained accessible online.
The State, on the other hand, did not dispute that an FIR had been registered. The Delhi Police, represented by the Additional Standing Counsel, accepted notice and informed the Court that the FIR had been registered only the previous day and that appropriate action would be taken expeditiously.
The State’s position, as recorded during the proceedings, therefore centred upon the ongoing investigation rather than upon any final determination of the allegations against the CJP leaders. The police were required to investigate the allegations and place the progress of that investigation before the Court through a status report.
The issue concerning removal of the online material was somewhat different. During the hearing, the Court orally indicated that the takedown relief was more appropriately placed before the Bench exercising civil jurisdiction. This distinction was important because a direction to an intermediary such as Meta concerning removal or disabling of access to online content involves a different legal framework from the immediate protective measures that can be granted in aid of an ongoing criminal investigation.
The Court nevertheless recognised that the petitioner should not be compelled to repeatedly approach different forums merely to obtain immediate protection in circumstances which, according to her allegations, involved threats to her personal safety and dignity.
Meta Platforms was consequently issued notice in relation to the allegations concerning content hosted or circulated through its platforms. The Court directed that access to the “objectionable content” on the social media managed by Meta be removed within 24 hours.
The legal framework provides an important context for this direction. The 2021 IT Rules contain a specific grievance mechanism dealing with content involving non-consensual intimate material and artificially morphed images. Government material concerning the rules has also specifically identified a 24-hour mechanism for complaints involving morphed or artificially generated images affecting an individual. (Press Information Bureau)
At the same time, the question of intermediary obligations cannot be considered independently of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India. The Supreme Court held that Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act had to be read in a manner under which an intermediary would be required to remove or disable access to unlawful material upon receiving actual knowledge through a court order or notification by the appropriate government or its agency, subject to the statutory framework. (Indian Kanoon)
Thus, the proceedings involved an intersection between the petitioner’s asserted rights to privacy, dignity and personal security, the police’s duty to investigate allegations of cyber offences, and the statutory responsibilities applicable to online intermediaries.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Girish Kathpalia first addressed the immediate question of the petitioner’s safety. The Court noted that the petitioner had deliberately not disclosed her present residential address in the petition. The Court treated that decision as appropriate in the circumstances, particularly considering that the petitioner had alleged receiving threats.
At the same time, the Court found that keeping the address completely unavailable to the investigating agency would make it difficult to provide effective police protection. It therefore adopted a middle course: the petitioner was directed to disclose her exact residence address privately to the investigating officer present in Court.
The investigating officer was then directed to immediately transmit the address to the SHO of the police station having territorial jurisdiction over the petitioner’s residence. The officer was also directed to transmit a copy of the Court’s order to the concerned SHO, who was directed to ensure complete police protection to the petitioner “in all possible and practical manner.”
The direction is significant because the Court did not require the petitioner’s address to become part of the public record. Instead, it created a mechanism under which the police would have the information necessary to provide protection while maintaining confidentiality of the petitioner’s residence.
The Court also directed the Registry to redact the impugned web links from the petition and its annexures. This direction reflected the Court’s concern that judicial proceedings themselves should not inadvertently become another means of reproducing or further disseminating the material whose circulation was being challenged.
At the same time, the Court directed the petitioner to supply the investigating agency with the relevant photographs and videos in electronic form, together with the web links associated with them. This would enable the investigating agency to examine the alleged manipulation, trace the source and circulation of the material, and undertake the necessary digital investigation.
The Court’s approach thus distinguished between preserving evidence for investigation and publicly reproducing allegedly objectionable material. The petitioner was required to make the material available to investigators, while the Registry was directed to ensure that the links were redacted from the publicly accessible court record.
The Court also issued notice to the four CJP leaders named as respondents. Importantly, the issuance of notice does not amount to a finding that the allegations against those individuals have been proved. The allegations remain subject to investigation and adjudication in accordance with law.
The Court’s observations regarding jurisdiction were equally significant. Justice Kathpalia orally indicated that the question of removal or takedown of online material would ordinarily have to be considered by the Bench exercising civil jurisdiction. The Court therefore did not treat the criminal writ proceeding as the conventional forum for finally determining all disputes concerning the online content.
However, the Court was conscious of the practical consequences of sending the petitioner from one forum to another when she claimed to be facing immediate threats. The Court observed that, in view of the sensitivity of the matter, the petitioner should not be required to “run from one place to another” merely to obtain immediate protective assistance.
The Court therefore proceeded to grant the limited but important relief of police protection while leaving the appropriate forum to consider the broader question of removal of online content.
The approach is consistent with the constitutional understanding that Article 21 protects more than mere physical existence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised dignity as an important component of the right to life and personal liberty. In K.S. Puttaswamy, the Supreme Court explained that privacy enables individual autonomy and is closely connected with dignity. (Indian Kanoon)
The principle assumes particular significance where a person’s identity is allegedly used without consent to create fabricated sexual or intimate imagery. Such conduct can potentially implicate several legal interests simultaneously, including privacy, dignity, reputation and personal security. The Court in the present case did not finally adjudicate the criminal liability of any respondent, but its interim directions demonstrate that allegations of this nature can warrant immediate protective intervention while investigation proceeds.
The existing intermediary framework also recognises that artificially morphed images can require urgent action. In X v. Union of India, the Delhi High Court considered Rule 3(2)(b) of the 2021 IT Rules and recorded that the provision prescribes a 24-hour period for an intermediary to take reasonable and practicable measures concerning specified content, including artificially morphed images of an individual. (Indian Kanoon)
The present case therefore sits within an evolving area of Indian law where traditional concepts of privacy and dignity increasingly intersect with digital identity and artificial intelligence. A photograph that was originally created for an entirely legitimate purpose can, through face-swapping or other generative techniques, allegedly be transformed into material that falsely attributes conduct or circumstances to the person depicted.
The Court’s direction to Meta to remove access to the “objectionable content” within 24 hours also demonstrates the importance of preventing judicial proceedings from becoming a mechanism for further dissemination. At the same time, the direction to preserve and furnish the relevant electronic material to the investigating agency recognises that removal from public circulation should not result in destruction of potential evidence.
The Court further observed that the petitioner would have a right to claim compensation from the organisers of the demonstration. It also clarified that filing the present petition would not prevent her from pursuing any other relief available to her in law.
This observation leaves open the possibility of further proceedings concerning monetary compensation or other civil and legal remedies, depending upon the evidence ultimately collected and the legal liability established against the concerned persons.
The Court also directed the Delhi Police to submit a status report within one week setting out the precise action taken in the matter. The direction ensures that the investigation remains subject to judicial monitoring at least at this preliminary stage and provides the Court with an opportunity to assess whether the authorities have acted on the allegations placed before them.
The order consequently does not amount to a final determination on whether the alleged deepfake was created by the named respondents, whether they circulated it, or whether any criminal offence has ultimately been established. Those questions remain matters for investigation and, if required, subsequent adjudication.
What the Court has addressed immediately is the protection of the alleged victim, preservation of evidence, confidentiality of her residential information, and the urgent issue of access to the disputed online material. The proceedings also underline the difficulty created when an alleged digital offence spreads rapidly across multiple platforms while the victim simultaneously has to pursue criminal investigation and seek appropriate civil or platform-level remedies.
The decision is therefore significant in the context of emerging legal disputes involving deepfakes and digitally manipulated personal images. It illustrates that the availability of technology does not eliminate existing legal protections relating to privacy, dignity and personal security. At the same time, the Court’s directions preserve the procedural distinction between criminal investigation and civil remedies concerning online takedown.
For the present, the Delhi Police has been directed to ensure protection to the petitioner, investigate the allegations expeditiously and file a status report within one week. The named respondents have been issued notice, Meta Platforms has been directed to act concerning the alleged objectionable content, and the petitioner has been left free to pursue further remedies, including a claim for compensation, in accordance with law. The allegations against the CJP leaders, however, remain allegations and will have to be established through the appropriate legal process.