Introduction:
In a significant judgment reinforcing procedural safeguards available to accused persons under food safety laws, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that failure to communicate the statutory right under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, to have a food sample examined by the Central Food Laboratory (CFL) strikes at the root of the prosecution and renders the criminal proceedings unsustainable. The decision was rendered by Justice Himanshu Joshi in Sharan Bihari Agarwal v. M.K. Gupta, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (MP) 220.
The case arose from a food adulteration prosecution initiated more than two decades ago following an inspection conducted by a Food Inspector on July 14, 2004. During the inspection of the pantry car of the Varanasi-Pune Gyan Ganga Express, the Food Inspector collected samples of coriander powder, suspecting that the product was adulterated. After following the prescribed procedure under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the sample was forwarded for analysis. The Public Analyst subsequently reported that the coriander powder was adulterated, leading to the filing of a criminal complaint against several individuals, including Brahmprakash and the present applicants.
The prosecution alleged that the accused had committed offences punishable under Sections 7 and 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act by manufacturing, storing, selling, or dealing with adulterated food articles. Over time, the applicants challenged the continuation of criminal proceedings against them, contending not only that there was insufficient material connecting them to the alleged offence but also that the mandatory procedural safeguards guaranteed by Section 13(2) of the Act had been violated.
The controversy before the High Court therefore extended beyond the factual issue of whether the applicants were responsible for the conduct of the business. It raised an important legal question concerning the nature and significance of the right conferred upon an accused under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The provision requires the Local Health Authority to furnish a copy of the Public Analyst’s report to the accused and inform him of his right to apply to the court for sending the counterpart sample to the Central Food Laboratory for independent examination. The certificate issued by the Central Food Laboratory enjoys overriding evidentiary value and supersedes the report of the Public Analyst.
The case thus required the Court to determine whether the failure to establish proper service of the analyst’s report and the accompanying statutory notice could invalidate the prosecution itself. In answering this question, the Court emphasized the indispensable role played by procedural fairness in criminal prosecutions and reaffirmed that statutory safeguards cannot be treated as mere technical formalities.
Arguments of the Parties:
The applicants challenged the criminal proceedings on multiple grounds. Their principal contention was that the prosecution had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. According to them, the prosecution could not produce any material demonstrating that a copy of the Public Analyst’s report had been duly served upon them together with a notice informing them of their right to seek examination of the sample by the Central Food Laboratory.
The applicants argued that the right conferred by Section 13(2) was not procedural in a narrow sense but constituted a substantive safeguard available to every accused person facing prosecution under the Act. The provision enables the accused to challenge the findings of the Public Analyst through an independent scientific examination conducted by the Central Food Laboratory. Since the certificate issued by the Central Food Laboratory supersedes the report of the Public Analyst and becomes conclusive evidence regarding the quality of the sample, denial of this opportunity causes serious and irreversible prejudice to the defence.
The applicants further submitted that the prosecution lacked independent evidence connecting them with the alleged offence. They contended that their implication in the case was based solely upon statements allegedly made by co-accused Brahmprakash. Apart from such statements, no documentary or other reliable evidence was produced to establish their involvement in the business operations of M/s RK Enterprises, the catering contractor associated with the pantry car.
To strengthen their case, the applicants relied upon a partnership deed showing that Applicant Nos. 1 and 3, namely Sharan Bihari Agarwal and Rahul Agarwal, were not partners in the firm on the date when the inspection was conducted. According to them, there was no evidence to establish that they were responsible for the day-to-day management of the business or that they exercised control over its affairs at the relevant time.
The applicants also challenged the reasoning adopted by the Trial Court while framing charges. They argued that the Trial Court incorrectly proceeded on the assumption that they had failed to exercise their right under Section 13(2) by not filing an application seeking analysis by the Central Food Laboratory. According to the applicants, such reasoning was fundamentally flawed because the right could not be exercised unless the statutory notice informing them of the right had first been properly communicated.
Invoking the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicants submitted that continuation of criminal proceedings in the absence of compliance with mandatory statutory requirements would amount to abuse of the process of law and result in grave injustice.
The respondent authorities opposed the petitions and defended the validity of the prosecution. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Food Inspector argued that the complaint disclosed a prima facie case of food adulteration. It was contended that the material collected during the investigation established sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused and that disputed questions of fact should not be adjudicated in proceedings seeking quashing of criminal cases.
The respondents further argued that the applicants had been shown to be associated with RK Enterprises and that issues relating to partnership, management, and responsibility for the conduct of business required a detailed examination during trial. According to the prosecution, such matters involved factual controversies that could only be resolved after evidence was led before the Trial Court.
The prosecution maintained that the charges had been framed after due consideration of the material on record and that the criminal proceedings should be permitted to continue. It was argued that the High Court should exercise restraint while invoking its inherent powers and should not interfere at a preliminary stage where allegations disclosed commission of cognizable offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
Thus, while the applicants emphasized the violation of a mandatory statutory safeguard and the absence of incriminating material, the prosecution sought continuation of the trial on the ground that the allegations disclosed a prima facie case and that factual disputes could be resolved only through a full-fledged trial.
Court’s Judgment:
After considering the rival submissions and examining the material available on record, the Madhya Pradesh High Court found substantial merit in the challenge raised by the applicants. Justice Himanshu Joshi held that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and that such failure had caused serious prejudice to the accused.
The Court began its analysis by examining the legislative purpose underlying Section 13(2) of the Act. It observed that the provision confers a valuable and substantive right upon an accused person. The right is designed to ensure fairness in the adjudicatory process by allowing the accused to seek independent scientific verification of the findings recorded by the Public Analyst.
The Court emphasized that the certificate issued by the Central Food Laboratory possesses a special legal status. Unlike the report of the Public Analyst, which is open to challenge, the certificate issued by the Central Food Laboratory supersedes the analyst’s report and constitutes conclusive evidence regarding the quality and composition of the food sample. Consequently, denial of the opportunity to obtain such examination deprives the accused of a crucial defence available under the statutory scheme.
Justice Joshi observed that because of the importance attached to this right, compliance with Section 13(2) cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality. The provision imposes a mandatory obligation upon the authorities to furnish a copy of the Public Analyst’s report and simultaneously inform the accused of the right to apply for examination of the counterpart sample by the Central Food Laboratory.
The Court found that the prosecution had failed to place any convincing material on record establishing that the mandatory notice was actually served upon the applicants. There was no evidence showing proper communication of the Public Analyst’s report together with the statutory intimation regarding the right available under Section 13(2). In the absence of such proof, the Court concluded that the applicants had effectively been deprived of a valuable legal safeguard.
The Court then examined the reasoning adopted by the Trial Court while framing charges. It noted that the Trial Court appeared to have proceeded on the assumption that the applicants had not exercised their right to seek examination of the sample by the Central Food Laboratory. However, according to the High Court, such reasoning overlooked a crucial preliminary requirement. Before drawing an adverse inference against the accused for not filing an application under Section 13(2), the prosecution was first required to establish that the statutory right had been properly communicated to them.
The Court observed that unless the accused is informed of the existence of the right, it would be unreasonable and legally unsustainable to blame him for failing to exercise it. Therefore, the very foundation of the Trial Court’s reasoning was found to be flawed.
Apart from the procedural violation, the Court also examined the material connecting the applicants with the alleged offence. It found that the prosecution had primarily relied upon information allegedly supplied by Brahmprakash. There was an absence of independent documentary evidence demonstrating the constitution of the firm or establishing that the applicants were responsible for managing its affairs at the relevant time.
The partnership deed relied upon by the applicants assumed significance in this context. The document indicated that certain applicants were not partners in the firm on the date of inspection. While the Court did not embark upon a detailed factual inquiry, it noted that the available material failed to satisfactorily establish the applicants’ involvement in the conduct of the business.
The High Court further stressed that criminal prosecutions must adhere not only to substantive legal requirements but also to procedural safeguards intended to ensure fairness. Procedural protections become particularly important where scientific evidence forms the foundation of criminal liability. The statutory opportunity to challenge such evidence through an independent laboratory examination cannot be denied without undermining the fairness of the entire process.
Relying upon the inherent jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court held that continuation of the prosecution in the present circumstances would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Court observed that the power under Section 482 exists precisely to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice in appropriate cases.
Justice Joshi concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish foundational compliance with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Since the accused had been deprived of a valuable statutory right, allowing the proceedings to continue would unfairly prejudice their defence and defeat the purpose underlying the legislative scheme.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the petitions and quashed the criminal proceedings pending before the Trial Court. The judgment serves as an important reaffirmation of the principle that statutory safeguards in criminal law are not empty formalities but essential protections designed to ensure fairness and reliability in the administration of justice. It also underscores that authorities prosecuting offences under food safety legislation must strictly comply with procedural requirements, particularly those that confer substantive rights upon accused persons. Failure to do so may render the entire prosecution vulnerable to judicial scrutiny and eventual quashing.