Introduction:

In XXX v. Gopalan K.T. and Another, CRA(V) No. 81 of 2025, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 10, the Kerala High Court, through a Division Bench comprising Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Jobin Sebastian, examined the scope and limits of a victim’s statutory right to appeal against an order of acquittal under Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and in doing so clarified an important procedural question concerning whether such an appeal can be summarily dismissed at the admission stage without issuing notice to the accused or calling for the lower court records. A case arose from serious allegations of sexual assault, where the appellant, who was the victim and defacto complainant, had alleged that the accused, a person not belonging to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community, committed rape upon her with the knowledge that she belonged to an SC community, an allegation which, if proved, carried grave penal consequences and invoked strong victim-centric considerations under criminal jurisprudence. The trial court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, acquitted the accused, primarily on the ground that the sole testimony of the victim suffered from material contradictions and inconsistencies and that there was unexplained delay in lodging the complaint, which cast serious doubt on the prosecution version. Aggrieved by the acquittal, the victim invoked her statutory right under the proviso to Section 413 BNSS and filed an appeal before the High Court. when the appeal came up for admission, the High Court undertook a preliminary scrutiny of the impugned judgment and the material on record and was confronted with the question whether, in the absence of any prima facie grounds to doubt the correctness of the acquittal, it was still mandatory to admit the appeal and issue notice to the accused merely because the appeal was filed by a victim. The Court’s answer to this question, rooted in a careful balancing of victim rights and the rights of an acquitted accused, led to a significant ruling that summary dismissal under Section 425 BNSS is equally applicable to victim appeals under Section 413, thereby reinforcing the principle that appellate criminal jurisdiction is not to be invoked mechanically or casually, even in cases involving serious allegations.

Arguments:

On behalf of the appellant victim, it was contended that the right to file an appeal against acquittal under Section 413 BNSS is a substantive and statutory right conferred specifically to strengthen the position of victims within the criminal justice system, and that such a right would be rendered illusory if courts were to dismiss appeals at the threshold without even admitting them or calling for records. It was urged that cases involving allegations of rape and offences touching upon the dignity and bodily autonomy of women require a victim-centric and sensitive approach, and that at the stage of admission, High Court ought not to conduct a mini trial or weigh evidence as if sitting in final appeal. according to the appellant, the trial court had adopted an overly technical and hypercritical approach in appreciating the victim’s testimony, ignoring the settled principle that minor inconsistencies are natural in cases of sexual violence and that delay in lodging a complaint cannot, by itself, be a ground to disbelieve the prosecutrix. It was further argued that once an appeal is filed by a victim, particularly in a sexual offence case, the High Court should ordinarily admit the appeal and issue notice, thereby allowing a full-fledged appellate scrutiny after hearing both sides. On the procedural aspect, the appellant asserted that Section 413 BNSS does not expressly provide for summary dismissal of a victim’s appeal, unlike certain other provisions, and therefore, reading such a power into the statute would amount to judicial legislation and would dilute the legislative intent behind granting victims an independent right of appeal. The appellant’s counsel emphasized that summary dismissal at the admission stage risks shutting the doors of justice prematurely on victims who already face systemic barriers, social stigma, and emotional trauma, and that a cautious, empathetic approach was necessary to ensure that the appellate forum remains meaningfully accessible to them.

On the other hand, the State, represented by the Public Prosecutor, while acknowledging the statutory right of the victim to file an appeal, supported the approach adopted by the High Court in exercising restraint and procedural discipline. it was submitted that an order of acquittal carries with it a reinforced presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, and that such presumption cannot be lightly unsettled by admitting appeals without any prima facie basis. the prosecution emphasized that appellate courts have consistently held that interference with an acquittal is justified only when the trial court’s view is perverse, manifestly illegal, or grossly unreasonable, and not merely because another view is possible. in the present case, it was pointed out that the trial court had given cogent and detailed reasons for disbelieving the prosecution case, particularly highlighting contradictions in the victim’s testimony which formed the sole foundation of the prosecution, and therefore, the acquittal was a plausible and legally sustainable view. On the procedural question, it was argued that Section 425 BNSS, which empowers the appellate court to summarily dismiss appeals after perusing the petition and judgment, embodies a general principle applicable to criminal appeals and that there is no rational basis to exclude victim appeals under Section 413 from its operation. the State cautioned that casual admission of appeals against acquittal would subject acquitted persons to prolonged uncertainty and harassment, effectively punishing them despite a finding of not guilty, and would undermine the finality that an acquittal is meant to confer.

Judgment:

After considering the rival submissions, the Division Bench delivered a reasoned judgment affirming the power of the High Court to summarily dismiss a victim’s appeal against acquittal at the admission stage when no arguable case is made out, and in doing so laid down important principles governing the exercise of such power. The Court first acknowledged, in clear terms, that the right of a victim to prefer an appeal under Section 413 BNSS is a valuable statutory right and that, particularly in cases involving sexual offences, courts are ordinarily expected to adopt a victim-centric approach and admit appeals where there is prima facie material warranting reconsideration of the acquittal. However, the Bench was equally mindful of the countervailing consideration, namely, the rights of an accused who has already secured an acquittal after a full-fledged trial, and observed that if appeals against acquittal are admitted casually and notices are issued mechanically, such proceedings would hang like a “Damocles’ sword” over the head of the acquitted person until the appeal is finally decided, thereby causing undue mental agony and legal prejudice. The Court reiterated the settled appellate principle that an acquittal should not be interfered with unless the trial court’s view is perverse, manifestly illegal, or grossly erroneous, and that where two reasonable views are possible, the one favouring the accused must prevail. on the statutory interpretation of BNSS, the Court held that although Section 413 does not expressly provide for summary dismissal, the general provision under Section 425 BNSS, which enables summary dismissal of appeals, applies mutatis mutandis to victim appeals as well, since there is no legislative indication to the contrary. The Bench clarified that summary dismissal does not mean arbitrary rejection, but a judicial determination based on a prima facie examination of the impugned judgment to see whether any arguable case exists. Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court noted that the trial court had meticulously analysed the evidence and recorded specific findings regarding contradictions in the victim’s testimony, which was the sole evidence against the accused, and had also taken note of the delay in lodging the complaint, thereby arriving at a plausible conclusion of acquittal. The High Court found no perversity, illegality, or gross error in the trial court’s reasoning and held that there was not even prima facie material to justify interference. It further observed that once an acquittal is recorded, a strengthened presumption of innocence operates in favour of the accused, and in the absence of compelling reasons, such presumption cannot be displaced. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal summarily at the admission stage without issuing notice to the accused or calling for records, holding that this approach was consistent with both statutory framework and principles of criminal justice.