Introduction:

The Uttarakhand High Court has stayed two administrative orders that had blacklisted a daily newspaper from receiving government advertisements for three years and removed its owner-editor from a committee constituted under the Uttarakhand Print Media Advertisement Rules, 2015. The Court found that the petitioner deserved interim protection after noting that the newspaper had allegedly been blacklisted without providing its owner-editor an opportunity of hearing. It also took note of the challenge to the authority of the officer who had ordered his removal from the Steering Committee before completion of his prescribed tenure.

Justice Pankaj Purohit passed the interim order in a writ petition filed by Deendayal Mittal, owner and editor of the daily newspaper Shrimat Express. Mittal had challenged two orders issued by the Director General, Information and Public Relations, Uttarakhand. The first order, dated May 30, 2026, blacklisted the newspaper from receiving government advertisements for a period of three years. The second order, dated July 8, 2026, removed Mittal from the Steering Committee constituted under Rule 5 of the Uttarakhand Print Media Advertisement Rules, 2015, despite his appointment being for a two-year term.

The dispute raises two important administrative law questions. The first concerns the obligation of public authorities to comply with the principles of natural justice before taking action that adversely affects the rights and interests of a person or institution. The second concerns the limits of statutory and delegated authority, particularly where rules expressly identify the authority empowered to appoint or remove a member of a committee.

Government advertisements are an important source of revenue for newspapers, particularly those operating at the regional and local levels. A decision to exclude a newspaper from receiving government advertisements for several years can therefore have substantial financial and operational consequences. Although the government may prescribe eligibility requirements and take appropriate action against publications that violate applicable rules or conditions, such action must be taken in accordance with law and fair procedure.

Blacklisting is not merely an administrative formality. It can affect an organisation’s commercial interests, reputation and ability to participate in future government-related opportunities. Consequently, where an authority proposes to impose such a restriction, the affected party must ordinarily be informed of the grounds and given a meaningful opportunity to respond, unless a legally recognised exception applies.

The second part of Mittal’s challenge arose from his membership of the Steering Committee constituted under Rule 5 of the 2015 Rules. According to the petitioner, the Rules prescribe the nomination and tenure of non-government members and provide for a maximum tenure of two years. They also identify circumstances in which membership may automatically cease or the tenure of a nominated member may be curtailed.

Mittal contended that the power to remove a nominated member was specifically vested in the Information Minister or the Chief Minister, subject to the circumstances contemplated by Rule 5. He therefore questioned the authority of the Director General, Information and Public Relations, to cancel his nomination through the order dated July 8, 2026.

The High Court’s interim intervention came after the State’s counsel acknowledged that the blacklisting order reflected that no opportunity of hearing had been given to the petitioner. The State also admitted the position under Rule 5 relied upon by Mittal. Taking these submissions into consideration, the Court stayed the operation and effect of both impugned orders until the next date of listing.

The Court also issued notice to respondent No. 3, made returnable within six weeks, and granted the respondents six weeks to file their counter-affidavits. Steps for service were directed to be taken within three days. The matter was listed for December 22, 2026.

The order is significant because it highlights that administrative decisions affecting commercial interests and statutory positions cannot be insulated from judicial scrutiny. Public authorities must act within the powers conferred upon them and follow fair procedures when exercising those powers.

Arguments of the Parties:

Appearing for Deendayal Mittal, counsel challenged both the blacklisting of Shrimat Express and his removal from the Steering Committee. The petitioner’s case was that the two orders suffered from legal infirmities and had been passed without adhering to the applicable procedural and statutory requirements.

With respect to the blacklisting order dated May 30, 2026, the petitioner’s counsel argued that the newspaper had been barred from receiving government advertisements for three years without the issuance of a show-cause notice or the grant of an opportunity of hearing to its owner-editor.

It was submitted that blacklisting was a serious administrative action carrying significant civil consequences. A newspaper excluded from government advertisements for such an extended period could suffer substantial financial prejudice. The decision could affect its revenue, business operations and ability to sustain itself in a competitive media environment.

According to the petitioner, an authority cannot impose such a serious consequence without first informing the affected party of the allegations or grounds on which the proposed action is based. The affected person must be given a reasonable opportunity to explain their position and respond to the material relied upon by the authority.

The petitioner’s argument was founded on the principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram partem, which requires that no person should be condemned without being heard. The principle is an essential safeguard against arbitrary administrative action and ensures that decisions affecting individuals or institutions are taken after considering their explanations.

Counsel maintained that the absence of a show-cause notice and hearing rendered the blacklisting order procedurally unfair. The petitioner therefore sought protection against the operation of an order that had been passed without giving him an opportunity to contest the action.

The petitioner also challenged the subsequent order dated July 8, 2026, by which he was removed from the Steering Committee constituted under Rule 5 of the Uttarakhand Print Media Advertisement Rules, 2015.

On this issue, counsel relied on the language and scheme of Rule 5. It was argued that the Rule governs the nomination and tenure of non-government members of the Steering Committee and provides for a maximum tenure of two years. It also specifies circumstances in which membership may cease automatically or the tenure of a nominated member may be curtailed.

According to the petitioner, the Rule does not confer an unrestricted power of removal upon every authority connected with the Information and Public Relations Department. Instead, it specifically identifies the Information Minister or the Chief Minister as the authority empowered to remove a nominated member, subject to the conditions prescribed under the Rule.

The petitioner’s counsel therefore argued that the Director General, Information and Public Relations, had no legal authority to cancel Mittal’s nomination or remove him from the Committee through the order dated July 8, 2026.

The challenge was not merely that the removal had taken place before the expiry of the two-year tenure. The more fundamental contention was that the decision had been made by an authority which, according to the petitioner, was not empowered under the Rules to take such action.

The petitioner maintained that when statutory or delegated rules prescribe a particular authority for exercising a power, that power cannot be assumed by another officer merely because the officer holds an administrative position within the concerned department. Any action affecting membership must conform to the procedure and authority expressly contemplated by the governing Rules.

The petitioner thus sought interim protection against both orders. The relief was intended to prevent the continued operation of the blacklisting decision and the removal order while the High Court examined their legality.

The State, represented by its counsel, responded to the petition and made significant submissions concerning the two challenges. In relation to the blacklisting order, the State acknowledged that the order itself reflected that no opportunity of hearing had been provided to the petitioner before the newspaper was blacklisted.

This acknowledgement was particularly relevant because the petitioner’s principal objection was that the adverse decision had been taken without issuing a show-cause notice or allowing him to present his case. The State’s submission therefore supported the factual basis of the procedural objection raised by Mittal.

The State also admitted the position under Rule 5 relied upon by the petitioner in challenging his removal from the Steering Committee. This was relevant to the question of whether the Director General, Information and Public Relations, was empowered to pass the July 8 order.

The supplied case summary does not disclose any detailed justification offered by the State for dispensing with a hearing before blacklisting the newspaper or for the Director General exercising the power of removal. Accordingly, the State’s position is best understood from the admissions recorded in the proceedings rather than from any additional defence that is not available in the case summary.

After considering the submissions, the Court found that the petitioner deserved interim protection and stayed the operation of both challenged orders until the next date of hearing.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Pankaj Purohit considered the circumstances surrounding the two administrative orders and the submissions made by the parties. The Court took note of the fact that the newspaper had been blacklisted without providing its owner-editor an opportunity of hearing. It also considered the petitioner’s challenge to the authority of the Director General, Information and Public Relations, to remove him from the Steering Committee under Rule 5 of the 2015 Rules.

On the issue of blacklisting, the central concern was the absence of an opportunity of hearing before the imposition of a three-year restriction on the newspaper’s eligibility to receive government advertisements.

The principles of natural justice form an important part of administrative law. They require public authorities to exercise their powers fairly, particularly when their decisions have adverse consequences for an individual or organisation. One of the fundamental components of these principles is the right to be heard before an adverse decision is made.

The rule of audi alteram partem ordinarily requires that a person likely to be adversely affected by an administrative decision should be informed of the case against them and given a reasonable opportunity to respond. The purpose is not merely to fulfil a procedural formality. It is to ensure that the decision-making authority considers the affected person’s explanation before reaching a conclusion.

In the context of blacklisting, this safeguard assumes particular importance. A decision to exclude a newspaper from government advertisements for three years can have serious financial and commercial consequences. It may affect the publication’s revenue, business prospects and reputation. Such a decision is therefore not comparable to a routine administrative adjustment that has no meaningful impact on the affected party.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised that blacklisting carries civil consequences and that an affected party must ordinarily be given an opportunity to be heard before such action is taken. In Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court explained the serious implications of blacklisting and emphasised the importance of fair treatment before a person is excluded from government dealings. The broader principle is that a public authority cannot impose a serious disqualification without following the requirements of natural justice.

Similarly, in Gorkha Security Services v. Government (NCT of Delhi), the Supreme Court emphasised the importance of a proper show-cause notice before blacklisting. The affected party must be made aware not only of the allegations but also of the proposed action so that an effective response can be submitted.

These principles provide the legal context for the objection raised by Mittal. The newspaper was allegedly blacklisted for three years without a show-cause notice or an opportunity of hearing. The State’s counsel acknowledged that the order reflected the absence of such an opportunity. This circumstance gave substantial weight to the petitioner’s plea that the blacklisting order required judicial scrutiny.

The right to a hearing is particularly meaningful where the authority is considering a measure that can materially affect a person’s commercial interests. Without prior notice, the affected party may not know the precise grounds on which the authority proposes to act. Without an opportunity to respond, the authority may reach its conclusion without considering relevant explanations or objections.

The purpose of a show-cause notice is therefore to ensure that the decision-making process is informed and fair. It allows the affected party to dispute factual allegations, explain circumstances and place relevant material before the authority. The requirement also promotes transparency and accountability in administrative decision-making.

The High Court’s interim order reflects the significance of this procedural protection. By taking note of the State’s acknowledgement that no opportunity of hearing had been provided, the Court considered the petitioner entitled to protection while the matter remained pending.

The second issue concerned the legality of the order removing Mittal from the Steering Committee constituted under Rule 5 of the Uttarakhand Print Media Advertisement Rules, 2015.

The petitioner contended that Rule 5 specifically identifies the Information Minister or the Chief Minister as the authority empowered to remove a nominated member, subject to the circumstances prescribed by the Rule. He further argued that the Rule provides for a maximum two-year tenure for non-government members and sets out the circumstances in which membership may automatically cease or the tenure may be curtailed.

The Court took note of the petitioner’s contention and the State’s admission concerning the position under Rule 5. The issue raised an important principle of administrative law: every statutory or rule-based authority must exercise its powers within the limits of the legal instrument from which those powers are derived.

An administrative officer does not acquire a power merely because the subject matter falls within the officer’s departmental responsibilities. The authority to take a particular decision must be traceable to the applicable statute, rule, regulation or valid delegation of power.

This principle is commonly expressed through the doctrine of ultra vires. An action is ultra vires when a public authority acts beyond the powers legally conferred upon it. Where a rule specifies the authority competent to take a decision, another officer cannot ordinarily assume that power unless the governing framework provides for such delegation or authorisation.

The doctrine protects the rule of law by ensuring that administrative decisions are not based merely on institutional hierarchy or convenience. Public authorities must demonstrate that they possess the legal authority to take the action in question.

In the present case, the petitioner alleged that the Director General, Information and Public Relations, was not the authority empowered under Rule 5 to remove him from the Steering Committee. If the Rule reserves that power to the Information Minister or the Chief Minister, an order passed by a different authority would raise a serious question concerning its legal validity.

The tenure provision was also relevant to the petitioner’s challenge. A prescribed term of membership provides a measure of continuity and protects nominated members from arbitrary removal. Where the Rules permit premature cessation or curtailment only in specified circumstances, the power must be exercised in accordance with those conditions.

The petitioner’s case was that his two-year term had not been completed and that the Director General could not terminate his membership through the impugned order. The State’s admission regarding the position under Rule 5 further supported the need to examine whether the removal order had been issued by a competent authority.

The High Court’s interim order should, however, be understood within its procedural limits. The Court did not finally adjudicate the validity of either impugned order or conclusively determine every aspect of the petitioner’s rights under Rule 5. It considered the submissions and the State’s admissions sufficient to grant temporary protection until the matter could be examined further.

The distinction between interim protection and final adjudication is important. At the interim stage, a court considers whether the applicant has raised a substantial legal issue and whether protection is necessary to prevent prejudice while the proceedings remain pending. The final determination follows after the respondents have had an opportunity to place their detailed case on record.

In this matter, the Court considered that the petitioner’s challenge involved both a serious procedural objection to the blacklisting order and a substantial question concerning the authority of the officer who removed him from the Steering Committee. The Court therefore found that he deserved protection.

Accordingly, the High Court stayed the operation and effect of the order dated May 30, 2026, blacklisting Shrimat Express from receiving government advertisements for three years. It also stayed the order dated July 8, 2026, removing Mittal from the Steering Committee constituted under Rule 5 of the 2015 Rules.

Both orders were stayed until the next date of listing. The Court issued notice to respondent No. 3, making it returnable within six weeks. The respondents were granted six weeks to file their counter-affidavits, and the petitioner was directed to take steps for service within three days. The matter was listed for December 22, 2026.

The interim relief means that the two impugned administrative decisions cannot operate during the period covered by the Court’s stay. However, the order does not amount to a final declaration that the newspaper is permanently entitled to government advertisements or that Mittal’s membership of the Steering Committee can never be terminated. Those questions remain subject to further proceedings and the final decision of the Court.

The ruling nevertheless reinforces two important safeguards governing public administration. First, blacklisting a newspaper from government advertisements for a substantial period is an action with serious civil consequences and must ordinarily be preceded by a fair opportunity of hearing. Second, an authority exercising powers under statutory or delegated rules must act within the limits of the authority conferred upon it.

The decision is particularly relevant for regional publications that depend, at least in part, on government advertisements as a source of revenue. While the government retains the authority to regulate the distributin of advertisements and enforce applicable conditions, such