Introduction:

In a significant decision reinforcing the statutory mandate of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) and the constitutional balance between education and religious instruction, the Kerala High Court, in Moithunnykutty and Another v. The District Collector and Others connected with Ma’din Knowledge Garden Public School v. Assistant Educational Officer and Others (2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 74), ordered the closure of a school imparting Quranic and allied religious education for want of mandatory recognition under Section 18 of the RTE Act. The judgment was delivered by Justice Harisankar V. Menon while adjudicating two interconnected writ petitions—one filed by private complainants seeking action against the school for operating illegally, and the other by the school itself challenging the proposed closure order issued by the District Collector. The controversy arose when complaints revealed that the institution was running an educational establishment catering to approximately 300 preschool children, imparting Quran and allied subjects, without obtaining recognition from the State Government as mandated by law. The school attempted to justify its functioning by relying on accreditation granted by the National Institute of Open Schooling (NIOS), contending that such accreditation insulated it from closure. The High Court rejected this contention, holding that compliance with Section 18 of the RTE Act is mandatory for any institution imparting education to children of the age group covered by the Act. While ordering closure, the Court also displayed sensitivity towards the students by permitting the school to continue for the academic year 2025–26 to enable parents and authorities to make alternative arrangements. The judgment assumes importance not only for its interpretation of the RTE Act but also for reaffirming that institutions imparting education cannot bypass statutory regulation under the guise of religious instruction.

Arguments on Behalf of the Complainant-Petitioners:

The complainant-petitioners contended that the school in question was functioning in blatant violation of Section 18 of the RTE Act, which unequivocally mandates that no school shall be established or function without obtaining recognition from the appropriate government authority. It was argued that the RTE Act is a welfare legislation enacted to ensure uniform standards of education, infrastructure, safety, and child protection, and any institution imparting education to children must strictly comply with its provisions. The petitioners submitted that the school was not merely imparting informal religious instruction but was operating as a full-fledged educational institution catering to preschool children, thereby squarely attracting the applicability of the RTE Act. They relied upon the report of the Assistant Educational Officer, submitted to the District Educational Officer, which clearly recorded that the institution was functioning without valid recognition. The complainants further argued that permitting such institutions to operate without recognition would create a parallel, unregulated educational system detrimental to children’s rights and welfare. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the school was imparting instruction exclusively in Quran and allied subjects, which, according to established precedent, is impermissible for institutions required to obtain recognition under the RTE Act. The petitioners placed reliance on the earlier judgment of the Kerala High Court in Trustee, Hidaya Educational & Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala and Others, wherein it was held that schools governed by the RTE Act cannot impart religious instruction of one religion exclusively, as such practice would be inconsistent with the secular framework of state-regulated education. It was contended that the school’s reliance on NIOS accreditation was misplaced, as such accreditation does not substitute statutory recognition under the RTE Act, particularly for preschool education. On these grounds, the complainant-petitioners sought a writ directing the educational authorities to take immediate action, including closure of the unrecognised institution, to safeguard the statutory and constitutional rights of children.

Arguments on Behalf of the School:

The school, which filed the second writ petition, challenged the proposed closure order issued by the District Collector and sought protection against what it termed as arbitrary and disproportionate state action. The primary contention advanced by the school was that it was duly accredited by the National Institute of Open Schooling (NIOS), a recognised national body, and therefore could not be treated as an illegal or unrecognised institution. It was argued that the school was not imparting conventional formal education as envisaged under the RTE Act but was primarily engaged in teaching Quran and allied religious subjects, along with preschool-level learning. The school contended that religious education falls within the domain of minority and cultural rights and should not be subjected to the same regulatory framework as mainstream schools imparting secular education. It was further argued that the RTE Act was not intended to regulate purely religious institutions and that applying Section 18 mechanically would infringe upon the institution’s rights to establish and administer educational institutions. The school also submitted that abrupt closure would cause severe hardship to nearly 300 students and their parents, disrupting their education midstream. It pleaded for reasonable time to either obtain necessary recognition or to make alternative arrangements for the students. The institution also argued that its functioning had not resulted in any complaint regarding safety, exploitation, or educational malpractice, and therefore, the extreme measure of closure was unwarranted. On these grounds, the school sought quashing of the closure direction and a declaration that its operations were lawful.

Court’s Judgment and Reasoning:

Justice Harisankar V. Menon, after carefully considering the rival submissions and the statutory framework, held that the school’s operation without recognition was clearly illegal and unsustainable in law. The Court began by emphasising the mandatory nature of Section 18 of the RTE Act, which categorically prohibits any school from being established or run without obtaining recognition from the appropriate government authority. The Court observed that the language of Section 18 admits of no ambiguity and that compliance is not optional or subject to the nature of subjects taught. The Court took note of the admitted position that the institution was functioning without state recognition and that it was imparting preschool education to around 300 children. The Court rejected the argument that NIOS accreditation could substitute recognition under the RTE Act, holding that accreditation by a national open schooling body does not exempt an institution from complying with state-level statutory requirements, particularly when the institution caters to children within the age group protected by the RTE Act. The Court further relied on the precedent in Trustee, Hidaya Educational & Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala and Others, reiterating that schools requiring recognition under the RTE Act are not entitled to impart religious instruction of one religion exclusively in preference to others. The Court clarified that while religious instruction per se is not prohibited, institutions that fall within the regulatory ambit of the RTE Act must adhere to its secular and inclusive framework. Justice Menon underscored that the purpose of the RTE Act is to ensure quality, uniformity, and child-centric safeguards in education, and permitting unrecognised institutions to function would defeat this legislative intent. The Court also examined the constitutional implications under Article 21A, holding that the right to education encompasses not merely access to education but access to regulated and standardised education. At the same time, the Court displayed a humane approach by considering the potential hardship to students. Acknowledging the school’s plea for time, the Court directed the authorities to permit the institution to function for the academic year 2025–26, thereby allowing parents sufficient time to secure alternative arrangements. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the school, allowed the petition filed by the complainants, and directed the educational authorities to take appropriate steps to shut down the institution thereafter in accordance with law.