Introduction:

The Calcutta High Court has dismissed two writ petitions challenging the promotion process conducted by Coal India Limited (CIL), holding that the decision to award marks uniformly to all candidates for questions subsequently found to be erroneous or outside the prescribed syllabus did not amount to an impermissible alteration of the selection criteria after commencement of the examination. Justice Amrita Sinha held that, in the absence of negative marking, the uniform award of marks for the disputed questions did not place any candidate at a disadvantage and therefore could not be characterised as a change in the “rules of the game”.

The judgment arose from petitions filed by employees of Bharat Coking Coal Limited, a subsidiary of Coal India Limited, who sought to challenge their exclusion from the final merit list for promotion from the non-executive cadre to the executive cadre. The proceedings involved questions concerning fairness in departmental promotion, the permissible scope of judicial review over expert examination decisions, the principle that selection criteria cannot ordinarily be altered after the process has commenced, and the rights of candidates who have already been promoted pursuant to the challenged selection process.

The promotion exercise had its origin in a notification issued in 2015 inviting eligible employees to participate in a selection process for promotion to the executive cadre. A written examination was conducted in January 2016. However, that examination was subsequently cancelled because of shortcomings attributable to the agency responsible for conducting the selection.

The selection process was revived several years later. A fresh Computer Based Test was conducted on July 31, 2021. The same group of eligible candidates participated in the examination, and the examination was conducted on the same syllabus that had governed the earlier process. The petitioners cleared the written examination and were thereafter shortlisted for the interview stage.

Following the examination, a model answer key was published and candidates were provided an opportunity to raise objections through a Response Query Management Portal. Some of the petitioners submitted objections, whereas others did not.

The objections were examined by the concerned examining agency and referred to subject experts. Upon scrutiny, the examining body concluded that 19 questions were either erroneous or outside the prescribed syllabus. Rather than permitting the disputed questions to affect the comparative assessment of candidates, the examining authority decided to award marks for those questions uniformly to every candidate, irrespective of whether the candidate had attempted the particular question.

The petitioners were subsequently called for interviews. However, they failed to secure sufficient marks to find a place in the final merit list. The cut-off for candidates belonging to the unreserved category was stated to be 144.88, while the petitioners secured marks below the prescribed cut-off.

The petitioners thereafter approached the Calcutta High Court, contending that the manner in which the 19 questions had been dealt with materially altered the marking scheme after the selection process had already commenced. According to them, candidates who had attempted the disputed questions and candidates who had left them unanswered were placed on the same footing, despite being differently situated.

The challenge raised significant questions under Article 14 of the Constitution, particularly the principle of equality and non-arbitrariness in public employment. The petitioners argued that a selection authority cannot alter the conditions governing a competitive examination after candidates have participated in it, especially where such alteration could affect the comparative ranking of candidates.

The petitioners relied upon the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the principle commonly described as “changing the rules of the game”. Among the authorities cited were K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court. Those decisions recognise that recruitment authorities cannot ordinarily introduce new criteria or alter the prescribed method of assessment after the selection process has commenced, since doing so can compromise fairness and legitimate expectations of participating candidates.

Coal India, however, maintained that there had been no alteration of the selection criteria. The disputed questions were examined because objections had been raised, and independent subject experts found that the questions were erroneous or fell outside the syllabus. The uniform award of marks was adopted precisely to prevent any candidate from suffering because of errors attributable to the examination process.

The matter was further complicated by the fact that the promotion process had already concluded. As many as 109 candidates had been selected and promoted pursuant to the process and had been working in their promotional positions since 2022. Those successful candidates had not been impleaded in the writ proceedings.

Against this factual and legal background, the High Court was required to determine whether the decision to award marks uniformly for the 19 disputed questions was arbitrary or discriminatory, whether it amounted to a post-commencement change in the selection criteria, and whether the Court could appropriately interfere with a promotion process that had been completed several years earlier.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioners principally challenged the manner in which the 19 disputed questions were treated after the examination. Their case was that the candidates had entered the selection process on the basis of a particular examination pattern and marking methodology. Once the examination had been conducted, the examining authority could not subsequently introduce a different method of awarding marks without giving candidates prior notice.

According to the petitioners, awarding marks even to candidates who had not attempted the disputed questions fundamentally altered the comparative assessment. They contended that a candidate who had attempted a question had made a conscious choice to answer it, whereas another candidate who had left the question unanswered had made a different choice. In their submission, treating both candidates identically created an artificial equivalence between two different categories of candidates.

The petitioners therefore argued that the candidates who attempted the disputed questions and those who did not attempt them constituted distinct classes. Equal treatment, they submitted, could not mean mechanically giving identical marks to persons who had behaved differently during the examination.

The petitioners further invoked Article 14 of the Constitution. Their argument was that the examination process had to remain transparent, predictable and non-arbitrary. Candidates were entitled to know the basis on which their performance would be evaluated, and any subsequent modification affecting their marks could potentially alter the merit position.

The petitioners relied upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, among other authorities. They sought to invoke the well-established proposition that the “rules of the game” governing a selection process cannot ordinarily be changed once the process has commenced.

According to the petitioners, the examination had already taken place when the examining agency decided that the 19 questions were erroneous or outside the syllabus. The subsequent decision to award marks for those questions, including to candidates who had not attempted them, was therefore argued to be an alteration of the marking mechanism after the candidates had already participated in the examination.

The petitioners also questioned the conclusion of the examining authority that the 19 questions were erroneous or outside the syllabus. Their position was that the Court should examine whether the questions were genuinely defective or outside the prescribed syllabus before accepting the justification offered for uniformly awarding marks.

The petitioners consequently sought judicial intervention in the promotion process and questioned the validity of the final merit list in which they had failed to secure promotion.

Coal India opposed the petitions and defended the process adopted by the examining authority. It submitted that the promotion examination was conducted centrally in accordance with the applicable cadre scheme and the notified procedure. There had been no arbitrary departure from the prescribed process.

CIL explained that the objections received against the model answer key had been considered through the prescribed mechanism. The disputed questions were examined by subject experts, who concluded that 19 questions were either erroneous or outside the syllabus. Once that conclusion had been reached, the authority had to adopt a method that would ensure that candidates were not unfairly penalised because of defective questions.

CIL argued that awarding marks uniformly to all candidates was the fairest available solution. If marks had been given only to those candidates who attempted the disputed questions, candidates who did not attempt defective questions could potentially have been disadvantaged. Uniform treatment, according to CIL, eliminated that possibility and preserved equality among the candidates.

The respondent also emphasised the absence of negative marking in the Computer Based Test. Since an incorrect answer did not result in deduction of marks, there was no additional disadvantage to a candidate who had attempted one of the disputed questions.

CIL further contended that the petitioners had participated in the selection process, including the examination and interview, without challenging the methodology at the relevant stage. Their challenge arose only after they failed to secure a place in the final merit list.

According to CIL, a candidate who voluntarily participates in a selection process cannot ordinarily question the process merely because the ultimate result is unfavourable. Permitting such challenges after an unsuccessful outcome would undermine certainty and finality in recruitment and promotion exercises.

Another significant objection raised by CIL concerned the passage of time and the rights of successful candidates. The promotion process had been completed in 2022, and 109 candidates had already been promoted and had been working in their promotional posts for more than four years.

CIL pointed out that these successful candidates had not been made parties to the writ proceedings. Any order setting aside or modifying the selection process could directly affect their existing positions. Such an order, it was argued, could not fairly be made without giving the affected promotees an opportunity to be heard.

The respondent therefore urged the Court to balance the petitioners’ claims against the interests and legitimate expectations of those who had successfully completed the selection process and had been functioning in their promotional posts for several years.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Amrita Sinha dismissed both writ petitions and upheld the promotion process conducted by Coal India Limited. The Court found no sufficient basis to conclude that the respondents had acted arbitrarily, illegally or in violation of the constitutional guarantee of equality.

A central issue before the Court was whether the uniform award of marks for the 19 disputed questions amounted to a change in the “rules of the game” after the examination had commenced. The Court acknowledged that the principle itself was well established. Selection authorities cannot ordinarily change the eligibility requirements, assessment criteria or other fundamental rules governing a selection process after candidates have entered the competition.

However, the Court held that the principle did not apply to the facts before it.

The critical factor was the absence of negative marking. Under the examination scheme, candidates were awarded marks for correct answers, but an incorrect answer did not result in a deduction of marks. Consequently, the Court found that the decision to award marks uniformly for the defective questions did not create an unfair advantage for one category of candidates over another.

The Court reasoned that had the examination involved negative marking, the position could have been materially different. A candidate who attempted a disputed question might have suffered a deduction for giving an incorrect answer, while a candidate who left it unanswered would not have suffered such a deduction. In those circumstances, the manner in which defective questions were treated could potentially have affected the competitive position of candidates.

That was not the situation in the present case. Because there was no negative marking, an unsuccessful attempt did not result in any deduction. The uniform award of marks therefore ensured that all candidates received the same benefit in respect of questions which the examining experts had found to be defective or outside the syllabus.

The Court specifically observed that had marks been awarded only to candidates who attempted the disputed questions, an issue of prejudice or discrimination might have arisen. That would have given one category of candidates an advantage over another based upon their decision to attempt questions that were subsequently found to be defective.

Instead, CIL adopted a uniform approach. Every candidate received the same treatment irrespective of whether they had attempted the disputed questions.

The Court therefore rejected the petitioners’ argument that candidates who attempted the disputed questions and those who did not attempt them necessarily constituted separate classes for the purpose of awarding marks. In the circumstances of this examination, neither category received a discriminatory advantage or suffered a corresponding disadvantage because the disputed marks were awarded equally to everyone.

The Court also declined to adjudicate upon the petitioners’ contention that the 19 questions were actually correct and within the syllabus. Such a determination involved specialised academic and technical assessment.

The examining authority had referred the disputed questions to subject experts. Those experts had concluded that the questions were erroneous or outside the prescribed syllabus. The High Court held that the writ jurisdiction was not an appropriate forum to substitute its own assessment for that of qualified experts on the correctness or validity of examination questions.

This aspect of the judgment reflects the established principle of judicial restraint in academic and examination matters. Courts generally do not substitute their own views for those of subject experts unless there is a clear demonstration of arbitrariness, mala fides, procedural illegality or some other recognised ground for judicial intervention.

The Court found no such exceptional circumstance in the present case.

The petitioners’ reliance on K. Manjusree and Tej Prakash Pathak was also considered in the context of the facts. The principle emerging from those decisions could not be applied mechanically. The question was not simply whether something had been done after commencement of the selection process, but whether the subsequent decision had altered the competitive rules in a manner that prejudiced candidates.

Here, the Court found that the respondents had not introduced a new eligibility condition, changed the prescribed cut-off, or selectively rewarded a particular group of candidates. Instead, they had responded to defective questions identified through the objection process and adopted a uniform solution.

Thus, the Court treated the decision not as a change in the rules but as a corrective measure designed to preserve fairness in the examination.

The Court’s approach is significant because it distinguishes between an impermissible modification of selection criteria and a remedial measure taken to address errors in an examination. A change that gives a particular candidate or category of candidates an advantage after the commencement of the selection process may violate the principle against changing the rules of the game. Conversely, a uniform corrective measure that affects all candidates equally may not necessarily attract the same prohibition.

The Court also considered the petitioners’ conduct in participating in the selection process. The candidates had appeared in the examination and proceeded through the selection process, including the interview. They did not successfully challenge the process at the appropriate stage and approached the Court after failing to secure promotion.

The Court relied upon the settled principle that a candidate who consciously participates in a selection process cannot ordinarily challenge the method of selection only after being unsuccessful. The principle is based on fairness and consistency: a participant cannot accept the rules when hoping for a favourable outcome and question their validity only after the result goes against them.

This did not mean that participation would forever prevent judicial review. If a selection process is demonstrably illegal, unconstitutional or fundamentally arbitrary, courts retain the power to intervene. However, the petitioners had failed to establish such circumstances here.

The passage of time was another decisive consideration.

The promotion process had been concluded in 2022, and 109 successful candidates had already been promoted. They had been functioning in their promotional positions for more than four years by the time the Court considered the challenge.

The Court was mindful that disturbing a concluded selection process after such a substantial period could have serious consequences for those who had relied upon the result and continued in their promotional posts.

More importantly, the successful promotees had not been impleaded in the writ proceedings. They were therefore not before the Court to defend their selection or explain the consequences that an adverse order might have upon their positions.

The Court held that an order adversely affecting such persons behind their back would offend the principles of natural justice. A person whose rights or interests may be directly affected by judicial proceedings ordinarily must be given an opportunity of being heard.

This consideration independently made the Court reluctant to reopen the promotion process several years after its conclusion.

The judgment therefore combines three important principles governing judicial review of selection processes. First, the rules governing a selection process cannot ordinarily be changed after the process has begun where such alteration prejudices candidates. Second, courts should exercise restraint in matters requiring expert evaluation of examination questions. Third, concluded selections should not lightly be disturbed, particularly where successful candidates have already assumed their posts and have not been joined as parties.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that CIL had adopted a “reasonable and balanced approach” in dealing with the defective questions.

The Court’s reasoning also underscores the importance of the absence of negative marking. This factual feature was central to the finding that no candidate had suffered prejudice. Had the examination deducted marks for incorrect answers, a candidate who attempted a defective question might have been placed at a disadvantage compared with one who left it unanswered. In such a situaion, the uniform award of marks could have raised a more subst