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The Legal Affair

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The Legal Affair

Let's talk Law

UAPA Bail Denied as J&K High Court Awaits Examination of Key Witnesses in Alleged Separatist Conspiracy Case

UAPA Bail Denied as J&K High Court Awaits Examination of Key Witnesses in Alleged Separatist Conspiracy Case

Introduction:

The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar has dismissed two appeals filed by Mohammad Rafiq Phaloo and Mohammad Yaseen Bhat challenging the rejection of their bail applications in a case registered under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA). The Court held that at the present stage of the trial, it would be premature to assess the appellants’ contention that there was no incriminating evidence against them, particularly when important prosecution witnesses connected with the alleged disclosure statements and subsequent recoveries were yet to be examined.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Rajnesh Oswal and Justice Sanjay Parihar observed that the testimony of witnesses associated with the seizure of incriminating material and the preparation of relevant seizure and disclosure memoranda would be significant in determining the circumstances surrounding the allegations against the appellants. The Bench further clarified that it would refrain from examining the evidentiary merits of the prosecution case at the bail stage, as doing so could potentially prejudice either side during the ongoing trial.

While refusing to interfere with the orders rejecting bail, the Court granted liberty to both appellants to approach the Trial Court again by filing fresh bail applications after the examination of the material witnesses concerned with their alleged disclosure statements and the recoveries.

The appeals arose from a case in which the appellants, along with several other accused persons, were alleged to have participated in activities aimed at reviving the prohibited Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front-Yasin Malik faction (JKLF-Y). According to the prosecution, a gathering organised under the appearance of an Eid Milan celebration was allegedly used as a platform to coordinate activities connected with the revival of the banned organisation and its cadre.

The allegations attracted serious provisions of the UAPA, including Section 18, which criminalises conspiracy and other acts connected with terrorist activities. Since the appellants had been charged under this provision, the statutory restrictions governing the grant of bail under Section 43D(5) of the Act became central to the dispute.

Section 43D(5) places significant limitations on the power of courts to grant bail in cases involving offences under Chapters IV and VI of the UAPA. It provides that an accused shall not be released on bail if, after examining the case diary or the report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true. This statutory restriction makes the assessment of the available prosecution material particularly important in determining whether bail can be granted.

The present appeals therefore required the High Court to consider not only the allegations and evidence relied upon by the prosecution but also the stage of the trial, the applicability of the statutory bail restrictions, the criminal antecedents attributed to the appellants and the medical grounds raised by one of them.

The Bench ultimately concluded that the circumstances did not justify granting bail at that stage, particularly because several material witnesses had not yet entered the witness box. At the same time, the Court ensured that the appellants would not be precluded from seeking bail again once the relevant evidence had been placed before the Trial Court.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellants challenged the orders passed by the Special Judge designated under the National Investigation Agency Act at Srinagar, contending that the Trial Court had incorrectly rejected their bail applications by relying upon the stringent provisions of the UAPA without properly examining whether a prima facie case was actually made out against them.

Their principal submission was that the prosecution had failed to produce sufficient material establishing their involvement in the alleged conspiracy. According to them, the evidence collected during the investigation, including the alleged recovery of mobile phones, digital devices, documents and other material, did not establish the specific criminal role attributed to either appellant.

The appellants particularly relied upon the statements of protected witnesses whose depositions had already been recorded during the trial. They submitted that these witnesses had not supported the prosecution’s allegations against them and had not provided any meaningful evidence concerning the alleged conspiracy. Their statements, according to the appellants, weakened the prosecution’s case and demonstrated that the allegations against them lacked adequate evidentiary support.

It was further argued that the prosecution had placed considerable reliance upon the recovery of electronic devices and documents allegedly connected with the banned organisation. However, the appellants maintained that the mere recovery of mobile phones or other digital material could not independently establish their participation in an unlawful conspiracy. They questioned whether the phones allegedly recovered from their possession contained any material capable of demonstrating their involvement in the alleged activities.

The appellants also challenged the reliance placed upon the alleged recovery of a resolution letter, press notes, posters, photographs and other documents associated with JKLF-related activities. They argued that the prosecution had not established a sufficient connection between these recoveries and the specific allegations of conspiracy levelled against them.

In particular, they contended that the existence of certain documents or digital material could not automatically establish the commission of offences under the UAPA unless the prosecution demonstrated the necessary connection between the material recovered and the alleged unlawful activities.

The appellants also questioned the Trial Court’s approach in invoking Section 43D(5) of the UAPA. They submitted that the statutory restriction on bail could not be applied mechanically and that the Court was required to examine whether the material available on record actually disclosed a prima facie case against them. In their submission, the absence of credible evidence connecting them with the alleged conspiracy meant that the statutory embargo should not operate against their release.

Apart from challenging the prosecution’s evidence, appellant Mohammad Yaseen Bhat raised concerns regarding his medical condition. He submitted that his health circumstances justified his release on bail and that his continued incarceration would cause difficulties in obtaining appropriate medical treatment. His medical condition was therefore presented as an additional ground warranting judicial consideration independently of the merits of the allegations.

On the other hand, the prosecution strongly opposed the appeals and maintained that the allegations against the appellants were serious in nature and concerned activities threatening the sovereignty, security and integrity of the country.

According to the respondent, the gathering held on July 9, 2023, at a restaurant in Srinagar was not an ordinary social event organised to celebrate Eid. Although it was presented as an Eid Milan party, the prosecution alleged that the gathering was actually intended to bring together former members of the banned JKLF-Y organisation and other separatist activists to coordinate activities aimed at reviving the prohibited organisation.

The prosecution submitted that the investigation had revealed the involvement of several individuals in the alleged conspiracy and that both appellants had played significant roles in the activities under investigation.

With regard to Mohammad Rafiq Phaloo, the prosecution relied upon a resolution letter allegedly recovered from the residence of another accused person. The document was stated to contain material indicating his appointment as the in-charge of Jammu and Kashmir for the organisation concerned. According to the prosecution, this recovery was significant in establishing his alleged organisational role.

The respondent also referred to the search conducted at the residence of Mohammad Yaseen Bhat, during which two Samsung mobile phones, one Nokia mobile phone, a laptop, an identity card, press notes relating to JKLF meetings, posters bearing photographs of Maqbool Bhat, Amanullah Khan and Yasin Malik, photographs of the appellants with the said individuals and bank passbooks were allegedly recovered.

The prosecution further relied upon the forensic examination of the seized electronic devices. According to the investigation, the examination allegedly revealed videos, voice notes, photographs, press releases of the Kashmir Global Council, letter pads associated with the organisation and an alleged conversation with a terrorist based in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir who was connected with JKLF.

The respondent also highlighted the alleged past activities of the appellants. It was submitted that Mohammad Yaseen Bhat had undergone arms training and had crossed over to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir on several occasions before returning in 1992 along with Yasin Malik. With respect to Mohammad Rafiq Phaloo, the prosecution referred to his alleged involvement in earlier FIRs concerning the kidnapping and killing of Air Force personnel.

The State argued that the allegations involved serious offences punishable with imprisonment extending up to life imprisonment. It further submitted that the appellants’ antecedents and the nature of the accusations gave rise to concerns that they might evade the judicial process if released on bail.

The prosecution accordingly maintained that the Trial Court had correctly assessed the material available on record and that no justification existed for interfering with its orders.

Court’s Judgment:

After examining the submissions advanced by both sides and the material available on record, the High Court declined to grant bail to the appellants and dismissed both appeals.

At the outset, the Bench took note of the fact that the appellants had been charged, among other offences, under Section 18 of the UAPA. Consequently, the statutory restrictions contained in Section 43D(5) of the Act were applicable to their bail applications.

Section 18 of the UAPA deals with conspiracy, or an attempt to commit, abetment of, advocacy, or incitement to the commission of a terrorist act, as well as acts preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act. The provision prescribes stringent punishment, which may extend to imprisonment for life, depending upon the circumstances of the offence.

The applicability of Section 43D(5) meant that the Court was required to consider whether the allegations against the appellants were prima facie true on the basis of the material collected during the investigation. The provision creates a special statutory restriction on the ordinary exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail.

The Bench, however, did not undertake a detailed evaluation of the prosecution’s entire evidentiary case. Instead, it focused on the procedural stage of the trial and the importance of the witnesses whose testimony was still awaited.

The Court noted that when the appeals were initially filed, only four prosecution witnesses had been examined. However, subsequent proceedings before the Trial Court revealed that eight additional witnesses had also been examined, taking the total number of witnesses examined to twelve.

Out of the total 68 witnesses cited by the prosecution, the examination of only twelve had been completed. The Bench acknowledged the considerable time already consumed in the trial and expressed awareness that more than two and a half years had passed while a substantial number of prosecution witnesses remained to be examined.

Nevertheless, the Court considered it significant that certain witnesses directly connected with the alleged disclosure statements and the seizure of incriminating material had not yet been examined.

These witnesses were considered important because their testimony could assist the Court in understanding the circumstances in which the alleged recoveries were made, the preparation of the relevant memoranda and the evidentiary connection between the appellants and the material relied upon by the prosecution.

The Bench therefore observed that the appellants’ contention regarding the absence of evidence against them could not be appropriately examined at that stage.

The Court specifically held:

“The contention raised by the appellants that there is no evidence against the appellants cannot be appreciated at this stage, particularly when the material witnesses with regard to the seizure of the incriminating material are yet to be examined.”

This observation formed the central basis of the Court’s decision. The Bench considered that an assessment of the prosecution’s case without the testimony of witnesses associated with the disputed recoveries could lead to an incomplete appreciation of the circumstances.

The Court also examined the depositions of the protected witnesses who had already been examined during the trial. It noted that one of the witnesses had turned hostile, whereas another had not.

However, the Bench declined to treat these developments as sufficient grounds for granting bail at that stage. It considered that the testimony of the remaining material witnesses was necessary before the evidentiary circumstances could be properly appreciated.

In this regard, the Court made an important distinction between considering the material for the limited purpose of deciding bail and undertaking an assessment that could influence the eventual determination of guilt or innocence.

The Bench stated:

“This court would not like to examine the merits of the evidence led by the prosecution till date lest it shall prejudice the parties during trial. As already observed above, the material witnesses are yet to be examined.”

The observation reflects the established judicial principle that proceedings concerning bail should not become a substitute for the actual criminal trial. Although a Court is required to examine the available material while deciding a bail application, it must avoid making detailed findings that could prejudice the prosecution or the defence during the final adjudication.

A bail order is not intended to determine the truthfulness of every allegation or the ultimate evidentiary value of the prosecution’s case. The Court must confine itself to the considerations relevant to the particular stage of proceedings.

In cases involving offences under the UAPA, this exercise becomes particularly significant because of the additional restriction imposed by Section 43D(5). The Court must consider whether the accusation appears prima facie true, but such consideration does not amount to a final determination of guilt.

The High Court also examined the reasons recorded by the Trial Court while rejecting the original bail applications. It noted that the Special Judge had considered several circumstances, including the criminal antecedents attributed to the appellants and the recovery of documents, voice notes and other material allegedly connected with separatist activities.

The Bench found no sufficient reason to disregard these circumstances at the present stage.

In particular, the Court observed that the criminal antecedents of the appellants could not simply be ignored while considering their entitlement to bail. The allegations concerning their previous involvement in criminal activities formed part of the overall circumstances considered by the Trial Court.

However, the Court did not convert these allegations into findings of guilt. Its consideration remained confined to whether the orders rejecting bail called for interference in the appeals.

The Bench also considered the Supreme Court judgment relied upon by the appellants in support of their plea. After examining the decision in the context of the present case, the High Court held that the precedent was not applicable to the facts and circumstances before it.

The Court thereby declined to accept the appellants’ argument that the principles emerging from the judgment relied upon by them required their release on bail.

Another important aspect of the judgment concerned the medical grounds raised by Mohammad Yaseen Bhat.

The appellant had relied upon his health condition to seek release from custody. The High Court examined the findings recorded by the Trial Court regarding his medical condition and the treatment available to him.

The Bench noted that the Trial Court had considered the medical documents, including a recent coronary angiography report. According to the medical assessment referred to in the impugned order, the appellant was suffering from non-obstructive coronary artery disease, which could be managed through medication.

The Trial Court had also considered his gallbladder condition and observed that the proposed surgery was elective and non-urgent in nature. It could therefore be scheduled without requiring his immediate release from custody.

The High Court found no reason to interfere with this assessment. It observed that the appellant was being provided appropriate medical facilities while in custody and that there was no specific case that he was suffering from an illness which could not be adequately managed in the custodial environment.

Consequently, the medical grounds raised by Mohammad Yaseen Bhat were not considered sufficient to justify his release on bail.

The Court’s approach demonstrates that medical grounds in bail proceedings must be examined in light of the actual nature and seriousness of the medical condition, the availability of treatment and the ability of the authorities to provide appropriate medical care. A medical condition, by itself, does not automatically entitle an accused to bail, particularly where the record indicates that the required treatment can be provided during custody.

The Bench also took into account the nature and gravity of the offences alleged against the appellants and the stage at which the trial was proceeding.

It acknowledged that the prosecution had examined only twelve out of 68 witnesses despite the passage of more than two and a half years. This observation is significant because the Court did not overlook the prolonged progress of the proceedings. Nevertheless, it considered that the identity and role of the remaining material witnesses were particularly relevant to the issues raised in the bail appeals.

The Court observed:

“This Court is conscious of the fact that in the last more than two and half years, the prosecution has examined only 12 witnesses out of 68 witnesses, but the fact remains that the material witnesses are yet to be recorded.”

This part of the judgment reflects the balance the Court sought to maintain between the accused persons’ right to seek liberty and the need to examine the material evidence before reaching a conclusion on their bail entitlement.

Importantly, the Bench did not hold that the appellants must remain in custody until the entire trial is completed. Instead, it identified a specific procedural stage at which their bail pleas could be reconsidered, namely, after the examination of witnesses connected with their alleged disclosure statements and the recoveries.

The Court accordingly granted liberty to both appellants to approach the Trial Court by filing fresh bail applications once those material witnesses had been examined.

It further clarified that such applications would have to be considered independently, in accordance with law and on their own merits, wthout being influenced by any observations made by the High Court in t