Introduction:
The Telangana High Court, in Gorla Jagadeeshwar v. State of Telangana (2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 105), reaffirmed the limited scope of judicial scrutiny while considering an application for anticipatory bail under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Justice N. Tukaramji held that where allegations prima facie disclose offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the statutory bar contained in Sections 18 and 18-A ordinarily operates, preventing the grant of anticipatory bail. The Court further observed that when the alleged caste-based abuse occurs near the entrance of a house or on an adjoining public road, it cannot be conclusively held at the pre-arrest stage that the incident did not occur within “public view.” Whether members of the public actually witnessed the incident is a question of fact that must be determined during investigation or trial.
The case arose from FIR No.118 of 2026 registered at Elanthakunta Police Station against the petitioner for offences under Sections 115(2) and 296(b) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, along with Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), and 3(2)(Va) of the SC/ST Act. According to the prosecution, the complainant, a member of a Scheduled Tribe community, had pledged his wife’s gold ornament with the petitioner’s father several years earlier. Although the loan was allegedly repaid with interest, the ornament was not returned. When the complainant visited the petitioner’s residence on June 6, 2026, seeking its return, the petitioner allegedly abused him by intentionally referring to his caste, used obscene language, and pushed him out through the entrance gate onto the adjoining road. The complaint was lodged five days later, leading to registration of the FIR.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner sought anticipatory bail contending that the allegations were false and had been made to pressurize him in what was essentially a civil dispute concerning repayment of money and return of pledged jewellery. It was argued that the complaint had been lodged after an unexplained delay of five days, creating doubt regarding its authenticity. The petitioner further submitted that the alleged incident occurred within the precincts of his private residence and therefore failed to satisfy the essential requirement of “public view” necessary for attracting Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act.
Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and Kurup Dayal v. State, the petitioner argued that every allegation of caste-related abuse does not automatically constitute an offence under the SC/ST Act. According to the settled legal position, the alleged insult or intimidation must occur in a place within public view. Since the incident allegedly took place inside his residential premises, the petitioner submitted that the statutory ingredients were absent. Consequently, the embargo on anticipatory bail under Sections 18 and 18-A of the Act would not apply, and he was entitled to the protection of pre-arrest bail.
The State opposed the petition, contending that the allegations clearly disclosed a prima facie offence under the SC/ST Act. The prosecution submitted that the investigation indicated that the complainant was pushed out through the entrance gate and that the alleged caste-based abuse occurred either at the gate itself or on the adjoining cement concrete road accessible to the public. Therefore, it could not be said that the occurrence was confined entirely within the privacy of the petitioner’s residence.
The State further argued that the complaint specifically alleged intentional caste-based humiliation in a place capable of being viewed or heard by members of the public. Whether independent witnesses were actually present was a matter to be established during investigation and trial and could not be conclusively examined while deciding an application for anticipatory bail. Since the complaint prima facie disclosed offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s), the statutory prohibition contained in Sections 18 and 18-A squarely applied.
Court’s Judgment:
The Telangana High Court dismissed the anticipatory bail petition, holding that at the stage of considering pre-arrest bail, the Court cannot undertake a detailed appreciation of disputed facts or conclusively determine whether every ingredient of the alleged offence has been established. Justice N. Tukaramji observed that the material available on record indicated that the complainant was allegedly pushed out through the gate of the house and that the incident occurred either at the entrance or on the adjoining public road. Such a location could not, at the preliminary stage, be conclusively treated as being outside the ambit of “public view.”
The Court accepted that the legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and Kurup Dayal v. State correctly interpret the expression “within public view” occurring in Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. However, it clarified that those judgments do not authorize the Court to decide disputed factual issues while considering anticipatory bail. Whether members of the public were present, whether the alleged caste-based remarks were audible to them, and whether the complainant was intentionally humiliated in public are factual matters that can only be determined after investigation and, if necessary, during trial.
The Court observed that the allegations contained in the complaint, read along with the material collected during investigation, prima facie disclosed the commission of offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. Once such a prima facie case exists, the statutory embargo created by Sections 18 and 18-A becomes operative.
While reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, which held that anticipatory bail may be granted in cases under the SC/ST Act only where the complaint does not disclose a prima facie offence. If the allegations, taken at face value, satisfy the ingredients of the offence, the statutory bar against anticipatory bail must ordinarily be respected.
Applying this principle, the High Court found that the complaint specifically alleged intentional caste-based abuse, humiliation, and physical assault at a place situated near the entrance gate of the petitioner’s residence and the adjoining public road. At this preliminary stage, these allegations could not be rejected merely on the basis of the petitioner’s defence that the incident occurred entirely within a private premises.
The Court further held that the defence regarding delay in lodging the complaint and the contention that the dispute arose out of a financial transaction are matters that may be examined during investigation or trial. Such disputed factual issues cannot be conclusively adjudicated while exercising jurisdiction under Section 438 of the Code governing anticipatory bail.
Accordingly, the High Court concluded that the complaint prima facie attracted the offences punishable under the SC/ST Act and that the statutory bar under Sections 18 and 18-A prevented the grant of anticipatory bail. The petition was therefore dismissed, leaving the investigating agency free to proceed in accordance with law.
The judgment reiterates that courts dealing with anticipatory bail applications under the SC/ST Act must confine themselves to determining whether the complaint discloses a prima facie offence and should refrain from conducting a mini-trial on disputed questions of fact. It also clarifies that allegations of caste-based abuse occurring near the entrance of a house or an adjoining public road may, depending on the evidence, satisfy the requirement of having taken place “within public view,” with the final determination resting upon the evidence led during trial.