Introduction:
The Telangana High Court has delivered an important ruling on local candidature for admission to medical and dental courses, holding that children of Central Government employees, Central Government Corporations and Central Public Sector Undertakings (CPSUs) who are compelled to pursue their education outside Telangana because of their parent’s official posting cannot be treated differently from similarly situated children of State Government employees. The Court directed that, pending a formal amendment to the relevant admission rules, such children must receive the benefit of the exception available to other categories of transferable employees.
The judgment was delivered by a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh and Justice G.M. Mohiuddin in Kodimela Samhitha v. State of Telangana & Anr., W.P. No. 23998 of 2026. The petition concerned the petitioner’s eligibility for local candidature for admission to MBBS and BDS courses for the academic year 2026-27 under the Competent Authority Quota.
The petitioner, Kodimela Samhitha, had appeared for NEET (UG)-2026 and secured 385 marks. Her difficulty arose not from her performance in the entrance examination but from the local candidature requirement under the Telangana Medical & Dental Colleges Admission (Admission into MBBS & BDS Courses) Rules, 2017, as amended by G.O.Ms.No.150, Health, Medical & Family Welfare (C1) Department, dated September 8, 2025.
Under Rule 3(a)(iii), a candidate seeking admission under the Competent Authority Quota is generally required to have studied in Telangana for at least four consecutive academic years ending with the year in which the candidate appeared for the qualifying examination. The rule is intended to identify candidates having the requisite educational connection with the State for the purpose of local candidature.
The rules, however, contain exceptions for students whose education outside Telangana resulted from the transferable nature of their parent’s employment. The proviso accommodates, among others, children of Telangana State Government employees, certain All India Services officers belonging to the Telangana cadre, specified defence and Central Armed Police Force personnel, and employees of corporations, agencies or instrumentalities under the Telangana Government who are liable to be transferred anywhere in India.
The difficulty was that the proviso did not expressly include children of Central Government employees, Central Government Corporations or Central Public Sector Undertakings who were transferred outside Telangana.
Samhitha’s circumstances brought the issue into sharp focus. Her father was employed with the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, a Central Government corporation functioning under the Union Ministry of Labour and Employment. He had entered service in 1997 and had served at different locations in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.
While the family was residing in Hyderabad, her father was transferred to Tirupati in December 2016. He continued to serve there until May 2024, when he was transferred back to Hyderabad. Because the transfer required the family to relocate, Samhitha pursued a substantial portion of her schooling outside Telangana.
She had studied from Nursery through Class IV in Hyderabad. However, she completed Classes V to X and her Intermediate education in Tirupati. Consequently, despite her father’s connection with Telangana and the fact that her education outside the State was occasioned by his official posting, she could not satisfy the general requirement of four consecutive academic years of study in Telangana.
The petitioner also produced a Nativity Certificate issued by the Tahsildar, Hyderabad District, certifying that her father was a native of Telangana and that her education outside the State had resulted from his official transfer.
Nevertheless, she was not treated as a local candidate under the amended Rule 3(a)(iii). This exclusion had significant consequences because local candidature can determine eligibility and access to seats under the Competent Authority Quota in professional medical and dental courses.
The petitioner challenged the exclusion as arbitrary and discriminatory, invoking Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Her central contention was that the admission rule itself recognised the hardship faced by children whose parents are transferable employees. Once the State had decided that such circumstances justified an exception, there was no rational basis to distinguish between children of State Government employees and children of Central Government employees merely because their parents served under different governments.
The High Court found substance in this concern. However, rather than directly striking down the rule as unconstitutional, the Court adopted a purposive and constructive interpretation that would prevent immediate hardship to the petitioner and similarly situated candidates while the State considered a formal amendment.
The Court ultimately declared that the proviso to Rule 3(a)(iii), pending formal amendment, must be read as including children of Central Government employees, Central Government Corporations and CPSUs who have served or are serving outside Telangana. Such candidates were to receive the same benefit, subject to the same conditions applicable to children of State Government employees.
The Court also directed Kaloji Narayana Rao University of Health Sciences to treat Samhitha as a local candidate for the 2026-27 admission process and permit her to participate in the ongoing counselling for MBBS and BDS courses.
The judgment therefore addresses an important question of equality in educational admissions: where a State recognises parental transfer as a legitimate reason for a child to study outside the State, can the benefit of that exception depend solely upon whether the parent is employed by the State Government or the Central Government?
The Telangana High Court answered that question in favour of substantive equality and adopted an interpretation that ensured similarly situated students were not disadvantaged because of the nature of their parent’s government employment.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner, Kodimela Samhitha, challenged the exclusion of children of Central Government employees from the exception contained in Rule 3(a)(iii) of the Telangana Medical & Dental Colleges Admission Rules.
Her principal argument was that the rule created an unreasonable distinction between two groups of students who were similarly situated in every material respect. According to her, children of State Government employees and children of Central Government employees could both be required to leave Telangana when their parents were transferred outside the State in the course of official service.
The petitioner submitted that the purpose underlying the exception was to protect children from the adverse consequences of circumstances beyond their control. Where a parent is transferred outside the State, a child may have no practical choice but to relocate with the family and continue education at the parent’s new place of posting.
Therefore, according to the petitioner, the relevant consideration should be the reason for the student’s education outside Telangana, rather than the particular employer of the parent.
The petitioner argued that there was no rational basis for saying that a child compelled to study outside Telangana because of a State Government parent’s transfer deserved protection, while a child placed in precisely the same situation because of a Central Government parent’s transfer did not.
She characterised the exclusion as arbitrary and discriminatory and invoked Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Her contention was that the rule was under-inclusive because it recognised one category of transferable government employees but failed to extend the same logic to another similarly situated category.
The petitioner also emphasised the factual circumstances of her own case. She had spent her early years studying in Hyderabad and had subsequently moved to Tirupati only because of her father’s official transfer. Once her father returned to Hyderabad, she again became connected to the State.
The Nativity Certificate issued by the Tahsildar was relied upon to establish her father’s roots in Telangana and to demonstrate that her educational history outside the State was not the result of a voluntary decision to sever her connection with Telangana.
The petitioner therefore contended that applying the four-year local study requirement rigidly in her case would punish her for an administrative decision made by her parent in the course of government service.
The State of Telangana defended the framework of the admission rules. It submitted that the proviso had been framed following a judgment of the Supreme Court dated September 1, 2025, and that the State had consciously identified the categories to which the exception would apply.
The State’s initial position was that the categories expressly mentioned in the proviso had a direct nexus with the Telangana Government and its administrative structure. On that basis, it sought to justify the existing formulation of the exception.
However, during the hearing, the Advocate General made an important concession. The State fairly acknowledged that the underlying rationale for granting the exception was to protect children who were compelled to study outside Telangana because of their parent’s official transfer.
The Advocate General accepted that this rationale could equally apply to children of Central Government employees. If the hardship sought to be addressed was the compulsory relocation of a child due to parental service, the same hardship could arise regardless of whether the parent worked for the State Government or Central Government.
The State informed the Court that the matter was already under active consideration and that an appropriate amendment or clarification was likely to be issued.
The State therefore did not maintain an absolute opposition to extending the benefit. Instead, it indicated that the administrative process for making the necessary amendment was underway.
The Kaloji Narayana Rao University of Health Sciences also participated in the proceedings through its Standing Counsel. The University was concerned with implementing the admission rules and counselling process for medical and dental admissions.
The dispute thus ultimately narrowed to the immediate treatment of the petitioner and similarly situated students while the State considered formal amendment of the rules.
The petitioner sought immediate judicial protection because the MBBS and BDS counselling process for the 2026-27 academic year was already underway. Waiting for a formal amendment could potentially result in the petitioner losing the opportunity to participate in counselling even though the State itself accepted that the rationale for the exception could extend to her category.
The Court was therefore required to balance the existing language of the rule, the constitutional challenge raised by the petitioner, the State’s concession, and the need to avoid immediate prejudice to a candidate seeking admission to a professional course.
Court’s Judgment:
The Division Bench of Chief Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh and Justice G.M. Mohiuddin granted relief to the petitioner and extended the benefit of the local candidature exception to children of Central Government employees, Central Government Corporations and CPSUs who had served or were serving outside Telangana.
The Court adopted what it described as a “purposive and constructive approach.” Instead of immediately deciding the constitutional validity of the exclusion under Articles 14 and 15, the Bench interpreted the existing proviso in a manner that advanced its underlying purpose and prevented hardship to similarly situated candidates.
The starting point of the Court’s reasoning was the structure of Rule 3(a)(iii). The general rule requires a candidate seeking admission under the Competent Authority Quota to have studied in Telangana for the prescribed period. The rule therefore establishes educational residence or local candidature through a specified period of study.
However, the proviso recognises that strict application of this requirement may cause injustice where a student’s education outside the State is not voluntary but is caused by the parent’s transferable employment.
The Court examined the categories already covered by the proviso. These included children of Telangana State Government employees and other specified categories whose employment could require postings outside Telangana.
The Bench then considered the rationale behind these exceptions.
The Court observed that once exceptions were created for employees whose service required transfers outside Telangana, there was no justifiable reason to exclude Central Government employees posted outside the State if their children faced the same circumstances.
The important question was therefore not the identity of the employer but the nature of the hardship experienced by the child.
A State Government employee and a Central Government employee may work under different administrative authorities, but their children can face exactly the same consequence when the parent is transferred outside Telangana: the child may have to relocate and pursue education outside the State.
The Court’s reasoning consequently focused on substantive similarity rather than formal classification.
The Bench observed that if exceptions could be carved out for the categories already specified in the proviso, there was no rational justification for excluding Central Government employees posted outside Telangana and their children from the same benefit.
This approach is closely connected to the equality principle under Article 14 of the Constitution. A classification is constitutionally sustainable only when there is a rational basis for distinguishing between the included and excluded groups and the distinction bears a reasonable relationship to the object sought to be achieved.
Although the Court did not formally strike down the provision on constitutional grounds, its interpretation effectively prevented an arbitrary distinction from operating against the petitioner during the admission process.
The Bench also took note of the State’s concession. The Advocate General fairly acknowledged that the underlying purpose of the exception would equally apply to children of Central Government employees.
This concession significantly influenced the Court’s approach. Since the State itself recognised the common rationale, there was little justification for denying immediate relief to the petitioner merely because the formal amendment had not yet been issued.
The Court therefore directed that the proviso to Rule 3(a)(iii), as amended by G.O.Ms.No.150 dated September 8, 2025, should, pending formal amendment, be read to include children of employees of the Central Government, Central Government Corporations and CPSUs who had served or were serving outside Telangana.
The benefit was not granted without conditions. The Court directed that such candidates would receive the benefit on the same terms and subject to the same conditions applicable to children of State Government employees.
This was significant because the Court did not create an entirely new category of eligibility detached from the existing scheme. Instead, it extended the existing exception to a similarly situated category so that the rule would operate consistently with its underlying purpose.
The facts of Samhitha’s case demonstrated why such an interpretation was necessary.
Her father had been serving with the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation since 1997. The ESIC is a corporation functioning under the Union Ministry of Labour and Employment. His transfer from Hyderabad to Tirupati in December 2016 resulted in the petitioner pursuing a substantial portion of her schooling outside Telangana.
She had studied in Hyderabad until Class IV, after which she completed Classes V to X and Intermediate in Tirupati. Her return to Hyderabad followed her father’s transfer back to the city in May 2024.
Thus, the educational history relied upon by the authorities to deny local candidature was itself the consequence of the parent’s official transfer.
The Court considered it inequitable to treat such a child differently from a student whose parent worked for the Telangana Government and was transferred under similar circumstances.
The Nativity Certificate also supported the petitioner’s connection with Telangana. Although nativity alone did not necessarily satisfy the ordinary local candidature requirement, it formed part of the factual circumstances demonstrating that the petitioner was not attempting to obtain an artificial connection with the State merely for admission purposes.
The Court also had to consider the practical consequences of denying relief. The petitioner had already qualified NEET (UG)-2026 with 385 marks and the counselling process for the 2026-27 academic year was ongoing.
If the Court had simply waited for the State to complete the formal amendment process, the petitioner could have lost a valuable opportunity to participate in counselling. Such prejudice could not easily be remedied later.
The Bench therefore directed Kaloji Narayana Rao University of Health Sciences to treat the petitioner as a local candidate for the relevant admission process and allow her to participate in counselling for MBBS and BDS courses under the Competent Authority Quota.
The Court’s direction was also framed with broader implications. It did not restrict the interpretation solely to Samhitha. Instead, it declared that the proviso should be read as extending to children of Central Government employees, Central Government Corporations and CPSUs who had served or were serving outside Telangana.
This ensures that similarly situated candidates are not required to approach the Court individually for identical relief while the formal amendment is pending.
At the same time, the Court directed the Telangana Government to expeditiously issue the necessary clarification or formal amendment to G.O.Ms.No.150.
The Bench thereby recognised the distinction between judicial interpretation and legislative or executive amendment. The Court provided immediate relief by interpreting the existing provision purposively, while leaving the State responsible for formally incorporating the appropriate language into the admission rules.
The Court expressly stated that its declaration and the relief granted would operate pro tanto, pending the formal amendment by the State.
This means that the judicial declaration was intended to operate to the extent necessary to address the immediate issue until the State formally amended or clarified the provision.
Another important aspect of the judgment is that the Court did not finally adjudicate the constitutional challenge raised by the petitioner.
The petitioner had challenged the exclusion under Articles 14 and 15. Ordinarily, a finding that a statutory or regulatory provision is discriminatory could require the Court to examine its constitutional validity directly.
However, in the present case, the State itself acknowledged the underlying difficulty and indicated that corrective action was under consideration. The Court therefore considered it unnecessary to enter into a definitive constitutional adjudication.
Instead, the Bench used interpretation to avoid the discriminatory consequence while respecting the existing regulatory framework.
This approach demonstrates judicial pragmatism. Courts are often required to balnce legal interpretation with the immediate consequences of a rule on individ