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The Legal Affair

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The Legal Affair

Let's talk Law

‘Tareekh Pe Tareekh’ Cannot Define Criminal Justice: Allahabad High Court Decries 24-Year Delay in Kidnapping Trial

‘Tareekh Pe Tareekh’ Cannot Define Criminal Justice: Allahabad High Court Decries 24-Year Delay in Kidnapping Trial

Introduction:

In a significant order highlighting the constitutional importance of a speedy criminal trial, the Allahabad High Court has strongly criticized the extraordinary delay in the disposal of a kidnapping case that has remained pending for more than twenty-four years. In Ajay Kumar @ Chingi and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh through its Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Lucknow and Another [2026 LiveLaw (AB) 425], Justice Rajeev Bharti observed that the often-quoted expression “तारीख पे तारीख” (Tareekh pe tareekh) should never become the defining feature of India’s criminal justice system. The Court remarked that criminal proceedings cannot be allowed to remain dormant for years, reducing a trial to a mere formality and defeating the constitutional promise of timely justice.

The case arose from a First Information Report registered on 12 December 2001 alleging offences under Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the prosecution, a fifteen-year-old girl had gone missing while her guardian was away from home. It was alleged that the principal accused, with the assistance of a co-accused, had enticed and abducted the girl with the intention of compelling her to marry him. The complaint further alleged that while leaving the house, the girl had taken gold and silver ornaments along with cash amounting to ₹1,000. Following investigation, the police filed a charge sheet in April 2002, and the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and summoned the accused to face trial.

The accused had challenged the summoning order before the High Court in 2007 and were granted interim protection. However, the petition was eventually dismissed for want of prosecution due to the absence of the applicants or their counsel. Although the interim protection stood vacated and the trial court was directed to proceed with the matter, the criminal case continued to remain pending for several years without meaningful progress. It was only in May 2026 that the trial court issued bailable warrants to secure the presence of the accused, prompting them to approach the High Court seeking anticipatory bail.

The case not only involved the question of anticipatory bail but also raised broader concerns regarding institutional delay, the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, and the responsibility of courts to ensure that criminal trials are concluded within a reasonable time.

Arguments of the Parties:

The applicants contended that the allegations contained in the FIR did not reflect the true nature of the relationship between the parties. Their counsel submitted that the alleged victim had voluntarily accompanied the principal accused in 2001 because both were in a consensual relationship. It was argued that what was initially projected as an incident of kidnapping had, in reality, culminated in a stable matrimonial relationship that had endured for over two decades.

The applicants further informed the Court that they were now legally married and had been living together peacefully as husband and wife. Their marriage had resulted in the birth of three children, demonstrating that the relationship had evolved into a settled family life. It was therefore submitted that continued incarceration or coercive proceedings after such an extraordinary lapse of time would neither advance the interests of justice nor serve any meaningful public purpose.

Another important submission made on behalf of the applicants related to the enormous delay in the criminal proceedings. Although the charge sheet had been filed in 2002, the trial had failed to progress for more than twenty-four years. The applicants argued that they had no previous criminal antecedents and undertook to cooperate fully with the trial court if granted protection from arrest. They therefore requested the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita relating to anticipatory bail in order to safeguard their liberty.

The State opposed the anticipatory bail application through the Additional Government Advocate. It maintained that serious offences involving kidnapping and abduction had been alleged and that the applicants had been summoned to face trial in accordance with law. The prosecution submitted that the trial court had rightly issued bailable warrants to secure the presence of the accused after the earlier proceedings before the High Court had concluded.

However, during the hearing, the State did not dispute the factual position that the alleged victim and the principal accused had subsequently married and were presently residing together as husband and wife. It was also not disputed that they had three children and had been leading a peaceful matrimonial life for several years. Likewise, the prosecution was unable to controvert the fact that the criminal proceedings had remained pending for more than two decades without reaching their logical conclusion.

Court’s Judgment:

After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Allahabad High Court granted anticipatory bail to the applicants while expressing serious concern over the prolonged pendency of the criminal trial.

Justice Rajeev Bharti observed that the delay of more than twenty-four years in concluding a criminal trial was deeply disturbing and wholly inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of a fair and speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court remarked that justice cannot be reduced to repeated adjournments and prolonged institutional inaction. Referring to the well-known phrase “तारीख पे तारीख”, the Court observed that such an expression is often used to criticize delays in the judicial process and should never become the hallmark of the criminal justice delivery system.

The Court noted that for several years the criminal proceedings had remained virtually dormant without any meaningful progress. Such prolonged inactivity, according to the Court, undermines public confidence in the justice delivery system and causes unnecessary hardship to all stakeholders, including the accused, the complainant and society at large.

While examining the bail application, the Court also considered the changed factual circumstances that had emerged over the years. It noted that the alleged victim and the principal accused had been living together as husband and wife for a considerable period and had three children. The State itself had not disputed this position. Although the Court did not enter into the merits of the allegations relating to the original incident of 2001, it acknowledged that the subsequent developments were relevant while considering the applicants’ prayer for anticipatory bail.

The High Court also took into account that the investigation had already been completed and the charge sheet had been filed as far back as April 2002. Since the applicants had no previous criminal history and had expressed their willingness to cooperate with the trial, the Court found that custodial interrogation was no longer necessary. The purpose of the investigation had already been served, and there was nothing to indicate that the applicants would evade the judicial process if granted appropriate protection.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Musheer Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, which reiterates the principles governing the grant of anticipatory bail and emphasizes the need to balance individual liberty with the interests of justice. Applying those principles, the Court held that the present case warranted the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the applicants.

Justice Bharti observed that Article 21 of the Constitution protects not merely the right to life but also the right to a fair, just and expeditious criminal process. A criminal prosecution cannot be permitted to linger indefinitely due to systemic delays, as such prolonged pendency itself becomes a source of injustice. The Court emphasized that the constitutional obligation to ensure a speedy trial rests upon all institutions involved in the administration of criminal justice.

Accordingly, the High Court allowed the anticipatory bail application and directed the applicants to surrender before the trial court within two weeks. Upon such surrender, they were directed to be released on anticipatory bail subject to the standard terms and conditions imposed by the Court, including cooperation with the trial proceedings and compliance with all directions issued by the trial court.

The judgment is an important reminder that criminal trials cannot be allowed to remain pending indefinitely. While the Court did not terminate the prosecution or express any opinion on the merits of the allegations, it strongly reaffirmed that prolonged institutional delay is incompatible with constitutional values. The order also underscores that the right to a speedy trial is not a mere procedural formality but an essential component of the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21. By granting anticipatory bail while simultaneously criticizing the extraordinary delay in the proceedings, the Allahabad High Court highlighted the urgent need for greater judicial efficiency and timely disposal of criminal cases so that justice is neither delayed nor denied.