Introduction:
The Supreme Court of India recently dismissed a public interest litigation challenging the constitutional validity of Section 13(2)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a provision that grants only wives the right to seek divorce where there has been no resumption of cohabitation after a maintenance decree against the husband. The matter, titled Jitender Singh vs Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 460/2026, came before a Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi.
The petition sought a judicial re-examination of Section 13(2)(iii) on the ground that the provision was discriminatory because it extended the remedy exclusively to women and not to men. The petitioner, who appeared in person before the Court, argued that the law should be made gender-neutral so that husbands could also invoke the same ground for divorce under similar circumstances. According to the petitioner, modern constitutional principles of equality required that matrimonial remedies should not be restricted to one gender alone.
Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides various grounds on which a marriage may be dissolved by a decree of divorce. While Section 13(1) enumerates general grounds available to both spouses, Section 13(2) confers certain additional grounds exclusively upon wives. Clause (iii) of Section 13(2) specifically enables a wife to seek divorce where a decree or order for maintenance has been passed in her favour under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, or under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and cohabitation between the parties has not resumed for a period of one year or more thereafter.
The provision was introduced as part of a broader legislative framework aimed at protecting women in matrimonial relationships, particularly in situations where they are financially dependent or subjected to neglect and abandonment. Historically, Indian matrimonial laws have recognized that women often occupy a vulnerable social and economic position within marriage, thereby justifying certain special statutory protections.
The petitioner contended that while such provisions may once have been justified, contemporary constitutional jurisprudence emphasizing equality under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution required a fresh look at gender-specific benefits. He argued that limiting the remedy only to wives unfairly excluded husbands facing similar marital circumstances.
However, the hearing soon revealed that the petitioner himself was involved in an ongoing matrimonial dispute, leading the Court to question whether the PIL was genuinely filed in public interest or was merely an attempt to pursue personal grievances through constitutional litigation. The Bench repeatedly expressed concern over the misuse of Article 32 jurisdiction for settling private matrimonial disputes under the guise of public interest.
The case ultimately became significant not merely for its challenge to Section 13(2)(iii), but also for the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of constitutional protections permitting special laws for women under Article 15(3). The judgment reflects the Court’s continuing approach toward balancing formal equality with substantive equality in matters concerning social welfare legislation.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner, appearing in person, argued that Section 13(2)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act was discriminatory because it created a one-sided matrimonial remedy exclusively in favour of wives. According to him, if a wife could seek divorce after non-resumption of cohabitation following a maintenance decree, then husbands should also be entitled to invoke a similar remedy under comparable circumstances.
The petitioner contended that the Constitution guarantees equality before law under Article 14 and prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex under Article 15(1). He argued that the provision failed to satisfy constitutional standards of equality because it excluded men from accessing a legal remedy solely on the basis of gender. In his view, modern constitutional interpretation demanded gender-neutral laws, especially in matrimonial disputes where both spouses may suffer emotional and social hardships.
During the hearing, the petitioner clarified that he was not seeking complete invalidation of the provision but rather a “relook” and expansion of the remedy so that it could apply equally to both men and women. He repeatedly submitted that the provision should be made available to husbands as well.
The petitioner also attempted to invoke broader themes of fairness and equal treatment within matrimonial law. Though not elaborately argued in the brief hearing reflected in the case summary, the essence of his challenge rested on the belief that legal protections should no longer presume that only women face disadvantage in marital relationships.
However, the Bench questioned the actual basis and motive behind the challenge. Chief Justice Surya Kant repeatedly asked the petitioner how the provision personally affected him and what concrete constitutional injury had been caused. The Court appeared unconvinced that a genuine public interest issue was involved.
When pressed further, the petitioner admitted that he himself was involved in matrimonial litigation and described himself as a “personal sufferer.” This admission significantly altered the tenor of the proceedings. The Bench immediately expressed concern that the petition was essentially motivated by personal grievances arising out of his own marital dispute.
The Chief Justice remarked that the Court had anticipated such a disclosure and questioned why exemplary costs should not be imposed for invoking the Supreme Court’s extraordinary writ jurisdiction for personal disputes. The Court also asked the petitioner whether he considered himself a “self-proclaimed leader of male rights,” indicating judicial skepticism regarding the broader public interest dimensions of the plea.
On behalf of the constitutional position, the Court itself referred to Article 15(3) of the Constitution, which permits the State to make special provisions for women and children. Justice Joymalya Bagchi pointed out that Section 13(2)(iii) falls squarely within the constitutional framework that recognizes the validity of beneficial legislation enacted specifically for women.
Article 15(3) acts as an enabling provision allowing affirmative and protective measures in favour of women, even where such measures create distinctions based on gender. The Bench emphasized that the Constitution itself contemplates differential treatment where necessary to achieve substantive equality and social justice.
The Court indicated that the Hindu Marriage Act provision was part of a legislative scheme intended to address historical and structural disadvantages faced by women in matrimonial relationships. Therefore, merely because a provision grants an additional remedy to wives does not automatically render it unconstitutional.
The Bench further cautioned against transforming personal dissatisfaction arising from matrimonial disputes into constitutional litigation under Article 32. The judges observed that constitutional remedies cannot be used as instruments for pursuing private vendettas or frustrations.
At the same time, the Court maintained a degree of empathy toward the petitioner. Since he informed the Court that he was pursuing legal studies, the Chief Justice addressed him with a measure of restraint and understanding. The Bench acknowledged that he might genuinely feel aggrieved by his personal experiences but clarified that such grievances alone could not justify constitutional invalidation of a statutory provision enacted as a special protective measure for women.
The Court also remarked that sympathy could not be unilateral. While acknowledging the petitioner’s distress, the Bench noted that equal sympathy must also extend toward his estranged wife, thereby reflecting the Court’s balanced approach in sensitive matrimonial matters.
Thus, the arguments before the Court ultimately revolved around two competing constitutional ideas: the petitioner’s demand for formal gender equality in matrimonial remedies, and the constitutional legitimacy of special protections for women under Article 15(3).
Court’s Judgment:
The Supreme Court dismissed the public interest litigation and declined to interfere with Section 13(2)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The Court firmly held that the provision constituted a constitutionally permissible special protection for women and that the challenge lacked merit.
At the outset, the Bench questioned the maintainability and bona fides of the petition itself. The judges were unconvinced that the matter represented a genuine public interest issue warranting invocation of the Supreme Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court repeatedly emphasized that constitutional remedies cannot be used to settle personal scores arising out of matrimonial discord.
The turning point during the hearing came when the petitioner admitted that he was personally involved in matrimonial disputes and described himself as a “personal sufferer.” The Court viewed this disclosure as confirmation that the PIL was motivated primarily by individual grievances rather than broader constitutional concerns.
Chief Justice Surya Kant observed that litigants should not misuse public interest litigation mechanisms to pursue personal vendettas. The Court’s remarks underscored a well-established judicial principle that PIL jurisdiction is intended for genuine public causes affecting larger sections of society and not for advancing private disputes disguised as constitutional challenges.
The Bench specifically warned against converting personal marital dissatisfaction into constitutional litigation. The Chief Justice remarked, “Don’t settle personal vendettas through Article 32,” thereby reaffirming the limited and carefully guarded nature of the Supreme Court’s writ jurisdiction.
On the substantive constitutional issue, the Court upheld the validity of Section 13(2)(iii) by relying upon Article 15(3) of the Constitution. Justice Joymalya Bagchi clearly observed that the provision forms part of a special legal framework designed to protect women and is therefore constitutionally protected.
Article 15(3) permits the State to enact special provisions for women and children notwithstanding the general prohibition against discrimination under Article 15(1). Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently recognized that equality does not always require identical treatment. In many situations, differential treatment may be necessary to remedy historical disadvantages and achieve substantive equality.
The Court’s reasoning reflects the long-standing judicial understanding that beneficial legislation enacted for women constitutes a valid constitutional classification. Matrimonial laws in India have historically acknowledged the unequal social and economic realities faced by women within marriage. Maintenance provisions, special divorce grounds, and protective remedies have often been introduced to safeguard women from abandonment, financial insecurity, and social vulnerability.
By refusing to strike down or modify Section 13(2)(iii), the Supreme Court effectively reaffirmed the constitutional legitimacy of gender-specific protective provisions within personal laws. The judgment demonstrates the Court’s continued preference for substantive equality over a purely formal or mechanical notion of gender neutrality.
Although the Court did not deliver a lengthy written constitutional analysis during the hearing, its oral observations clearly indicated that special statutory protections for women remain constitutionally sustainable so long as they are rooted in legitimate social objectives.
The Bench also addressed the petitioner’s status as a law student. Chief Justice Surya Kant advised him that while he may genuinely feel aggrieved by his personal circumstances, constitutional litigation should not be pursued impulsively or emotionally. The Court observed that filing such petitions without broader constitutional foundation sends an inappropriate message, particularly for someone studying law.
Importantly, the Court adopted a balanced and humane tone despite expressing strong disapproval of the PIL. The judges acknowledged the possibility that the petitioner may indeed have experienced emotional distress due to his matrimonial dispute. However, the Court emphasized that sympathy cannot operate selectively and must also extend toward the estranged spouse.
This aspect of the hearing reflects the judiciary’s broader sensitivity toward matrimonial conflicts, where both parties often experience emotional and social hardships. Rather than treating the issue as a simplistic battle of gender rights, the Court approached the matter through the lens of constitutional structure, legislative purpose, and judicial restraint.
The dismissal of the PIL therefore reinforces two major legal principles. First, special statutory protections enacted for women under Article 15(3) remain constitutionally valid even where they create gender-based distinctions. Second, the Supreme Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32 cannot be invoked merely to ventilate personal grievances arising from private disputes.
The ruling may also have wider implications for contemporary debates surrounding gender-neutral matrimonial laws in India. While there is increasing public discourse regarding equal treatment of spouses irrespective of gender, the judgment indicates that courts are unlikely to invalidate women-centric protective provisions solely on the ground that they are not gender-neutral.
Instead, the judiciary appears inclined to defer to legislative wisdom in matters involving social welfare and affirmative protections for historically disadvantaged groups. Any broader restructuring of gender-specific matrimonial remedies may therefore require legislative intervention rather than judicial rewriting of statutory provisions.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case reflects a careful balance between constitutional equality principles and the continuing necessity of protective legal frameworks for women. By dismissing the PIL, the Court reaffirmed that beneficial legislation designed to safeguard women’s rights within marriage continues to enjoy strong constitutional support under the Indian legal system.