Introduction:
The Supreme Court of India, in Mondira Ghosh v. Chaitali Ghosh (2026 LiveLaw (SC) 579), has delivered a significant judgment clarifying the scope and limitations of additional written statements under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The decision reinforces the principle that a litigant cannot be permitted to fundamentally alter the nature of her defence after the commencement of trial by introducing a completely inconsistent and contradictory plea through an additional written statement.
The judgment was rendered by a Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, which set aside an order of the Calcutta High Court that had allowed the defendant to file an additional written statement at an advanced stage of the proceedings. The Supreme Court restored the order of the trial court and held that the defendant’s attempt was not a bona fide effort to clarify facts but a deliberate attempt to replace an existing defence with an entirely new case.
The dispute arose out of a civil suit filed by Mondira Ghosh against Chaitali Ghosh concerning possession of certain immovable property. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendant was in unlawful occupation of the suit property and sought consequential relief for eviction. The case initially proceeded on the basis of the defendant’s categorical assertion that she was not a trespasser or unauthorized occupant but rather a bona fide co-sharer in the property.
The defendant filed her written statement in December 2022 and specifically denied the allegations made by the plaintiff. Her principal defence rested upon her alleged status as a co-owner or co-sharer of the property. On the basis of the pleadings of both parties, the trial court framed issues in May 2023, and the matter proceeded to trial. Evidence was led by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s witness was extensively cross-examined.
At this advanced stage, after the trial had already commenced, the defendant filed an application under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC seeking permission to file an additional written statement accompanied by a counterclaim. Through this proposed pleading, the defendant abandoned her earlier claim of co-ownership and instead asserted that she was occupying the property as a tenant under the plaintiff.
This dramatic shift in position raised important procedural questions concerning the extent to which pleadings may be altered after the commencement of trial. The case therefore involved the interplay between Order VIII Rule 9 CPC, which governs subsequent pleadings, Order VI Rule 7 CPC, which prohibits inconsistent pleadings, and the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, which restricts amendments once the trial has begun.
The trial court rejected the defendant’s application, holding that the law does not permit a litigant to withdraw an existing defence and substitute it with an entirely contradictory case after the commencement of trial. However, the Calcutta High Court partially interfered with that decision and allowed the filing of the additional written statement upon payment of costs while rejecting the counterclaim. The matter eventually reached the Supreme Court, which was called upon to determine whether such a radical departure from the original defence could be permitted under the CPC.
The judgment is significant because it reiterates the importance of certainty and consistency in pleadings, protects the integrity of civil trials, and prevents litigants from changing their positions according to the evolving circumstances of litigation.
Arguments of the Parties:
The appellant-plaintiff, Mondira Ghosh, challenged the order of the Calcutta High Court and argued that the permission granted to the defendant to file an additional written statement was contrary to established procedural law. It was contended that the defendant had consciously chosen her defence at the time of filing the original written statement and had unequivocally claimed to be a co-sharer of the suit property. Having adopted that position and contested the suit on that basis, she could not subsequently abandon it and introduce a completely contradictory plea.
The appellant argued that there is a fundamental distinction between elaborating an existing defence and substituting it with an entirely new case. While courts generally adopt a liberal approach in permitting amendments or additional pleadings where necessary for determining the real controversy between parties, such discretion cannot be exercised to allow a litigant to make a complete volte-face after the commencement of trial.
It was further submitted that the proposed additional written statement was not intended to clarify facts that had been inadvertently omitted from the original pleading. Rather, it sought to destroy the foundation of the original defence and replace it with an entirely different legal relationship. A claim of co-ownership and a claim of tenancy are based on mutually inconsistent legal rights. A co-owner claims an ownership interest in the property itself, whereas a tenant acknowledges the ownership of another person and claims a right of occupation under a contractual or statutory tenancy arrangement.
According to the appellant, allowing such a contradictory plea at an advanced stage would seriously prejudice the plaintiff. The plaintiff had already conducted the litigation on the basis of the original defence. Issues had been framed, evidence had been led, and witnesses had been examined. Permitting a fresh and contradictory defence would effectively require the entire trial to be reopened.
The appellant also argued that the defendant’s application was an indirect attempt to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Since amendments to pleadings after commencement of trial are subject to strict limitations, the defendant sought to achieve the same result by invoking Order VIII Rule 9 CPC and presenting the proposed pleading as an additional written statement.
The respondent-defendant, Chaitali Ghosh, supported the High Court’s order and contended that courts possess broad discretionary powers to permit subsequent pleadings where such pleadings assist in the effective adjudication of disputes. It was argued that procedural laws are intended to advance the cause of justice and should not be interpreted in a rigid or technical manner.
The respondent maintained that the additional written statement was necessary to place the complete facts before the court. It was contended that the object of civil procedure is to facilitate a fair adjudication on merits rather than to punish parties for procedural mistakes or omissions.
The defendant further argued that no irreparable prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff because the plaintiff would have an opportunity to respond to the additional pleading and meet the case through evidence. According to the respondent, courts should generally permit additional pleadings if they assist in determining the real controversy between the parties.
Reliance was also placed on the discretionary nature of Order VIII Rule 9 CPC. The respondent argued that the provision empowers courts to permit subsequent pleadings whenever circumstances justify such permission. The High Court had exercised that discretion and imposed costs to compensate the plaintiff, thereby balancing the interests of both parties.
However, the appellant countered these submissions by emphasizing that procedural flexibility cannot be stretched to the extent of permitting mutually destructive and contradictory stands after the commencement of trial. According to the appellant, the respondent was not merely elaborating an existing defence but was seeking to erase one defence and replace it with another altogether.
Court’s Judgment:
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court categorically held that the High Court had committed a serious error in permitting the defendant to file the proposed additional written statement.
The Court began by examining the nature of the defendant’s original defence and the contents of the proposed additional written statement. It noted that in her original pleading, the defendant had specifically asserted that she was a bona fide co-sharer of the suit property. This claim formed the foundation of her defence and constituted the basis upon which the suit proceeded.
The Court observed that the proposed additional written statement sought to introduce an entirely different case. Instead of claiming co-ownership, the defendant now sought to assert that she was a tenant under the plaintiff. The Bench emphasized that these two positions were fundamentally inconsistent and mutually destructive.
The Court observed that this was not a situation where a party was merely supplementing existing facts or providing additional details in support of an earlier defence. Nor was it a case involving inadvertent omission of material particulars. Instead, the defendant sought to withdraw her earlier plea altogether and substitute it with a completely contradictory stand.
Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran held that such a course of action was impermissible under the CPC. The Court specifically referred to Order VI Rule 7 CPC, which prohibits parties from departing from their pleadings or raising allegations inconsistent with previous pleadings except by way of proper amendment. The rule is designed to ensure certainty, fairness, and consistency in litigation.
The Bench emphasized that pleadings are not mere formalities. They define the scope of the dispute, identify the issues requiring adjudication, and guide the conduct of the trial. Once parties have disclosed their respective cases and the trial has commenced, courts must guard against attempts to fundamentally alter the nature of the controversy.
The Court further observed that the defendant’s application appeared to be an attempt to circumvent the restrictions contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. The proviso imposes significant limitations on amendments after commencement of trial and permits such amendments only where the party demonstrates that despite exercising due diligence, the matter could not have been raised earlier.
According to the Court, the defendant had failed to satisfy these requirements. Instead of seeking amendment at an appropriate stage and establishing due diligence, she attempted to invoke Order VIII Rule 9 CPC as an alternative route for introducing a new case.
The Supreme Court firmly rejected this approach. It held that procedural provisions cannot be used in a manner that defeats the legislative intent underlying the restrictions on amendments after commencement of trial. Courts must examine the substance of the application rather than its label.
The Bench observed that permitting such a drastic change in defence would undermine the fairness of the trial process. The plaintiff had already structured her case based on the original defence. Evidence had been recorded and witnesses had been examined. Allowing a contradictory defence at that stage would not only prejudice the plaintiff but would also disrupt the orderly conduct of the proceedings.
The Court also stressed that litigation cannot be conducted on shifting and inconsistent foundations. Judicial proceedings require certainty and predictability. Parties are expected to disclose their case at the earliest opportunity and remain bound by their pleadings except in exceptional circumstances recognized by law.
Significantly, the Court described the defendant’s conduct as an abuse of process. It observed that the application was filed after the trial had commenced and appeared to be a deliberate attempt to avoid the statutory limitations governing amendments. Such conduct, the Court held, could not be encouraged.
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had correctly appreciated the legal position and rightly rejected the application. The High Court, in permitting the additional written statement, failed to recognize the fundamentally contradictory nature of the proposed plea and the procedural barriers applicable after commencement of trial.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Calcutta High Court’s order dated September 3, 2025, and restored the trial court’s order rejecting the defendant’s application under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC.
The judgment serves as an important reaffirmation of the principle that while procedural laws are intended to facilitate justice, they cannot be employed to permit litigants to radically alter their case after trial has begun. It reinforces the sanctity of pleadings, upholds the restrictions on post-trial amendments, and underscores that courts must prevent misuse of procedural provisions designed to ensure fairness and finality in civil litigation.