Introduction:

In a recent ruling dated January 22, 2025, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the scope of appeal in delay condonation cases, emphasising that the High Court should not delve into the merits of a matter when the appeal is restricted solely to the condonation of delay—the case at hand, Surendra G. Shankar & Anr. v. Esque Finamark Pvt. Ltd & Ors. Involved the appellants seeking to challenge an order by the Appellate Tribunal in Mumbai that had refused to condone the delay in filing their appeal. This decision was made in the context of complaints initially filed before the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) regarding possession of a flat. The appellants had faced setbacks with their dismissed complaints, and one of the orders even discharged the developer from the proceedings. The matter was taken to the Appellate Tribunal, where the delay in filing the appeal was contested. However, the Tribunal dismissed the condonation application, reasoning that the delay had not been sufficiently explained and that the order had been passed in the presence of all parties. Upon the matter reaching the High Court, the Court remarked that under normal circumstances, it would have condoned the delay but went on to make observations concerning the case’s merits. This led to the dismissal of the appeals. The High Court’s decision aggrieved the appellants and subsequently approached the Supreme Court for further relief. The issue before the Apex Court was whether the High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction by commenting on the case’s merits while examining only the condonation of delay.

Arguments:

In the appeal, the appellants argued that the High Court should have focused exclusively on whether the delay in filing the appeal could be excused, as the scope of the appeal was limited to this question alone. They contended that by delving into the case’s merits, the High Court had unfairly prejudiced the outcome of the appeals. Additionally, they argued that the Appellate Tribunal had not considered the case’s merits in its order, making it improper for the High Court to have made observations on the same.

On the other hand, the respondents argued that the High Court had merely observed that under normal circumstances, the delay should have been condoned but was bound by the existing procedural rules that dictated the dismissal of the appeal. They contended that the High Court’s approach was consistent with the facts before it and that it was within its rights to comment on the merits in a limited capacity.

Judgement:

In its judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court’s role when dealing with appeals limited to condoning delay is not to delve into the merits of the case. The Court pointed out that the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, had not addressed the merits of the order but had focused only on the delay issue. Therefore, the High Court should not have made observations about the case’s merits, especially when it was not within its purview to do so.

The Court reiterated that once the High Court concluded that, under normal circumstances, the delay should have been condoned, it should have refrained from making any remarks on the case’s merits. The proper course of action, the Court observed, was for the High Court to set aside the order rejecting the delay condonation application, condone the delay, and allow the appeals to be restored before the Appellate Tribunal.

The Supreme Court further clarified that upon condoning the delay, the Appellate Tribunal should be allowed to consider the case on its own merits, free from any prejudicial comments made by the High Court. The Court allowed the appeals, condoned the delay, and restored the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh consideration of the merits, untainted by the observations made by the High Court.

In light of these findings, the Supreme Court made it clear that the role of the High Court in delay condonation appeals is strictly limited to examining the reasons for the delay and not to evaluating the substantive issues of the case. The judgment reinforced the principle that procedural matters, such as the condonation of delay, should be handled separately from the core issues of the dispute.