Introduction:
In a landmark judgment that once again reaffirms India’s secular fabric and the sanctity of individual freedom of belief, the Supreme Court of India, in Rajendra Bihari Lal and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, W.P. (Crl.) No. 123 of 2023 and connected cases, cited as 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1021, quashed a series of FIRs registered under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (“UP Conversion Act”) against the Vice Chancellor and officials of the Sam Higginbottom University of Agriculture, Technology and Sciences (SHUATS), Prayagraj. The FIRs had alleged forced mass conversions to Christianity. A division bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra, while granting relief to the petitioners, expressed serious prima facie concerns regarding several provisions of the UP Conversion Act, particularly those mandating pre- and post-conversion declarations before District Magistrates, police inquiries into intended religious conversions, and publication of personal details of converts. Although the constitutional validity of the UP Act was not directly before the Court, the Bench used the occasion to highlight how some of its provisions appeared to infringe fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, notably Article 25 which protects freedom of conscience and religion.
Arguments on behalf of the Petitioners:
The petitioners, represented by Senior Advocates Siddharth Dave, Siddharth Agarwal, Rebecca M. John, Advocate A.S. Vairawan, and Pallavi Sharma, argued that the FIRs filed against the officials of SHUATS were a gross misuse of the UP Conversion Act, reflecting a larger pattern of criminalising legitimate religious and charitable activities under the guise of preventing forced conversions. They contended that the University and its office bearers were wrongly accused of mass conversions when their activities involved ordinary religious gatherings, prayers, and social work initiatives, none of which fell within the prohibited categories of “force,” “fraud,” or “allurement” as defined under the Act. The petitioners argued that criminal law was being weaponised to harass individuals belonging to minority faiths and that such misuse threatened the constitutional right to freely profess and propagate religion. They urged the Court to note that the right to change one’s faith or to persuade others by legitimate means was part of the fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution.
Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the provisions of the UP Conversion Act placed an unconstitutional burden on individuals seeking to change their religion by requiring them to make prior declarations before District Magistrates, followed by intrusive police inquiries. Such procedures, they contended, stripped the act of conversion of its private and spiritual character and turned it into a matter of state surveillance. They also questioned the provision mandating publication of personal details of converts on public notice boards, arguing that it directly violated the fundamental right to privacy recognized in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) and exposed individuals to social hostility and persecution. The petitioners relied on Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018), where the Court had emphasized the primacy of individual autonomy in matters of faith, marriage, and belief, and reiterated that the State could not dictate personal choices under the pretext of social regulation. They asserted that the FIRs against SHUATS officials lacked specific allegations of coercion, inducement, or fraudulent means—making the prosecution untenable in law.
Arguments on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh:
On the other hand, the Attorney General for India, R. Venkataramani, and Additional Advocate General Garima Prashad appeared for the State of Uttar Pradesh and defended the FIRs. The State contended that the UP Conversion Act had been enacted to safeguard vulnerable sections of society, particularly women, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes, from organized and coercive religious conversions. It argued that the statutory requirement of pre- and post-conversion declarations before District Magistrates was meant to ensure transparency and to prevent conversions carried out through unlawful inducements or deceit. The State maintained that the provisions did not prohibit voluntary conversion but merely regulated the process to ensure that consent was genuine.
Counsel for the State further submitted that allegations in the FIRs indicated that large numbers of people were induced to convert through promises of education, healthcare, and financial aid, which fell within the prohibited “allurement” under the statute. They argued that such organized activities justified criminal investigation and that the judiciary should refrain from interfering at the threshold stage, particularly when the validity of the Act itself was under challenge in other pending matters. The State also contended that publication of conversion details was essential for transparency and preventing fraudulent claims. They urged that since the UP Act had not yet been declared unconstitutional, the State was bound to implement it in letter and spirit.
The Court’s Judgment:
After carefully examining the FIRs, the provisions of the UP Conversion Act, and the factual matrix of the case, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that the FIRs against the Vice Chancellor and officials of SHUATS were unsustainable and deserved to be quashed. The Bench held that “criminal law cannot be used as a tool to harass innocents,” noting that none of the FIRs contained specific allegations constituting an offence under the UP Conversion Act. The Court clarified that mere religious gatherings, prayers, or acts of charity do not amount to offences under the Act unless there is credible evidence of conversion through coercion, fraud, or allurement. In doing so, the Court reiterated that India’s legal system must uphold individual liberty and not criminalize acts of faith or religious expression.
Significantly, even while not adjudicating on the constitutionality of the UP Conversion Act itself, the Court made several prima facie observations about its provisions. It expressed concern that the Act imposed “a very onerous burden on a person wanting to adopt a faith other than the one he professes,” and that the involvement of State authorities—particularly the mandatory police inquiry before any conversion—represented visible and excessive interference in personal matters of conscience. The Court observed that requiring prior declarations and police scrutiny effectively made religious conversion a matter of state permission, contrary to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience.
The Bench further noted that the statutory requirement to publish personal details of converts on public notice boards might not conform with constitutional jurisprudence protecting the right to privacy. Referring to the K.S. Puttaswamy case, the Court highlighted that Article 25 embodies not only freedom of religion but also facets of privacy and freedom of conscience. It emphasized that the right to choose one’s faith is integral to personal autonomy and individual dignity. The Court also cited Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) to underscore that the secular character of India is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, and that liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship are the very foundations of the Indian Republic as articulated in the Preamble.
The judgment elaborated that secularism in India does not mean irreligion but equal respect for all religions and the complete freedom of individuals to profess, practice, and propagate their beliefs without fear or State interference. The Bench remarked that “the people of India have the liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship, and this liberty is an embodiment and expression of the secular nature of the country.” Reaffirming the importance of the Preamble and its binding character, the Court stated that the Constitution must be read and interpreted in the light of the noble vision it expresses.
In a detailed analysis, the Court explained that Article 25, subject to reasonable restrictions, grants every individual the right not merely to hold religious beliefs but to manifest them through overt acts and to propagate them for the edification of others. It reiterated that religion is a matter of faith and conscience, and that courts have consistently recognized it as an essential aspect of personal liberty. The Bench cited Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. to highlight that autonomy in matters of faith and marriage cannot be curtailed by the State, and that laws must respect individual choices.
The Court was categorical in observing that the UP Conversion Act’s procedural requirements—such as pre-conversion declaration, police inquiry, and post-conversion publication—require deeper constitutional scrutiny. These provisions, in the Court’s prima facie view, “seem to introduce a very onerous procedure to be followed by an individual seeking to adopt a faith other than the one he professes,” and that “the involvement and interference of the State authorities in the conversion procedure is also conspicuous.” The Bench stopped short of striking down any provision of the Act, as its constitutional validity was not directly under challenge in this case, but it sent a strong signal that such matters warrant “deeper examination” in pending challenges before the Court.
By quashing the FIRs, the Court not only protected the petitioners from harassment but also reaffirmed the principle that criminal law should not be weaponized to target individuals based on their faith. The Court emphasized that neither religious congregation nor charitable activity amounts to conversion unless accompanied by coercive means, and that faith-based interactions must be protected under Article 25. This pronouncement, while confined to the facts of the SHUATS case, will likely influence future interpretations of anti-conversion statutes across India, especially in the context of ongoing constitutional challenges to similar laws enacted by states such as Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka.
The Bench’s remarks also serve as a reminder to the State that while the legislature may regulate conversions to prevent fraud or coercion, it cannot impose unreasonable conditions that make voluntary conversion practically impossible. The Court thus reaffirmed that secularism, as part of India’s basic structure, obliges the State to remain neutral in matters of faith and to safeguard the individual’s autonomy to choose and change religion as an exercise of conscience.