Introduction:

The Supreme Court of India has raised significant constitutional and social concerns over the continued validity of laws that disqualify individuals having more than two children from contesting elections to local self-government institutions. Observing that India’s demographic circumstances have undergone a substantial transformation over the past two decades, the Court expressed the strong opinion that such restrictions have lost their relevance and that the justification on which they were originally based has considerably weakened. The Court emphasised that India’s declining Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which has fallen below the replacement level, requires a fresh examination of population-control measures that impose electoral disabilities on citizens having more than two children.

A Bench comprising Justice P. S. Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe made these observations while hearing a petition filed by Mangala Bhimrao, a former Sarpanch of Kakoda Gram Panchayat in Maharashtra. The proceedings raised an important question concerning the constitutional validity of Section 14(1)(j-1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, which provides for the disqualification of a person from continuing as a member of a village panchayat if they have more than two children, subject to the statutory conditions.

The provision was introduced through an amendment that came into force on September 13, 2000. Its underlying objective was to encourage population control by discouraging individuals from having more than two children. Under this framework, the birth of a third child could result in disqualification from holding an elected position in a village panchayat. Similar restrictions were introduced in several other States as part of population-control policies intended to address concerns about increasing population and the pressure on public resources.

The constitutional foundation of such restrictions was examined by the Supreme Court in Javed v. State of Haryana (2003). In that case, a three-judge Bench upheld the validity of provisions under the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, which disqualified persons having more than two living children from contesting elections to panchayati raj institutions. The Court had rejected the challenge based on Article 14 of the Constitution, holding that the classification adopted by the legislature was constitutionally permissible and that the restriction was connected with the objective of promoting family planning.

However, the present proceedings brought the continuing relevance of that precedent into focus. The Supreme Court considered whether the reasoning adopted in Javed could still justify the exclusion of citizens from democratic participation when the country’s demographic realities had changed considerably.

The Court particularly relied on the decline in India’s Total Fertility Rate. At the time Javed was decided in 2003, India’s TFR stood at approximately 3. It has since declined to around 1.9, falling below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1. The replacement rate represents the level at which a population can replace itself from one generation to the next, in the absence of migration and other demographic factors.

The Bench expressed concern that continuing to enforce restrictive population-control laws without considering these changes could produce consequences opposite to those originally intended. A fertility rate below the replacement level may gradually contribute to an ageing population and reduce the proportion of people in the working-age group.

Against this background, the Supreme Court referred the question concerning the correctness of the decision in Javed v. State of Haryana to a larger Bench. It also set aside the disqualification imposed on Mangala Bhimrao under the Maharashtra legislation, thereby bringing the immediate dispute before it to a favourable conclusion for the petitioner.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner, Mangala Bhimrao Ingle, challenged the decision disqualifying her from holding the office of Sarpanch under Section 14(1)(j-1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959. Her challenge arose from proceedings initiated following a complaint alleging that she had given birth to a third child and had consequently incurred statutory disqualification. The Additional Collector accepted the complaint and passed an order disqualifying her. Her subsequent appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Amravati Division, was also dismissed, leaving the disqualification undisturbed.

Before the Bombay High Court, the petitioner questioned the basis on which the authorities had concluded that she had incurred the disqualification. One of the central issues concerned the birth certificate of the third child, from which she attempted to distance herself. However, the High Court observed that the document contained the names of both parents and that there was no material available to establish that the certificate was incorrect or could otherwise be disregarded. Consequently, the High Court declined to interfere with the administrative findings and upheld the disqualification by its order dated August 5, 2025.

Aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, Ingle approached the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition. Her challenge brought into question not only the correctness of the disqualification in her individual case but also the constitutional justification for continuing to impose electoral disabilities on persons having more than two children. The petition placed the two-child restriction under scrutiny in the context of the changing demographic conditions of the country and the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Advocate Pratik Bombarde appeared for the petitioner. However, the available account of the proceedings does not set out a complete, separately recorded statement of the petitioner’s legal submissions. Accordingly, the broader constitutional concerns considered by the Supreme Court should not be treated as verbatim arguments advanced by counsel.

On the other side, the disqualification had been defended through the statutory framework under the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959. The authorities had proceeded on the basis that the birth of the third child attracted Section 14(1)(j-1), which imposed a restriction on persons having more than two children from continuing as members of village panchayats or holding the office of Sarpanch. The administrative decision was sustained by the Additional Commissioner and subsequently by the Bombay High Court.

The State’s position also had to be considered against the existing constitutional precedent in Javed v. State of Haryana (2003). In that judgment, the Supreme Court had upheld a similar two-child restriction under the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The earlier ruling provided the constitutional basis on which comparable provisions in State legislation had continued to operate. Therefore, the larger question before the Supreme Court was whether the reasoning supporting such restrictions remained sustainable despite the substantial changes in India’s fertility patterns.

Advocate Rukmini Bobde, who assisted the Court as amicus curiae, provided information concerning the position adopted by different States. The Court had specifically sought a compilation of State laws imposing restrictions on persons having more than two children from contesting local-body elections. The compilation demonstrated that there was no uniform legislative approach throughout the country. Seven States had repealed the two-child restriction, while fifteen States did not have such a policy. Certain States, including Assam, Goa, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Odisha and Uttarakhand, continued to retain provisions imposing similar restrictions.

The material placed before the Court thus demonstrated that the two-child norm was not being implemented uniformly across India. The differing legislative approaches also raised questions about whether the continued exclusion of individuals from local democratic institutions could still be justified by relying on a population-control policy formulated under substantially different demographic circumstances.

The Supreme Court was consequently required to examine the competing considerations underlying the controversy: the legislative objective of population control, the constitutional protection of individual liberty and reproductive autonomy, and the importance of ensuring meaningful participation in democratic institutions. The Court’s examination extended beyond the immediate dispute to the continuing validity of the constitutional reasoning adopted in Javed.

Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court, comprising Justice P. S. Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe, expressed serious reservations about the continued enforcement of laws disqualifying individuals from contesting local-body elections merely because they have more than two children. The Bench observed that the demographic circumstances prevailing when such restrictions were introduced had changed substantially and that the justification originally relied upon to sustain them could no longer be accepted without reconsideration.

Justice Narasimha, while pronouncing the judgment, stated that laws penalising individuals for having more than two children had lost their relevance. According to the Bench, the foundation of these restrictions was the fear of overpopulation. However, the substantial decline in India’s fertility rate over the past two decades had weakened that justification. The Court emphasised that legislation intended to address a particular demographic concern must be examined in light of contemporary realities rather than being continued mechanically on the basis of assumptions that may no longer hold true.

A significant part of the Court’s reasoning concerned India’s declining Total Fertility Rate. The Bench noted that India’s TFR stood at approximately 3 in 2003, when the Supreme Court decided Javed v. State of Haryana. It has since declined to approximately 1.9, which is below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1.

The replacement fertility rate represents the average number of children a woman would need to have for one generation to replace itself in the absence of migration and other demographic influences. A rate of approximately 2.1 is generally considered necessary to maintain a relatively stable population over successive generations.

The Court clarified that although India’s overall population has not yet started declining, a fertility rate below the replacement level could eventually produce a significant demographic transition. Such a transition would be characterised by an increasing proportion of elderly persons and a declining share of the working-age population. This change could create serious economic and social challenges, particularly concerning the availability of an adequate workforce and the responsibilities associated with an ageing population.

The Bench cautioned that population-related legislation must respond to changing demographic realities. Continuing to enforce restrictions designed to discourage larger families without taking account of declining fertility could result in consequences that are inconsistent with the country’s emerging demographic requirements.

In this regard, the Court also referred to China’s experience with population-control policies. In Javed, the Supreme Court had referred to China as an example of a country that had successfully implemented stringent population-control measures, including its one-child policy. However, China’s subsequent demographic developments led it to abandon the one-child policy in 2015 and introduce measures encouraging families to have more children. Even the subsequent relaxation of restrictions did not produce the desired demographic changes, prompting further incentives for families to have three children.

The reference to China was significant because it demonstrated how population-control policies may become unsuitable when demographic circumstances change. A measure that might have appeared justified during a period of high fertility may become counterproductive when the fertility rate falls substantially. The Supreme Court therefore considered that India must carefully assess the long-term consequences of retaining population-control restrictions in the present demographic environment.

The Bench observed:

“We are of the strong opinion that the laws which penalise having more than two children have lost their relevance. The foundation of such laws, that is the fear of over population, has crumbled due to demographic changes in the past few decades.”

The Court further explained that India’s fertility rate had declined from 3 in 2003 to 1.9, falling below the replacement rate of 2.1. It observed that this development could lead to an older population with a declining proportion of working-age individuals. Consequently, laws restricting population growth required reconsideration to ensure that they did not create serious demographic consequences in the future.

Reconsideration of the 2003 Javed Judgment

One of the most important aspects of the judgment was the Supreme Court’s decision to refer the issue to a larger Bench for reconsideration of Javed v. State of Haryana (2003).

In Javed, a three-judge Bench had examined the constitutional validity of provisions under the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, which disqualified individuals having more than two living children from contesting elections to local self-government institutions. The challenge principally involved Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.

The Supreme Court had upheld the restriction, accepting that the classification created by the legislation was constitutionally permissible and that the measure was connected with the objective of promoting family planning and population control. The judgment had consequently provided legal support for similar restrictions introduced by other States.

However, the present Bench questioned whether the constitutional reasoning adopted in Javed continued to remain valid in light of the country’s changing demographic circumstances. It considered that the assumptions underlying the earlier decision required fresh examination, particularly because the population-control rationale had substantially weakened over time.

The Court’s decision to refer the matter to a larger Bench was also significant from the standpoint of judicial discipline. Since Javed had been decided by a three-judge Bench, the present two-judge Bench could not simply overrule that precedent. If the present Bench considered the earlier legal position to be incorrect or required reconsideration, the appropriate course was to refer the question to a Bench of greater strength.

Accordingly, rather than directly declaring the two-child restrictions unconstitutional, the Court referred the constitutional issue to a larger Bench. This would enable a more authoritative examination of whether the reasoning in Javed should continue to govern the validity of similar State laws.

Impact on Reproductive Autonomy Under Article 21

The Supreme Court also raised substantial concerns about the effect of two-child disqualification laws on reproductive autonomy, which forms part of the protection of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law. Its constitutional interpretation has expanded over the years to protect several aspects of individual dignity, personal choice and autonomy.

The Bench questioned whether the State could continue to impose serious electoral consequences on individuals merely because they chose to have more than two children. It observed that such restrictions compelled citizens to make an unacceptable choice between exercising their reproductive freedom and participating in democratic processes.

The Court considered this particularly concerning because having more than two children does not necessarily have any direct or rational connection with an individual’s ability to discharge the responsibilities of an elected public representative. A person’s family size, by itself, does not establish their competence, integrity, administrative ability or suitability to hold public office.

The Bench observed that allowing such restrictions to continue would exclude an entire class of citizens from political representation on grounds bearing little relevance to their capacity to hold public office.

Justice Narasimha further expressed concern over the reasoning adopted in Javed to justify what the present Bench described as a manifestly arbitrary restriction. The Court indicated that the continuation of such laws would effectively place reproductive choices and democratic participation in opposition to each other.

In its observations, the Bench stated:

“Further, it compels an unconscionable choice between bearing children and democratic participation, infringing upon the right to reproductive autonomy under Article 21.”

This observation highlights an important constitutional distinction between the State’s authority to formulate population-related policies and its power to penalise individuals for exercising personal reproductive choices. Although the State may pursue legitimate social and developmental objectives, the measures adopted to achieve those objectives must remain consistent with constitutional guarantees.

The Court’s concern was not merely that the restrictions might be outdated from a policy perspective. It also questioned whether excluding individuals from elected institutions on the basis of family size could satisfy constitutional standards of fairness, equality and personal liberty.

Disqualification Under the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959

Turning to the individual dispute, the Court examined the disqualification imposed on Mangala Bhimrao Ingle under Section 14(1)(j-1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959.

The provision, which came into force on September 13, 2000, introduced the two-child restriction into the Maharashtra village panchayat framework. Under the statutory scheme, having more than two children could result in disqualification from membership of a village panchayat and consequently affect a person’s eligibility to hold the office of Sarpanch.

Ingle had been disqualified following a complaint concerning the birth of her third child. The Additional Collector passed the disqualification order, and the Additional Commissioner rejected her appeal. The Bombay High Court subsequently upheld the administrative decisions on August 5, 2025, relying upon the birth certificate that identified both parents.

The petitioner thereafter approached the Supreme Court. The operation of the High Court’s impugned judgment had earlier been stayed by the Supreme Court on November 4, 2025, pending consideration of the matter.

After examining the broader constitutional questions, the Bench allowed the petition and set aside the disqualification imposed on Ingle. The relief was significant because it ensured that the individual petitioner would not continue to suffer the consequences of the disqualification challenged before the Court.

At the same time, the Court considered it necessary to address the larger legal issue rather than limiting its decision to the facts of the individual dispute. It therefore referred the correctness of Javed v. State of Haryana to a larger Bench for authoritative reconsideration.

It is important to understand the scope of this decision. The Supreme Court’s observations indicate a strng judicial opinion that two-child disqualification laws