Introduction:
The case of Surendra Khawse v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 968, decided by a Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, represents an important development in the evolving jurisprudence surrounding allegations of rape on the pretext of marriage. The Court was faced with the difficult task of assessing a situation where allegations of rape were filed only after the complainant had been subjected to disciplinary action at her workplace, raising questions about the timing, intent, and bona fides behind the initiation of criminal proceedings. The case involved a woman employed as a computer operator with the Municipal Corporation, who accused her colleague, an Assistant Revenue Inspector, of having exploited her by making false promises of marriage. She alleged that despite being married and having a son, she entered into a physical relationship with him on the assurance of marriage, and when he later refused, she lodged an FIR under Sections 376 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code. The accused, however, contended that their association was voluntary, that she was harassing him, and that she filed the FIR only as retaliation after disciplinary proceedings were initiated against her following his complaints. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law, and whether the facts justified the quashing of the chargesheet.
Arguments of the Appellant-Accused:
On behalf of the appellant-accused, Senior Advocate Mrigendra Singh, assisted by Advocate-on-Record Niti Richhariya, argued that the complaint was nothing but an act of vengeance instituted with mala fide intent. The defence placed emphasis on the sequence of events that unfolded prior to the registration of the FIR. It was pointed out that the accused had, over a significant period, filed multiple complaints against the complainant before both municipal and police authorities, alleging that she was subjecting him to harassment, abuse, and even threats of suicide. These complaints, according to the defence, were genuine in nature and had led to administrative scrutiny of the complainant’s conduct. Following these complaints, the Municipal Corporation issued a show-cause notice dated 6 July 2023 to the complainant, wherein she was cautioned that unless her behavior improved, she could face termination of employment. It was only after this notice was issued that the complainant decided to file an FIR, four months after the alleged incident of rape.
The defence argued that the timing of the FIR itself was highly suspicious and undermined the complainant’s case. They submitted that if the allegations were genuine and if the complainant had indeed been coerced into sexual relations on the false promise of marriage, she would have approached the authorities at the earliest opportunity, especially after the alleged refusal by the accused in April 2023. Instead, she chose to remain silent until disciplinary action was taken against her. This, the defence argued, demonstrated that the FIR was an afterthought, designed not to seek justice but to protect herself from administrative repercussions and to retaliate against the accused for exposing her conduct.
The defence further relied on the principle established in the landmark case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), which enumerates the circumstances under which criminal proceedings can be quashed, including situations where the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide intent or instituted with the object of wreaking vengeance. Counsel also referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mohd. Wajid v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023), where the Court held that in cases of potentially vexatious prosecution, courts must not be guided solely by the FIR but must examine the larger factual matrix and surrounding circumstances. Applying these principles, it was argued that the complainant’s actions fell squarely within the Bhajan Lal framework and that allowing the prosecution to continue would amount to abuse of the judicial process.
The defence also submitted that the nature of the relationship between the parties indicated mutual consent rather than coercion. The complainant was not an unmarried woman but was already married and had a son, and therefore the allegation that she was induced into a sexual relationship solely on the basis of a promise of marriage was implausible. According to the accused, the parties were friends for over five years, and any physical intimacy between them was consensual. Thus, the invocation of Sections 376 and 376(2)(n) IPC was wholly unwarranted.
Arguments of the State and the Complainant:
On the other hand, the State, represented by Deputy Advocate General Bhupendra Singh assisted by Advocate-on-Record Mrinal Gopal Elker, argued that the allegations made by the complainant were serious and that they prima facie disclosed the commission of offences under Sections 376 and 376(2)(n) IPC. The State emphasized that the complainant had alleged that on 15 March 2023, the accused forcibly established sexual relations with her, promising marriage, and that such relations continued until April 2023. When she later enquired about marriage, the accused allegedly refused and suggested that she marry someone else. It was only at this point, after being deceived and humiliated, that the complainant felt compelled to approach the authorities.
The State contended that the mere delay in filing the FIR could not be a ground to dismiss the complaint at the threshold. In cases involving allegations of sexual assault, victims often take time to muster the courage to come forward due to social stigma, emotional trauma, and fear of repercussions. The complainant’s silence in the immediate aftermath of the alleged acts did not, therefore, imply falsity. Furthermore, it was argued that whether the relationship was consensual or coerced was a matter of trial, and the High Court had rightly refused to quash the proceedings at the preliminary stage.
The State also submitted that promises of marriage, if made dishonestly and with the intention of luring a woman into sexual relations, could indeed amount to rape under Section 376 IPC, as recognized by judicial precedent. The complainant’s marital status, it was argued, did not automatically negate the possibility of her being deceived into a relationship. Thus, the allegations could not be dismissed outright as mala fide, and the truth of her claims needed to be determined through trial.
Court’s Judgment and Reasoning:
After carefully considering the rival submissions and perusing the record, the Supreme Court held that the case fell within the parameters of the Bhajan Lal guidelines, warranting the quashing of proceedings. The Bench emphasized the importance of examining the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the criminal law was being invoked for genuine redressal or for ulterior purposes.
The Court observed that the FIR was lodged on 10 July 2023, almost four months after the alleged incidents of March and April 2023, and crucially, only after the complainant was issued a show-cause notice by her employer on 6 July 2023. The Court noted that the accused had previously lodged several complaints against the complainant, leading to this disciplinary action. This sequence of events, according to the Court, strongly suggested that the FIR was not the product of an immediate grievance but rather a retaliatory measure taken to counter the adverse consequences faced by the complainant at her workplace.
The Bench stated:
“If the description of the offence is taken at face value, right at the first instance, the complainant was not willing and was persuaded to engage in relations on the assurance of eventual marriage between the parties. When she enquired as to when the same would take place, a few days later, allegedly, the Appellant accused refused and asked her to marry someone else. That would be the first occasion when, having realized that she had been taken advantage of, the complainant should have taken the requisite action. Even if that was not done so, the fact that the subject FIR was only lodged after the issuance of show-cause notice, which obviously has large real-world implications insofar as the complainant is concerned, leaves open a gaping possibility that the same was lodged as an afterthought and was a vehicle for vengeance for the impending consequences described above.”
The Court reiterated that while the law recognizes that promises of marriage made with dishonest intent can amount to rape if they vitiate consent, each case must be judged on its own facts. In the present case, the long-standing relationship between the parties, the complainant’s marital status, and the timing of the FIR raised serious doubts about the bona fides of the prosecution.
Referring to Mohd. Wajid v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023), the Bench highlighted that courts must go beyond the allegations in the FIR when there are clear indications of mala fides, and must ensure that criminal law is not misused as a tool of personal vengeance. The Court concluded that allowing the prosecution to continue in this case would constitute abuse of process and would result in undue harassment of the accused.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed both the FIR and the chargesheet filed against the accused under Sections 376 and 376(2)(n) IPC, setting aside the order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court which had refused to do so.