Introduction:

The Supreme Court has laid down a detailed procedural framework governing the re-arrest of an accused whose earlier arrest has been declared illegal for violation of the constitutional right to be informed of the grounds of arrest. A Division Bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar, in Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 4234 of 2026, has held that once an arrest is vitiated for non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution, the investigating agency cannot simply re-arrest the accused on its own decision. Any proposed re-arrest must first receive judicial consideration from the concerned Magistrate.

The judgment assumes significance because it moves beyond merely declaring an arrest unconstitutional and addresses the practical question that follows: what happens to the investigation if the investigating agency still considers custodial interrogation necessary after the accused has been released? The Supreme Court has answered that question by introducing a judicial layer between the investigating agency and any subsequent arrest. The Court has also directed administrative consequences against the police officer responsible for the original constitutional violation and ordered that further investigation be entrusted to another officer. (Live Law)

The case arose from the arrest of Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol, a Shiromani Akali Dal-affiliated political functionary associated with the Mullanpur Dakha constituency, in connection with allegations involving sexual assault of a minor. According to the case background, Deol was arrested by the Punjab Police from his residence in Ludhiana on May 17, 2026. He was produced before the Magistrate around noon on the following day. His case was that he had not been supplied the grounds of arrest as required under Article 22(1) of the Constitution. The Magistrate accepted the contention and directed his immediate release after holding that the failure to communicate the grounds of arrest violated his fundamental right. (Live Law)

The controversy, however, did not end with his release. The investigating officer subsequently sought custody of Deol. That application was dismissed as not maintainable. Deol thereafter approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court seeking protection against re-arrest. The High Court took the view that there was no absolute legal bar on the investigating officer re-arresting him after his release on account of the Article 22(1) violation. The High Court also indicated that the police officials responsible for the earlier violation could be proceeded against separately.

The Supreme Court was therefore required to consider a question of wider constitutional significance: where an accused has been released because his arrest was unconstitutional for failure to furnish the grounds of arrest, can the investigating agency arrest him again, and if so, what procedure must be followed?

The judgment builds upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, decided in November 2025. In that case, the Court had reaffirmed that Article 22(1) requires the grounds of arrest to be furnished in writing and in a language understood by the arrested person. The Court had further held that the safeguard was a fundamental constitutional protection and not merely a procedural requirement. (Indian Kanoon)

The present judgment carries that principle one step further by regulating what the police must do if they seek to restore custody after an unconstitutional arrest.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner challenged the position adopted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and contended that the constitutional illegality attached to the original arrest could not simply be bypassed by permitting the same investigating agency to re-arrest him at its own discretion. The central submission was that Article 22(1) protects personal liberty at the moment when the State seeks to take a person into custody, and that the right cannot become meaningless if an unconstitutional arrest is followed immediately by another arrest without judicial scrutiny.

The petitioner relied upon the constitutional character of Article 22(1), which provides that a person arrested cannot be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. The provision also protects the arrested person’s right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. The petitioner’s case was therefore not merely that a police officer had omitted a procedural step, but that the manner in which custody had initially been secured was inconsistent with a fundamental right.

The petitioner also questioned the proposition that release following an Article 22(1) violation should be treated in the same manner as an ordinary release on bail. The distinction was important because an accused released on bail remains subject to the legal consequences of a valid arrest and remand, whereas a person released because his detention itself was unconstitutional has been deprived of liberty through an invalid process. The Supreme Court had already recognised this distinction in Mihir Rajesh Shah, where it held that an accused released for violation of Article 22(1) is not released on bail but is released from illegal and unconstitutional detention. (Order)

The State, on the other hand, maintained the investigating agency’s interest in continuing the investigation and obtaining custody where custodial interrogation was considered necessary. The existence of an investigation into serious allegations, according to the State’s position, could not by itself extinguish the investigating agency’s statutory powers. The proceedings consequently raised a balance between two competing considerations: the constitutional protection of personal liberty and the legitimate investigative requirement of securing custody where legally justified.

The State’s position before the High Court had found support in the view that an Article 22(1) violation in the first arrest did not permanently deprive the investigating agency of the power to arrest the accused in accordance with law. The High Court had therefore held that there was no complete fetter on the investigating officer’s power to re-arrest Deol after his release. It treated action against the police officials responsible for the original violation as a separate issue.

The Supreme Court did not accept the proposition that re-arrest could simply be left to the same investigative authority whose conduct had resulted in the constitutional violation. The Court’s concern was not that re-arrest could never occur. Rather, the question was whether the same authority could unilaterally decide that custody should again be obtained after having already failed to comply with the constitutional safeguard.

The Court accordingly fashioned a procedure that preserves the investigating agency’s ability to seek custody while ensuring that the decision to re-arrest is subjected to independent judicial scrutiny.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court considered earlier decisions dealing with Article 22(1), including Mihir Rajesh Shah, as well as decisions referred to during the controversy concerning re-arrest, including Sri Darshan and the case concerning Sonam Raghuvanshi. Justice Bhuyan noted that the latter decisions involved arrests made before the Supreme Court’s authoritative pronouncement in Mihir Rajesh Shah. The Bench therefore treated Mihir Rajesh Shah as laying down the governing legal position on the requirement to furnish grounds of arrest. (Live Law)

Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court began by reaffirming the constitutional importance of Article 22(1). The Court held that the grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing and in a language understood by the accused. A copy of those written grounds must be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and at the earliest.

This principle flows directly from the Court’s earlier ruling in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, where the Bench had explained that the right to know the grounds of arrest is intended to enable an arrested person to understand why his liberty has been curtailed, consult a lawyer effectively, oppose police custody and seek appropriate legal remedies. The Court had held that merely reading out the grounds of arrest would not satisfy the constitutional requirement where written communication was mandated. (Live Law)

In the present case, the Court emphasised that Article 22(1) is not confined to any particular criminal statute. The constitutional safeguard applies across the spectrum of offences, including cases arising under special enactments. The nature or gravity of the allegation cannot be used to dilute the constitutional obligation.

This aspect is important because the Court treated Article 22(1) as a constitutional guarantee rather than a technical procedural rule. Consequently, an accused is not required to establish separate or additional prejudice caused by the failure to furnish the grounds of arrest. The violation of the fundamental right itself has legal consequences.

The Court further clarified the effect of subsequent developments in the criminal case. The filing of a charge-sheet or the taking of cognisance by a court does not retrospectively cure an unconstitutional arrest. Once the constitutional safeguard has been violated, subsequent investigative or judicial steps cannot transform the original illegal detention into a valid one. This principle was already recognised in Mihir Rajesh Shah and was reiterated in the present case. (Live Law)

The Court also made an important distinction regarding the nature of the accused’s release. When a person is released because his arrest has been rendered unconstitutional by non-compliance with Article 22(1), that release is not equivalent to release on bail. The accused is released from an illegal and unconstitutional detention. This distinction prevents the investigating agency from treating the constitutional release as though it were simply a temporary liberty granted subject to the ordinary conditions of bail.

The principal question before the Bench was then whether such an accused could ever be re-arrested. The Court answered that re-arrest is not completely prohibited. However, it cannot take place merely because the investigating officer wishes to regain custody.

The first requirement is that, if the investigating agency believes custodial interrogation is necessary for the further investigation, it must make an application before the concerned Judicial Magistrate. The application must specifically disclose the reason for seeking re-arrest and explain why custodial interrogation is considered necessary.

The second safeguard is equally significant. Before such an application is filed, the accused must be furnished the grounds of arrest in writing. The police cannot first seek permission to arrest and only thereafter provide the constitutional information. The written grounds must precede the application seeking judicial permission for custody.

The application must also explain why the grounds of arrest were not supplied at the time of the first arrest. Thus, the investigating agency is required to account for the original constitutional lapse rather than simply treating the first arrest as though it had never occurred.

The Supreme Court additionally required the application to carry the endorsement of the immediate superior authority of the police officer concerned. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that a constitutional violation committed during the first arrest is brought to the notice of a higher authority before further custody is sought.

The Bench explained the underlying rationale in clear terms: once Article 22(1) has been violated, the power to re-arrest cannot remain exclusively with the very authority responsible for the initial violation. Judicial scrutiny must intervene before the State again deprives the accused of liberty. (Live Law)

The Magistrate is therefore required to independently consider whether re-arrest is justified. The Court directed that the application should be decided expeditiously and, following the approach indicated in Mihir Rajesh Shah, preferably within a week of its submission, while adhering to the principles of natural justice.

Importantly, the Magistrate’s role is not merely ministerial. Re-arrest can be permitted only where the Magistrate is satisfied that there were bona fide reasons why the grounds of arrest could not be furnished at the first instance and that those grounds have subsequently been supplied. The Magistrate must then separately be satisfied that the accused actually needs to be re-arrested.

This means that two considerations must be addressed. First, there must be a genuine explanation for the failure to furnish the grounds during the original arrest. Second, there must be an independent basis for concluding that re-arrest and custodial interrogation are necessary.

The procedure consequently prevents a situation in which an investigating officer could use an unconstitutional arrest, suffer its invalidation, and then immediately repeat the arrest without accountability or judicial oversight.

The Supreme Court also imposed administrative safeguards. When the superior police authority receives an application seeking endorsement for custody after an Article 22(1) violation, the investigation must be handed over to another officer. In other words, the officer responsible for the original constitutional lapse cannot continue to exercise control over the investigation merely because the agency wishes to pursue further custody.

The superior authority must also direct a departmental inquiry into the original violation. If the inquiry ultimately produces an adverse finding against the police officer concerned, departmental action must follow, including an entry in the officer’s service record. The Court further directed that a copy of its judgment be circulated to the Directors General of Police of all States and Union Territories. (Live Law)

The Court’s approach therefore creates three separate layers of accountability. The first concerns the accused’s immediate constitutional protection, requiring written grounds of arrest. The second concerns judicial oversight, requiring the Magistrate to authorise any proposed re-arrest. The third concerns institutional accountability, requiring superior police authorities to initiate an inquiry and, where warranted, disciplinary proceedings against the officer responsible.

The Bench also connected its reasoning with the broader constitutional jurisprudence surrounding Article 22(2), which requires an arrested person to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest, excluding the time necessary for travelling to the court. The Court referred to the longstanding decision in Khatri, emphasising that the constitutional requirement of timely production before a Magistrate must be strictly observed. (Live Law)

The Court further indicated that the same procedural approach should operate where there has been a breach of Article 22(2) and the investigating agency nevertheless seeks custody after the accused’s release from unconstitutional detention. Depending on the facts, the High Courts may also consider compensation as a public law remedy for violation of Article 22(2), without preventing the affected person from pursuing remedies available under private law.

The judgment also referred to Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. The District Magistrate, Kamrup (1974) for the broader constitutional proposition that the seriousness of an alleged offence cannot by itself justify departure from constitutionally prescribed safeguards. The Supreme Court reiterated that constitutional guarantees must be respected regardless of the gravity of the allegations. (Live Law)

In the context of Deol’s case, the Supreme Court consequently treated the failure to furnish the grounds of arrest as a constitutional violation and laid down the safeguards governing any future attempt to obtain his custody. The decision does not create an absolute immunity from arrest after an Article 22(1) violation. Instead, it places re-arrest within a controlled judicial process.

The significance of the judgment lies precisely in this distinction. The Court recognised the legitimate requirements of criminal investigation while making clear that investigative convenience cannot replace constitutional procedure. The police may seek custody where the law permits it, but after an unconstitutional arrest they must first disclose the grounds of arrest, explain the earlier failure, obtain the endorsement of a superior authority and approach the Magistrate. The Magistrate must then independently assess the bona fides of the explanation and the necessity for re-arrest.

The ruling thus transforms the principle established in Mihir Rajesh Shah into a more comprehensive procedural framework. The earlier judgment established the constitutional duty to furnish written grounds of arrest. The present judgment addresses the next stage and specifies what happens when that duty has already been violated and the investigating agency still seeks custody.

At its core, the judgment reinforces the idea that personal liberty cannot depend solely on the discretion of the authority exercising the power of arrest. Once a constitutional safeguard has been breached, subsequent deprivation of liberty must pass through an additional layer of judicial scrutiny.

The decision is therefore likely to have consequences extending beyond the individual proceedings. Police officers will have to treat the furnishing of written grounds of arrest as an indispensable constitutional obligation, while investigating agencies seeking re-arrest after an Article 22(1) violation will have to follow the judicially prescribed procedure. The direction for departmental inquiry also makes clear that constitutional violations during arrest may have consequences for the officer responsible, rather than being treated merely as irregularities in an individual criminal proceeding.

The Supreme Court’s judgment ultimately places the protection of personal liberty and the requirements of criminal investigation within a clearly defined procedural framework. Investigation may continue, and re-arrest may remain legally possible, but only after the constitutional breach is acknowledged, the accused is furnished the grounds of arrest, the proposed custody is independently scrutinised by the Magistrate, and responsibility for the original lapse is addressed at the departmental level.