Introduction:
In a significant judgment reflecting changing social realities and the constitutional principles of fairness in public employment, the Supreme Court of India held that a consensual premarital relationship between two unmarried adults cannot, by itself, be considered evidence of poor moral character or a ground to deny appointment in the police force. The ruling came in Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board & Others [2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606], where a Bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan set aside the decision of the Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board cancelling the candidature of a police constable recruit on the ground that he had previously been involved in a criminal case arising out of a failed romantic relationship.
The judgment addresses an important intersection between criminal law, public employment, individual liberty, and evolving societal values. It reiterates that while government employers, particularly those recruiting for disciplined forces such as the police, possess the authority to assess the suitability and character of candidates, such assessments must be based on objective material and cannot rest on assumptions, stereotypes, or moral judgments unsupported by evidence.
The appellant had applied for the post of Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Police Constable (SCTPC) in Telangana. During the recruitment process, he disclosed that a criminal case had previously been registered against him under Sections 417, 420, and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The allegations arose from a complaint lodged by a woman who claimed that he had maintained a long-term relationship with her on the promise of marriage but later married another woman. The dispute, however, did not proceed to trial. Instead, it was amicably resolved and compounded before a Lok Adalat in 2015.
Despite the fact that the appellant had truthfully disclosed the criminal proceedings in his attestation form and there was no allegation of concealment or suppression of material information, the Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board concluded that he had been involved in an offence involving moral turpitude and was therefore unsuitable for appointment in the police force. Consequently, his candidature was cancelled.
The appellant challenged the decision before the High Court. While a Single Judge directed reconsideration of his candidature, the Division Bench reversed that decision and upheld the cancellation. Aggrieved by the Division Bench’s ruling, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.
The case thus raised important questions concerning the extent of discretion available to recruitment authorities in assessing a candidate’s character, the meaning of moral turpitude in the context of public employment, and whether a consensual relationship that does not culminate in marriage can legitimately be used to deny an individual entry into government service.
Arguments of the Parties:
The appellant argued that the cancellation of his candidature was arbitrary, unjustified, and contrary to established legal principles governing public employment. He emphasized that he had not concealed any information from the recruitment authorities. The criminal case registered against him had been specifically disclosed in the attestation form submitted during the recruitment process. Therefore, there was no question of suppression of material facts, which is often considered a serious factor in determining suitability for public service.
The appellant further submitted that the criminal proceedings arose from a private dispute involving a personal relationship between two consenting adults. According to him, the allegations related to a romantic relationship that continued for nearly four years and eventually did not result in marriage. The matter had subsequently been settled amicably before a Lok Adalat, and the complainant had chosen not to pursue the allegations any further.
It was argued that the Recruitment Board wrongly assumed that the compromise amounted to an admission of guilt. The appellant contended that a settlement of a criminal case does not automatically establish the truth of the allegations, nor can it be treated as conclusive proof that an offence involving moral turpitude was committed. He maintained that the authorities had failed to undertake any independent assessment of the facts and had instead relied on assumptions unsupported by evidence.
The appellant also submitted that modern social realities cannot be ignored while evaluating questions of character and suitability. He argued that consensual relationships between unmarried adults are not prohibited by law and that the failure of such a relationship to culminate in marriage does not necessarily imply deception, dishonesty, or immoral conduct. Therefore, the decision to deny him public employment solely on the basis of allegations arising from such a relationship violated principles of fairness and reasonableness.
On the other hand, the Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board defended its decision by emphasizing the special nature of police service. The Board argued that police personnel are entrusted with maintaining law and order and are expected to exhibit the highest standards of integrity, discipline, and moral conduct. Consequently, recruitment authorities are entitled to conduct a rigorous assessment of a candidate’s character and suitability.
The respondents contended that the allegations against the appellant involved cheating and breach of trust in a relationship allegedly based on a promise of marriage. According to the Board, such allegations reflected adversely on the appellant’s moral character and raised concerns regarding his suitability for service in a disciplined force.
The Board also argued that even where criminal proceedings end in acquittal, discharge, or compromise, the employer retains the power to independently evaluate the underlying conduct of the candidate. It maintained that the settlement before the Lok Adalat did not erase the circumstances that led to the registration of the criminal case. Therefore, the authorities were justified in considering those circumstances while assessing the appellant’s suitability.
The respondents relied upon judicial precedents recognizing that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically confer a right to appointment in public service. They argued that recruitment authorities possess a broad discretion to examine antecedents and determine whether a candidate meets the standards expected of members of the police force.
Thus, the central dispute before the Supreme Court was not merely whether the appellant had been involved in a criminal case, but whether the nature of the allegations and the circumstances of the compromise could legitimately support a conclusion that he lacked the moral character necessary for appointment as a police constable.
Court’s Judgment:
The Supreme Court carefully examined the principles governing recruitment to public service and the discretion available to employers when evaluating candidates who have previously faced criminal proceedings.
The Court began by acknowledging that employers, particularly those recruiting for disciplined services such as the police, are entitled to assess the suitability of candidates even in cases where criminal proceedings have ended in acquittal, discharge, or compromise. However, the Court emphasized that such discretion is not unfettered. Administrative decisions affecting fundamental rights and employment opportunities must satisfy the requirements of fairness, reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness.
The Bench observed that before a candidate can be denied appointment on the ground of involvement in an offence involving moral turpitude, there must be credible material establishing two essential elements. First, there must be sufficient basis to conclude that an offence involving moral turpitude was actually committed. Second, there must be material demonstrating the candidate’s involvement in such misconduct despite the acquittal or compromise.
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court found that the Recruitment Board had failed to satisfy either requirement.
The Court noted that the complainant and the appellant were adults who had voluntarily maintained a relationship for nearly four years. Importantly, there was no allegation of rape, force, coercion, or sexual exploitation. The allegations were confined to the assertion that the appellant had promised marriage but subsequently married another woman.
The Bench observed that relationships between consenting adults often involve emotional expectations and personal commitments. However, not every relationship ultimately results in marriage. The mere failure of a relationship cannot automatically lead to an inference that one party intentionally deceived or cheated the other.
The Court emphasized that whether a person was induced into a relationship through false promises is essentially a question of fact that ordinarily requires evidence, particularly the testimony of the complainant. In the present case, the complainant chose not to pursue the allegations and agreed to compound the matter before a Lok Adalat. Once the complainant withdrew from the proceedings, the evidentiary foundation necessary to establish cheating became significantly weakened.
A major aspect of the judgment concerns the Court’s recognition of changing social realities. The Bench observed that consensual premarital relationships between unmarried adults have become increasingly common in contemporary society. Such relationships, by themselves, are not prohibited by law and do not constitute criminal conduct.
The Court categorically stated that a physical relationship between two consenting unmarried adults cannot, in itself, create an adverse impression regarding the character of either individual. It held that public authorities must remain sensitive to evolving social norms and should avoid imposing outdated moral standards while making decisions affecting employment and individual rights.
The Court was particularly critical of the Recruitment Board’s assumption that the compromise before the Lok Adalat amounted to an admission of guilt. The Bench described this reasoning as entirely baseless and perverse. It observed that compromise may occur for numerous reasons, including a desire to avoid prolonged litigation, preserve personal dignity, or bring closure to a private dispute. Therefore, a settlement cannot automatically be treated as proof that the allegations were true.
The Supreme Court also distinguished earlier decisions in which candidates were denied appointment despite acquittal based on compromise. In those cases, the allegations involved acts of violence, assault, public disorder, or conduct directly affecting public peace and security. Such offences carry a different degree of seriousness and have a direct bearing on suitability for police service.
In contrast, the present case involved a personal and private relationship between two adults. The Court observed that once the complainant withdrew her allegations and agreed to compound the matter, serious doubt arose regarding the commission of the alleged offence itself. Therefore, the rationale underlying earlier precedents was not applicable to the facts before the Court.
The Bench reiterated that public authorities cannot base recruitment decisions on conjectures or assumptions. The power to evaluate suitability must be exercised objectively and on the basis of relevant material. Decisions founded upon stereotypes, moral prejudices, or unsupported inferences violate constitutional principles of fairness and equality.
The Court concluded that the Screening Committee had acted arbitrarily in treating the appellant’s involvement in the criminal case as proof of moral turpitude. The authorities failed to establish either that the offence of cheating had actually been committed or that the appellant’s conduct demonstrated a character defect rendering him unsuitable for police service.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the order passed by the Single Judge of the Telangana High Court directing reconsideration of the appellant’s appointment. The Division Bench judgment upholding the cancellation of candidature was set aside.
The decision is significant not only because it grants relief to an individual candidate but also because it reflects a broader constitutional commitment to dignity, personal autonomy, and fairness in public employment. The judgment reinforces the principle that character assessment cannot be divorced from contemporary social realities and that consensual relationships between adults should not be used as a basis for stigmatization or exclusion from public service. It further serves as an important reminder that administrative authorities must exercise their discretion rationally, objectively, and in accordance with constitutional values rather than moral assumptions unsupported by evidence.