Introduction:
In a landmark judgment that redefines the contours of eligibility for judicial appointments, the Supreme Court Constitution Bench in Rejanish K.V. vs. K. Deepa [Civil Appeal No. 3947 of 2020] (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989) has held that a judicial officer with a combined experience of seven years as a judicial officer and as an advocate is eligible to apply for direct appointment as a District Judge. The five-judge bench comprising Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, and Justices MM Sundresh, Aravind Kumar, SC Sharma, and K Vinod Chandran, while delivering this crucial verdict, overruled the precedent set in Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, which had earlier excluded in-service judicial officers from seeking direct recruitment under Article 233(2) of the Constitution. The Court also held that eligibility must be determined as on the date of the application, and to maintain fairness, the minimum age of in-service candidates applying for direct recruitment as District Judges should be 35 years. Importantly, this decision applies prospectively and does not disturb previous appointments or ongoing selection processes.
Arguments by the Petitioners:
The petitioners, represented by an eminent panel of Senior Advocates including Jayant Bhushan, Arvind Datar, PS Patwalia, Gopal Sankarnarayanan, V. Giri, Vibha Makhija, Jaideep Gupta, Seshadri Naidu, Manish Singhvi, and Menaka Guruswamy, argued that the Dheeraj Mor judgment had misinterpreted the phrase “a person not already in the service of the Union or the State” under Article 233(2). They contended that the intent of Article 233(2) was never to bar in-service judicial officers from competing in the direct recruitment process, provided they had the requisite seven years of experience as an advocate before or after joining judicial service. The petitioners argued that Article 233 should be interpreted purposively and harmoniously with the objective of attracting the best and most competent candidates to the judiciary. They further submitted that the Constitution did not restrict judicial officers with prior bar experience from seeking direct recruitment. The petitioners highlighted that the rule of seven years of practice should not be construed as seven continuous years of practice but as seven years of cumulative experience in advocacy and judicial service. They stressed that the restrictive interpretation in Dheeraj Mor had created an artificial barrier, excluding meritorious officers from competing with advocates despite having extensive judicial experience. They also pointed out that many State Rules had already been designed to permit candidates with mixed experience to apply for direct recruitment, and the denial of such eligibility was inconsistent with constitutional principles of equality and fairness. The petitioners further urged that the phrase “has been for not less than seven years an advocate or pleader” under Article 233(2) must be interpreted in a manner that recognizes experience gained in different capacities within the legal profession. Moreover, they contended that the essence of Article 233 was to ensure a robust and efficient judiciary by selecting candidates of proven competence and experience, irrespective of whether that experience was gained at the Bar or on the Bench. The petitioners relied on the principle of purposive interpretation to argue that the constitutional provision should not be read pedantically but with an intent to enhance the quality of the judiciary.
Arguments by the Respondents:
On the other hand, the respondents, represented by Senior Advocates CU Singh, Nidhesh Gupta, Vijay Hansaria, Rajiv Shakdher, and Ravindra Srivastava, defended the reasoning of Dheeraj Mor, emphasizing that Article 233(2) clearly stipulates that only “a person not already in service of the Union or of the State” is eligible for appointment by direct recruitment as a District Judge. They argued that the constitutional text was unambiguous and had been consistently interpreted for over six decades to mean that only practising advocates, not serving judges, could apply for direct recruitment. The respondents asserted that altering this long-standing interpretation would disrupt the judicial appointment structure and undermine the principle of stare decisis. They contended that the eligibility criterion under Article 233(2) was exhaustive and that introducing a combined-experience rule would amount to rewriting the Constitution. Furthermore, the respondents submitted that the seven-year practice rule under Article 233(2) must be continuous and not cumulative. They argued that continuity in practice ensures professional engagement and familiarity with current legal trends, which could not be presumed in cases of discontinuous practice. The respondents also opposed the notion of providing any special advantage to in-service officers, stating that doing so would violate the equality clause under Article 14 by giving preferential treatment to those already within the judicial system. They also maintained that the recruitment process must be transparent and distinct between direct recruits (advocates) and promotees (judicial officers), as envisaged by the Constitution and respective State rules. In their view, judicial officers already have an avenue for promotion within the judiciary, and allowing them to compete in the direct recruitment process would create administrative confusion and overlap in service cadres.
Court’s Judgment:
After an extensive analysis of the constitutional text, precedent, and purpose behind Article 233, the Constitution Bench delivered a landmark ruling that balances fairness, opportunity, and efficiency in the process of judicial appointments. The Court categorically held that judicial officers who have a combined experience of seven years as an advocate and as a judicial officer are eligible to apply for direct appointment as District Judges, provided they meet the age and other eligibility criteria as on the date of the application. Chief Justice BR Gavai, writing the lead opinion, emphasized that Article 233 must be read as a whole and its sub-articles cannot be interpreted in isolation. A purposive interpretation, which furthers the objective of securing the most competent individuals for the judiciary, was preferred over a literal reading. The Court clarified that the combined experience of seven years could include periods as an advocate before joining service, as a judicial officer, and even as an advocate after leaving judicial service. However, such experience must be continuous to ensure an active and unbroken connection with the legal profession. The Court observed that any person who has practised for a few years, taken a long break, and resumed practice later would not meet the requirement of continuous experience, as such breaks disrupt engagement with the law.
The bench held that while Article 233(2) does not specifically provide for in-service candidates, to ensure a level playing field, States must amend their recruitment rules to permit in-service candidates who meet the combined seven-year criterion to apply. Importantly, the Court also fixed the minimum age of eligibility for both advocates and in-service candidates at 35 years to maintain parity and fairness. The bench rejected the plea for reserving a 25% quota for advocates under Article 233(2), holding that such classification was neither constitutionally mandated nor conducive to efficiency. The Court observed that the objective of any selection process in the public service, especially in the judiciary, should be to identify and appoint the most meritorious individuals, not to preserve artificial categories. It further acknowledged that judicial officers, due to their rigorous training and practical experience, often possess superior knowledge and skill compared to advocates with equivalent years of practice. Therefore, denying them the opportunity to compete directly for the post of District Judge would not only be unfair but would also deprive the judiciary of talented and experienced officers.
The Court also took the opportunity to overrule a long line of precedents, including Satya Narain Singh and Dheeraj Mor, stating that they did not lay down the correct law. It ruled that these judgments had taken an overly restrictive and literal view of Article 233(2), which failed to consider the constitutional goal of promoting administrative efficiency in the judiciary. The Court declared that the present interpretation would henceforth govern future selections and directed all High Courts and State Governments to amend their recruitment rules accordingly within three months. The judgment was pronounced prospectively, ensuring that it does not affect any recruitment processes already completed or appointments already made under the previous interpretation.
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice MM Sundresh elaborated on the principle that constitutional provisions concerning appointments should be interpreted in a manner that expands, rather than restricts, opportunities for deserving candidates. He emphasized that while maintaining the integrity of judicial service is paramount, inclusion of in-service candidates with substantial experience enriches the pool of potential District Judges and fosters judicial excellence. Both opinions underscored the need for harmonizing the professional experience of advocates and judicial officers to ensure that only the most capable individuals ascend to higher judicial positions.
The bench also addressed the issue of continuity of practice, making it clear that the seven years’ experience must be continuous. The Court justified this requirement by explaining that consistent engagement in legal work keeps candidates updated with evolving jurisprudence and procedural developments, which intermittent practice cannot ensure. It also emphasized that the quality of judicial administration depends heavily on the knowledge, competence, and ethical integrity of those who preside over courts, and therefore, experience continuity plays a vital role in assessing suitability.
The Court’s directive for the States and High Courts to modify their rules within three months reflects an intention to create uniformity across jurisdictions and eliminate ambiguities in judicial recruitment frameworks. This ensures that all potential candidates—whether serving judicial officers or practising advocates—are evaluated under a common yardstick that values both courtroom and bench experience.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision signifies a transformative step in broadening eligibility for judicial appointments and promoting inclusivity in the higher ranks of the judiciary. By recognizing the combined value of bar and bench experience, the Court has aligned constitutional interpretation with practical realities of the legal profession. The judgment not only corrects a long-standing anomaly created by earlier rulings but also strengthens the institutional structure by ensuring that the most competent and meritorious candidates can aspire to serve as District Judges, irrespective of their current position in the legal system.