Introduction:

The Supreme Court of India has reserved its judgment on an important question concerning the interpretation of the University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulations, 2018, particularly whether the period spent pursuing a Ph.D. degree can be included while calculating the mandatory eight years of teaching experience required for appointment as an Associate Professor. The dispute raises significant questions regarding the distinction between teaching experience and research qualifications, the meaning of active service, and the circumstances in which a faculty member pursuing doctoral studies can claim such a period as teaching experience.

A Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Manmohan heard appeals filed by the University Grants Commission (UGC) and Professor Joseph Skaria challenging a 2023 judgment of the Kerala High Court Division Bench. The High Court had upheld the appointment of Priya Varghese as Associate Professor at Kannur University. Varghese is the wife of CPI(M) leader K.K. Ragesh, who served as the Private Secretary to the then Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan.

The controversy originated from the selection process for the post of Associate Professor at Kannur University. Dr. Joseph Skaria, who was placed below Varghese in the selection rank list, questioned her eligibility on the ground that she did not possess the prescribed eight years of teaching experience under the applicable UGC Regulations. According to him, the period Varghese spent pursuing her Ph.D. could not legally be treated as teaching experience for the purpose of determining her eligibility.

The dispute consequently centred on Regulation 3.1.1 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, which specifically addresses the treatment of time spent pursuing M.Phil. and Ph.D. degrees while calculating teaching and research experience. The provision generally excludes the time taken to acquire these qualifications from the experience required for appointment to teaching positions. However, it also contains a qualification concerning faculty members who pursue research degrees while remaining in active service without taking leave.

The interpretation of these different parts of the regulation became the principal issue before the Supreme Court. While the appellants maintained that the provision could not be used to convert a period spent away from teaching duties into teaching experience, Varghese argued that her deputation status and the circumstances surrounding her doctoral studies distinguished her case from the general exclusion contemplated by the regulation.

The proceedings are significant because the outcome could influence how universities calculate teaching experience for faculty members who pursue doctoral research while serving in academic institutions. It also raises the broader question of whether holding an administrative or institutional position during the relevant period can have a bearing on the calculation of teaching experience under the UGC framework.

Arguments of the Parties:

Arguments on behalf of Professor Joseph Skaria:

Senior Advocate P.N. Ravindran, appearing for Professor Joseph Skaria, challenged the interpretation adopted by the Kerala High Court Division Bench and argued that Regulation 3.1.1 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, must be understood according to its language and structure.

He drew the Supreme Court’s attention to Regulation 3.1.1, which provides:

“The time taken by candidates to acquire M.Phil. and/or Ph.D. Degree shall not be considered as teaching/research experience to be claimed for appointment to the teaching positions. Further, the period of active service spent on pursuing a Research Degree simultaneously with teaching assignment without taking any kind of leave, shall be counted as teaching experience for the purpose of direct recruitment/promotion. Regular faculty members up to twenty percent of the total faculty strength (excluding faculty on medical/maternity leave) shall be allowed by their respective institutions to take study leave for pursuing Ph.D. degree.”

Ravindran submitted that the provision contains three distinct components, each dealing with a different situation. According to him, the first part establishes a general rule applicable to all candidates seeking appointment to teaching positions. It expressly states that the time taken to acquire an M.Phil. or Ph.D. degree cannot ordinarily be counted as teaching or research experience for recruitment purposes.

He argued that the second part creates a limited exception for individuals who pursue a research degree while remaining in active service and simultaneously performing their teaching assignments without taking any kind of leave. In such circumstances, the period can be counted as teaching experience because the candidate continues to discharge teaching responsibilities alongside academic research.

The third component, according to the petitioner’s counsel, deals with regular faculty members who are permitted by their institutions to take study leave for pursuing a Ph.D. degree. He contended that this provision cannot be interpreted in a manner that automatically allows the entire doctoral research period to be treated as teaching experience, irrespective of whether the individual actually performed teaching duties during that period.

Applying this interpretation to Varghese’s case, Ravindran argued that she did not satisfy the conditions necessary to claim the benefit of the second part of Regulation 3.1.1. He pointed out that she was on deputation during the relevant period and was not discharging her regular teaching responsibilities in the manner contemplated by the regulation.

The counsel further submitted that a substitute teacher had been appointed in her place when she proceeded to Kannur University. According to him, this demonstrated that Varghese was not simultaneously engaged in teaching while pursuing her Ph.D. and, therefore, the relevant period could not be treated as teaching experience.

Another important aspect of his argument concerned the position held by Varghese at Kannur University. Ravindran pointed out that she was appointed as the Director of Student Services, which, according to him, was an administrative or non-teaching position rather than a regular teaching assignment.

Referring to the relevant ordinances of Kannur University, he submitted that the responsibilities associated with the Director of Student Services were primarily interactive and administrative in nature. Merely holding such a position, he argued, could not satisfy the requirement of teaching experience prescribed for appointment as an Associate Professor.

He also relied upon the provision concerning the restriction that institutions may permit regular faculty members up to twenty per cent of their total faculty strength to take study leave for pursuing a Ph.D. degree. According to him, this limitation demonstrated that the regulatory framework carefully distinguished between active teaching service and periods spent pursuing higher academic qualifications.

During the hearing, Justice Manmohan questioned whether such an interpretation could discourage young academics from accepting important institutional responsibilities. The Judge observed that senior academic positions, such as that of a Dean in Delhi University, may involve substantial interaction and administrative responsibilities rather than regular classroom teaching.

He questioned whether accepting the petitioner’s interpretation would effectively prevent young professors from taking up such positions without risking the loss of their teaching experience for future appointments.

Justice Sanjay Kumar also examined the petitioner’s interpretation of the third component of the regulation. He observed that the provision permitting regular faculty members to pursue a Ph.D. through study leave could not simply be ignored while interpreting the regulation as a whole.

The Bench indicated that the second and third components needed to be understood in a manner that gave independent meaning to each part rather than rendering any portion redundant.

Arguments on behalf of Priya Varghese:

Senior Advocate K. Parmeshwar, appearing for Priya Varghese, opposed the challenge and sought to defend the interpretation adopted by the Kerala High Court Division Bench.

He clarified that Varghese was not on leave during the relevant period but was on deputation. This distinction, according to him, was important because the petitioner’s arguments proceeded on the assumption that she had been entirely away from service while pursuing her doctoral studies.

Parmeshwar also questioned the manner in which the petitioner had presented his own professional circumstances before the Court. He pointed out that Joseph Skaria had retired and was subsequently working as a Professor at Calicut University. This submission was made in the context of the broader dispute concerning the petitioner’s challenge to Varghese’s eligibility.

Addressing the interpretation of the twenty per cent provision, the counsel argued that the petitioner’s understanding was incorrect. According to him, the provision was not intended to impose a rigid restriction on the extent to which faculty members could pursue doctoral research while retaining the benefit of teaching experience.

He submitted that the relevant part of the regulation had to be understood as a comprehensive arrangement dealing with faculty members pursuing Ph.D. degrees, including those who were permitted to take leave for that purpose.

The counsel argued that the regulatory intention was to recognise the relevant period even where a faculty member was on leave for pursuing a Ph.D. He maintained that interpreting the provision otherwise would produce an unreasonable and illogical result.

His central submission was that the different components of Regulation 3.1.1 should not be interpreted in isolation. Instead, the provision had to be understood in its entirety, keeping in view the purpose behind allowing regular faculty members to undertake doctoral research.

He therefore opposed the contention that the period spent by Varghese pursuing her Ph.D. must necessarily be excluded from the calculation of her teaching experience merely because she was not performing conventional classroom teaching throughout that period.

Arguments on behalf of the University Grants Commission:

Additional Solicitor General K.M. Nataraj, appearing for the UGC, supported the challenge to Varghese’s appointment and argued that she did not satisfy the mandatory eligibility conditions prescribed under the UGC Regulations, 2018.

The UGC maintained that the period spent by Varghese pursuing her Ph.D. under the Faculty Development Programme could not be included while calculating the eight years of teaching experience required for appointment as an Associate Professor.

The Additional Solicitor General submitted that the 2018 Regulations had superseded the earlier UGC clarification that had permitted certain periods spent pursuing a Ph.D. to be counted towards teaching experience. Consequently, the earlier clarification could not be relied upon to claim an entitlement contrary to the express language of the subsequent regulations.

The UGC further argued that Varghese was away from her regular teaching responsibilities during the relevant doctoral research period. The appointment of a substitute teacher at her college was highlighted as an important circumstance indicating that she was not simultaneously performing her teaching duties while pursuing research.

According to the UGC, the exception under Regulation 3.1.1 could not be extended to a candidate who had effectively discontinued teaching responsibilities during the period claimed as experience.

It was also argued that research undertaken while a faculty member is on leave cannot automatically be equated with teaching experience. The regulatory framework makes a distinction between acquiring higher academic qualifications and actually rendering teaching service, and that distinction must be respected while determining eligibility for senior academic appointments.

The UGC accordingly submitted that Varghese could not claim the benefit of the disputed period without satisfying the specific conditions prescribed under the 2018 Regulations.

Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court has reserved its judgment after hearing the rival submissions advanced by the parties. Therefore, no final determination has yet been made on whether the period spent by Priya Varghese pursuing her Ph.D. can be included while calculating the eight years of teaching experience required for appointment as an Associate Professor.

However, the questions raised by the Bench during the hearing indicate that the Court is closely examining the language, structure and purpose of Regulation 3.1.1 rather than accepting an isolated interpretation of any particular portion of the provision.

One of the principal issues considered by the Bench was whether the three components of Regulation 3.1.1 should be treated as separate categories or as interconnected provisions that must be interpreted harmoniously.

The first component expressly excludes the time taken by candidates to acquire M.Phil. or Ph.D. degrees from the teaching or research experience claimed for appointment to teaching positions. The second component, however, recognises the period of active service during which an individual pursues a research degree simultaneously with a teaching assignment without taking leave.

The third component deals with regular faculty members who may be permitted to take study leave for pursuing a Ph.D. degree, subject to the prescribed institutional limit.

The Bench appeared concerned that the interpretation advanced by the petitioner’s counsel might fail to give adequate effect to the third component of the regulation.

Justice Sanjay Kumar examined the relationship between the second and third components and observed that the second part concerns individuals who continue in active service while pursuing a research degree without taking leave. The third part, on the other hand, specifically refers to regular faculty members who are allowed to pursue doctoral studies through study leave.

The Judge questioned how the third component could be excluded from consideration when the regulation expressly recognises a separate arrangement for regular faculty members pursuing Ph.D. degrees.

The observation was significant because an interpretation that renders an express portion of a statutory or regulatory provision meaningless is generally undesirable. Courts ordinarily seek to interpret provisions in a manner that gives effect to every part of the text, provided such an interpretation is consistent with the language and overall scheme of the regulation.

Justice Manmohan agreed with the concern expressed by Justice Kumar. He observed that accepting the petitioner’s interpretation without considering the third component could make that portion of the regulation otiose.

In legal interpretation, the principle against rendering a provision otiose requires courts to avoid constructions that make a particular part of a legal instrument redundant or ineffective. Where two or more components appear to address different situations, the court must attempt to understand their relationship and identify the purpose served by each.

The Bench’s observations indicate that the question cannot be answered merely by stating that the time spent pursuing a Ph.D. is always excluded from teaching experience. The exceptions and qualifications expressly contained in Regulation 3.1.1 also require consideration.

Another important aspect of the hearing concerned the meaning of teaching experience and whether institutional responsibilities outside conventional classroom teaching could have any relevance while calculating such experience.

Justice Manmohan referred to the example of a Dean in Delhi University, observing that such a position may involve substantial institutional interaction and administrative responsibilities. The Judge questioned whether a professor accepting such a position should automatically lose the benefit of teaching experience merely because the role does not involve regular classroom teaching.

This observation brought attention to a broader issue concerning the nature of academic service. Universities frequently assign faculty members to administrative, academic coordination and institutional leadership positions. Such responsibilities may be important for the functioning of an institution, even though they are different from regular teaching assignments.

The Bench’s questions suggest that the Court was not inclined to accept an interpretation that would automatically exclude every period spent in an institutional leadership position without examining the nature of the responsibilities and the applicable regulatory provisions.

Nevertheless, the observations made during oral arguments should not be understood as a final finding that Varghese’s tenure as Director of Student Services necessarily qualifies as teaching experience. The precise nature of her appointment, the terms of her deputation and the applicable university regulations remain relevant to the determination.

The Court must ultimately examine whether the work performed during the disputed period satisfies the requirements of Regulation 3.1.1 and whether the period can legally be included in the calculation of the prescribed experience.

The question of deputation also assumes significance. Varghese’s counsel specifically clarified that she was on deputation rather than leave. This distinction may have a bearing on the interpretation of the provision because the regulation refers to active service, teaching assignments and study leave in different contexts.

However, merely establishing that an individual remained in service or was placed on deputation may not, by itself, resolve the eligibility question. The nature of the service rendered during the relevant period and its relationship with the teaching assignment must also be examined.

The UGC’s argument regarding the appointment of a substitute teacher introduces another factual consideration. If a substitute was appointed because Varghese was not performing her teaching duties during the doctoral research period, the circumstance may be relevant in determining whether she was simultaneously engaged in teaching as contemplated by the regulation.

At the same time, the Court would have to consider whether the applicable provision creates an independent basis for counting the period of study leave or deputation, even where regular classroom duties were not performed.

The dispute also raises the question of the legal effect of the earlier UGC clarification relied upon in the proceedings. The UGC argued that the 2018 Regulations superseded the earlier clarification and that the eligibility of candidates must be assessed under the subsequently notified regulatory framework.

If accepted, this argument would require the Court to determine whether the earlier clarification can have any continuing relevance after the introduction of Regulation 3.1.1 in its present form. The issue is particularly important because eligibility for university appointments must ordinarily be determined in accordance with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.

Another significant aspect of the proceedings was the Court’s direction to Varghese’s counsel to submit a chart setting out her teaching experience. This direction indicates that the Bench considers the factual calculation of her experience important alongside the interpretation of the regulation.

Such a chart would enable the Court to examine the diferent periods claimed by Varghese, distinguish between her actual te