Introduction:
The Supreme Court of India has expressed serious concern over the growing pendency of cases under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), coupled with what it described as an “unfortunate alarming increase” in offences under the statute across the country. In its continuing suo motu proceedings in In Re: Creation of Special Exclusive Courts, registered as SMW(Crl) No. 1/2026, a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana directed the Union Government, States and Union Territories to take concrete steps for establishing the requisite exclusive Special Courts for the expeditious trial of NDPS cases. The Court indicated that the necessary courts should preferably be established within six weeks, emphasising that the increasing criminal caseload under the NDPS Act required an urgent institutional response.
The proceedings arose from the Supreme Court’s broader concern regarding the inadequate availability of exclusive judicial forums for offences governed by special criminal statutes. The Court has been monitoring the establishment and functioning of exclusive Special Courts under statutes including the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (NIA Act), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), and the NDPS Act. The underlying objective is to prevent specialised criminal trials from being absorbed into the already burdened ordinary judicial system and thereby ensure that cases involving national security, organised crime, terrorism and narcotics offences are brought to conclusion within a reasonable period.
The proceedings are significant because the Supreme Court has linked the availability of adequate judicial infrastructure with the constitutional requirement of timely administration of criminal justice. A criminal justice system cannot effectively enforce stringent penal legislation if investigation, prosecution and adjudication remain delayed for years. The creation of specialised courts is therefore not merely an administrative exercise but an essential component of ensuring that the statutory framework operates effectively.
The Court had earlier monitored the creation of exclusive NIA Courts under Section 11 of the NIA Act. During the present proceedings, the Union informed the Bench that substantial progress had been made in establishing such courts. A total of 22 exclusive NIA Courts had been established across the country. The Court was also informed about the position in individual States, several of which had either already established exclusive courts or initiated the process of notifying and operationalising them.
The proceedings also revealed, however, that the situation concerning NDPS Courts required substantially greater attention. According to the status placed before the Court, 449 exclusive courts had been identified as necessary for dealing with NDPS matters, whereas only 176 had been established. The gap between the assessed requirement and the number of functioning courts demonstrated the scale of the institutional deficiency confronting narcotics trials.
The Court’s intervention must also be viewed against the special character of proceedings under the NDPS Act. The statute prescribes stringent provisions relating to possession, trafficking, commercial quantity, bail and presumptions in specified circumstances. Narcotics trials frequently involve voluminous documentary material, forensic evidence, seizure witnesses, official witnesses and questions concerning compliance with statutory safeguards. Such trials require judicial time and specialised attention. When these cases are listed alongside ordinary criminal matters before courts carrying a wide range of responsibilities, delays can become inevitable.
At the same time, prolonged criminal proceedings have consequences for both sides. Victims and society have an interest in effective prosecution of drug offences, while an accused person is constitutionally entitled to a fair and reasonably expeditious trial. The principle that justice delayed can undermine justice is therefore equally relevant to prosecution and defence.
The Supreme Court’s present intervention seeks to address this institutional imbalance. Rather than merely directing courts to dispose of pending matters faster, the Bench has focused on the more fundamental question of whether sufficient judicial infrastructure exists to handle the workload in the first place. The direction to create exclusive courts, appoint necessary staff and provide infrastructure represents an attempt to deal with delay at its structural source.
The Court’s directions concerning NIA Courts further illustrate this approach. The Bench emphasised that the purpose of exclusive courts would be defeated if excessive numbers of cases were assigned to each court. The Court therefore stressed the importance of maintaining a manageable caseload so that specialised courts could actually facilitate time-bound trials. The monitoring exercise consequently extends beyond the mere creation of courts to their effective operationalisation.
Arguments of the Parties:
Since the proceedings were initiated by the Court on its own motion, there was no conventional petitioner seeking relief against a private respondent. The Court was assisted by the Additional Solicitor General, Advocates General and counsel appearing for various States and Union Territories, along with representatives and counsel connected with the High Courts. The submissions largely concerned the availability of exclusive courts, the number of pending cases, infrastructure, staffing and the time required to operationalise the courts.
Appearing for the National Investigation Agency, Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati informed the Supreme Court that considerable progress had been achieved in establishing exclusive NIA Courts. She submitted that eight new NIA Courts had been established since the previous hearing, taking the total number to 22. At the same time, she pointed out that certain States, including Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Telangana, had not yet completed the process of establishing the requisite exclusive courts. The Union therefore sought the Court’s intervention to ensure that these States moved forward with the process.
The Union’s position essentially reflected a need for coordinated action between the Central Government, State Governments and High Courts. Establishment of a Special Court requires more than the designation of a judicial officer. Appropriate courtrooms, administrative staff, prosecutors, supporting personnel and other infrastructure must be made available. The Union therefore placed before the Court the progress made and the remaining requirements in different States.
The States, on the other hand, placed before the Bench their individual circumstances and the steps already undertaken. Karnataka informed the Court that it proposed to establish three exclusive Special Courts for NIA cases and that the courts were likely to be notified within two weeks. The submission was recorded by the Bench.
Kerala informed the Court that orders had already been issued for establishment of two exclusive Special Courts for NIA cases. Counsel appearing for the State sought additional time on the ground that creating the requisite infrastructure would require a longer period. The Supreme Court, however, declined to grant an extended period and directed that the courts should become functional within approximately four weeks. The Bench observed that Kerala had a proactive High Court and therefore the process should not be unduly delayed.
Tamil Nadu informed the Court that there were 28 pending NIA cases and that two courts were being established. One of them was already operational, while the second was expected to become operational within two weeks. The State thus indicated that the process was substantially underway.
In Telangana, the Court noted that one exclusive NIA Court would be sufficient in view of the number of cases under Section 11 of the NIA Act. The Chief Justice emphasised that the purpose of creating such courts was to facilitate the interests of litigants and ensure speedy disposal. The State indicated that the requisite court could be established within two weeks.
Assam informed the Court that one exclusive NIA Court had already been notified and made functional, while proposals concerning two additional courts were under consideration. The Court noted the pendency of NIA cases in the State and directed that the pending proposal be expedited.
The situation in Jammu and Kashmir was also considered. Counsel appearing for the Union Territory submitted that the existing NIA infrastructure was located in Jammu and that one court could be operationalised immediately. However, in view of the substantial pendency, it was stated that additional courts were required. A suggestion was made that existing District Judges’ Courts could be redesignated as exclusive NIA Courts, with their other judicial responsibilities withdrawn.
The Chief Justice made it clear that the Court was seeking genuinely exclusive courts rather than ordinary courts merely carrying an additional designation. This distinction is important. The purpose of an exclusive court is to ensure that the judge’s time and administrative resources are devoted to the specialised category of cases for which the court has been established. Merely adding NIA matters to the docket of an already overburdened court would not necessarily achieve the objective of speedy disposal.
West Bengal also placed its position before the Court. While the NIA had indicated a lower number of pending cases, the State’s own figures showed a higher pendency under Section 11 of the NIA Act. Two exclusive courts were stated to be functioning, while three additional courts were considered necessary. The Court accordingly directed the Union and State authorities to take steps for establishment of the additional courts.
Uttarakhand informed the Court that it had a designated court for NIA matters and that there was no pendency requiring further expansion. Uttar Pradesh informed the Court about its NIA caseload and stated that one dedicated court was functioning at Lucknow. Bihar, meanwhile, informed the Bench that two exclusive NIA Courts were already functional for its pending cases.
Odisha submitted that five cases under Section 11 of the NIA Act were pending, while a substantially larger number of UAPA cases were pending in the State. The High Court had proposed the establishment of additional courts, and the Supreme Court directed that, at least with respect to the NIA cases under consideration, the High Court and State Government should take steps to establish the required court within the stipulated period.
The submissions regarding NDPS Courts were different in scale. The Union placed before the Court the revised assessment that 449 exclusive NDPS Courts were required across the country. Only 176 had been established. The significant shortfall prompted the Court to examine the issue independently of the progress made in the NIA-related exercise.
The States’ submissions, therefore, demonstrated that while considerable progress had been made in certain jurisdictions, there remained substantial differences between States in terms of pendency, court infrastructure and the stage of implementation. The Court’s intervention sought to ensure that administrative difficulties did not become a permanent justification for judicial delay.
Court’s Judgment:
The Supreme Court’s order proceeds from a fundamental proposition: specialised legislation cannot function effectively without an adequate judicial mechanism for enforcing it. The Bench recognised that the increasing number of NDPS cases, together with existing pendency, required immediate institutional measures. The Court therefore directed the Union Government, State Governments and Union Territories to take necessary steps for creating the infrastructure and appointing the required staff for exclusive NDPS Courts.
The Court specifically noted the “current pendency” of cases under the NDPS Act and the “unfortunate alarming increase” in offences under the statute throughout the country. In the Court’s view, these circumstances made it expedient and necessary, in the interests of justice, to establish the requisite courts at the earliest.
The significance of the direction lies in the fact that the Court did not confine itself to judicial manpower. It expressly directed the authorities to provide infrastructure and appoint the necessary staff. A court cannot function merely because a notification has been issued. It requires judicial officers, court staff, prosecutors, administrative support, courtrooms, technological facilities and other basic resources. The Court’s direction therefore adopts a holistic approach towards judicial capacity.
The order also reflects the constitutional importance of speedy trial. Article 21 of the Constitution protects life and personal liberty, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised that a reasonably expeditious criminal trial forms an important component of fair procedure. The constitutional principle developed in cases such as Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar established that prolonged incarceration and unreasonable delay in criminal proceedings cannot be viewed as insignificant procedural inconveniences. The right to speedy trial is part of the broader guarantee of fair and just procedure.
The same principle was reaffirmed in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, where the Supreme Court explained that there cannot be an arbitrary, mechanical formula applicable to every case for determining delay, but the right to speedy trial remains an integral part of Article 21. The Court’s present approach is consistent with this constitutional philosophy: speedy justice cannot be achieved merely by exhorting judges to work faster when the judicial system lacks the necessary capacity to handle its workload.
The present proceedings also demonstrate the difference between a specialised court and a court that is merely designated to hear specialised cases. The Court insisted, particularly in the context of NIA cases, that the purpose of exclusive courts would be defeated if they continued to carry substantial unrelated judicial responsibilities. The emphasis on manageable caseloads is intended to ensure that specialisation translates into actual speed and efficiency.
The Court had earlier indicated that NIA Courts should be established with reference to the number of pending cases, keeping in mind that an excessive number of cases should not be entrusted to a single court. The present order records that most States had made substantial progress towards establishing such courts, although certain jurisdictions continued to lag behind. The Court therefore issued specific directions tailored to individual States.
In Karnataka, the Court recorded the proposal for three exclusive NIA Courts and the State’s assurance that the courts would likely be notified within two weeks. Kerala was directed to operationalise two courts within approximately one month despite its request for additional time. Tamil Nadu was directed to complete the process of operationalising its additional court within two weeks, while Telangana was directed to establish its requisite exclusive court within the same broad timeframe.
In Assam, the Court directed the State to expedite the proposal for additional courts. Jammu and Kashmir received particular attention because of the significant number of pending NIA cases. The Court refused to accept the mere redesignation of courts carrying ordinary judicial work as an adequate substitute for genuinely exclusive NIA Courts.
The Court’s approach towards West Bengal similarly demonstrates the principle that the number of courts must correspond to actual pendency. Where the number of cases exceeds the reasonable capacity of the existing courts, additional exclusive courts must be established. The exercise is therefore data-driven rather than merely administrative.
The directions relating to NDPS Courts constitute the most significant part of the present order because of the magnitude of the deficit. The assessment placed before the Court showed that 449 exclusive courts were required, whereas only 176 had been established. This meant that a substantial proportion of the identified requirement remained unmet.
The Court’s concern is understandable in light of the nature of NDPS litigation. Narcotics prosecutions often involve stringent statutory provisions and serious allegations carrying severe penal consequences. At the same time, the consequences of a criminal prosecution can be profound for an accused person. Prolonged trials may result in extended incarceration, repeated court appearances, uncertainty and considerable financial and social consequences. An efficient trial system therefore serves both the interests of effective prosecution and the rights of the accused.
The creation of exclusive courts is also important from the perspective of judicial specialisation. NDPS trials involve recurring legal questions concerning search and seizure, compliance with statutory safeguards, chain of custody, forensic examination, presumptions, possession, conscious possession, sampling and evidentiary requirements. A dedicated judicial mechanism can help develop greater institutional familiarity with these recurring issues while ensuring that cases are not continually postponed because of conflicting priorities on a general criminal docket.
However, the establishment of exclusive courts does not mean that the safeguards available to accused persons under the NDPS Act or the Constitution can be diluted. Speedy trial must remain a fair trial. Specialisation cannot become a justification for overlooking procedural safeguards, evidentiary requirements or the presumption of innocence. The objective is not simply faster convictions but timely and legally sound adjudication.
This distinction is particularly important under the NDPS Act because the legislation contains stringent provisions concerning bail and presumptions. The more serious the statutory consequences, the greater the importance of ensuring that the trial itself is conducted fairly and without unreasonable delay.
The Court’s order also places responsibility on multiple institutions. The Union Government has a role in providing support and coordinating the process. State Governments are required to create infrastructure and appoint staff. High Courts have an important administrative and supervisory role in identifying suitable courts and ensuring their effective functioning. Judicial administration therefore becomes a shared institutional responsibility.
The proceedings also reveal the Supreme Court’s continuing use of its constitutional and supervisory jurisdiction to address systemic deficiencies in criminal justice administration. Rather than waiting for individual litigants to approach the Court after years of delay, the Bench has undertaken a broader monitoring exercise to identify structural problems and require executive and judicial authorities to respond.
This approach is especially relevant to special-statute litigation. Parliament may enact stringent laws to address serious offences, but legislative effectiveness ultimately depends upon investigation, prosecution and adjudication. If courts are unavailable or overloaded, the intended statutory mechanism becomes ineffective. The Supreme Court’s directions therefore seek to align legislative policy with judicial capacity.
The Court ultimately directed the Union, States and Union Territories to take necessary steps to provide the infrastructure and taff required for the establishment of the req