Introduction:
The Supreme Court of India recently declined to interfere with an order of the Madras High Court dismissing a petition seeking directions relating to the lighting of a ceremonial lamp atop the Thiruparankundram Hills in Tamil Nadu. While refusing to disturb the High Court’s findings on merits, the Supreme Court considered the costs imposed by the High Court to be excessive and accordingly reduced them from ₹50,000 to ₹5,000. The decision came in a Special Leave Petition filed by Hindu Dharma Parishad v. Union of India and Others, challenging an order passed by the Madras High Court on 9 April 2026.
The matter arose from a prolonged and highly sensitive dispute surrounding the traditional lighting of the Karthigai Deepam on the Thiruparankundram Hill, a site of considerable religious significance. Thiruparankundram is known for housing the ancient Arulmighu Subramaniya Swamy Temple and has also been the subject of controversy owing to the existence of a dargah and competing claims relating to access, religious practices, and administrative control over portions of the hill.
The litigation had its origins in earlier proceedings before the Madras High Court. On 1 December 2025, Justice G.R. Swaminathan directed the management of the Arulmighu Subramaniya Swamy Temple to light the Karthigai Deepam at a stone pillar situated atop the hill near the dargah. The Court had fixed a specific time for the ceremony and emphasized the importance of preserving longstanding religious traditions associated with the temple.
However, implementation of the order soon became contentious. The Tamil Nadu Government did not facilitate the lighting of the lamp as directed, citing concerns relating to law and order, public safety, and the sensitive nature of the site. This led to further litigation, including contempt proceedings alleging non-compliance with judicial directions.
During the contempt proceedings, Justice Swaminathan passed additional orders permitting devotees to proceed to the hill and light the lamp themselves under the protection of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). The Court also set aside prohibitory orders issued under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and directed the appearance of senior state officials, including the Chief Secretary and the Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order).
The Tamil Nadu Government challenged these developments through a Letters Patent Appeal. Although certain appeals were dismissed, subsequent judicial proceedings saw intervention by a Division Bench, which stayed the continuation of contempt proceedings before the Single Judge.
Against this backdrop, the Hindu Dharma Parishad, represented by its Managing Trustee K.K. Ramesh, approached the courts with a broader set of grievances. The organisation alleged discriminatory treatment of Hindu devotees and sought action against officials who, according to them, had prevented Hindus from carrying out traditional religious practices while permitting persons belonging to other faiths to access the hill.
The petition eventually came before the Madras High Court, which dismissed it, imposed exemplary costs, and expressed strong disapproval of what it viewed as litigation driven by political considerations rather than genuine legal concerns. Aggrieved by that dismissal, the organisation approached the Supreme Court seeking intervention.
The case therefore presented important questions concerning judicial restraint, the limits of public interest litigation, the management of religiously sensitive sites, and the balance between constitutional rights and public order considerations.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner organisation, Hindu Dharma Parishad, challenged the actions of governmental authorities and sought judicial intervention regarding access to and activities conducted on the Thiruparankundram Hill. The organisation contended that Hindu devotees were being prevented from carrying out traditional religious practices, particularly the lighting of the Karthigai Deepam, despite judicial directions recognizing such practices.
The petitioner relied upon provisions of the Ancient Monuments, Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 2010. It argued that the hill possessed historical, religious, and archaeological significance and that any activities damaging or altering the site would attract statutory consequences. According to the petitioner, certain activities allegedly taking place on the hill were inconsistent with the sanctity and preservation of the monument.
The petitioner further alleged that some organisations associated with the Muslim community were engaging in activities detrimental to the religious character of the hill. Serious allegations were raised regarding the conduct of certain groups, including claims that such organisations were attempting to create communal tensions and disturb public harmony. It was also alleged that the slaughter of animals on or near the hill violated the sanctity of the site and affected the religious sentiments of Hindu devotees.
Based on these assertions, the petitioner sought directions to the Union Government and the Archaeological Survey of India to take appropriate action. It was argued that authorities had failed to discharge their statutory obligations and had acted in a discriminatory manner by restricting Hindu religious activities while allegedly permitting other forms of access and usage.
The petitioner also questioned the conduct of state officials who had not implemented earlier judicial directions relating to the lighting of the Karthigai Deepam. According to the organisation, such actions amounted to unequal treatment and violated constitutional guarantees relating to religious freedom and equal protection of the law.
On the other hand, the respondents opposed the petition and supported the conclusions reached by the Madras High Court. The respondents maintained that the dispute involved highly sensitive questions concerning public order, communal harmony, and administration of a site where multiple religious sentiments were involved.
The respondents contended that the petition lacked a sufficient factual foundation and was based largely on speculative allegations. They argued that courts should exercise caution before entertaining claims that could potentially aggravate tensions in communally sensitive areas.
It was further submitted that governmental authorities had acted within the framework of law and had taken decisions based on security assessments, administrative requirements, and the need to preserve public peace. The respondents maintained that there was no material demonstrating arbitrary discrimination against any particular religious community.
The respondents also defended the High Court’s observations regarding the nature of the litigation. It was argued that courts have repeatedly cautioned against the use of judicial proceedings for advancing political agendas or creating social divisions under the guise of public interest. According to the respondents, the petition fell within that category and therefore deserved dismissal.
The respondents further emphasized that religious freedoms, though constitutionally protected, are subject to reasonable restrictions relating to public order, morality, and health. In situations involving competing claims and sensitive circumstances, authorities must be afforded a degree of discretion in managing access and regulating activities.
Accordingly, the respondents urged the Supreme Court not to interfere with the High Court’s judgment and to uphold the dismissal of the petition.
Court’s Judgment:
The Supreme Court considered the challenge to the Madras High Court’s order within the limited scope of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Vacation Bench comprising Justice P.S. Narasimha, Justice Aravind Kumar, and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar examined whether any grounds existed for interference with the conclusions reached by the High Court.
At the outset, the Court declined to interfere with the substantive findings recorded by the Madras High Court. By refusing to entertain the challenge, the Supreme Court effectively affirmed the High Court’s decision dismissing the petition.
Although the Supreme Court’s order was concise, the refusal to interfere is significant from a legal perspective. The Court evidently found no exceptional circumstances warranting exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. The power under Article 136 is extraordinary in nature and is generally invoked only where substantial questions of law, grave injustice, or manifest legal errors are demonstrated. The Court was not persuaded that the case met those requirements.
The decision reflects the principle that the Supreme Court does not function as a routine appellate forum for every order passed by a High Court. Rather, intervention is reserved for cases involving significant legal errors or substantial miscarriage of justice. The Court’s refusal to disturb the High Court’s conclusions indicates its acceptance of the reasoning adopted by the lower court in dismissing the petition.
At the same time, the Supreme Court took note of the costs imposed by the Madras High Court. The High Court had directed the petitioner organisation to pay ₹50,000 as costs while dismissing the proceedings. Such costs are often imposed by constitutional courts to discourage frivolous litigation, abuse of judicial process, or proceedings considered motivated by extraneous considerations.
The Supreme Court observed that while it was not inclined to interfere with the dismissal itself, the amount of costs appeared excessive in the facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, the Court exercised its discretion to modify that part of the order.
The Bench specifically held that the costs of ₹50,000 could be reduced to ₹5,000. This aspect of the judgment illustrates the Court’s balanced approach. While the Court agreed that the petition did not merit interference and accepted the High Court’s conclusions, it simultaneously recognized that the financial burden imposed on the petitioner could be moderated.
The reduction of costs also reflects a broader judicial principle that sanctions imposed by courts should remain proportionate to the conduct in question. Costs serve an important deterrent function, but they must not become unduly punitive unless circumstances clearly justify such a course.
The Supreme Court’s order therefore achieved two objectives. First, it preserved the High Court’s decision rejecting the substantive claims advanced by the petitioner. Secondly, it ensured proportionality in the imposition of costs.
From a constitutional perspective, the case underscores the judiciary’s cautious approach toward disputes involving religious sensitivities and communal considerations. Courts are often called upon to balance competing rights and interests in such cases. While religious practices are protected under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, those rights are not absolute and remain subject to considerations of public order, morality, and health.
The litigation also highlights the judiciary’s increasing concern regarding the misuse of public interest litigation for purposes unrelated to genuine public causes. Courts have repeatedly emphasized that constitutional remedies should not be converted into instruments for political mobilization, publicity, or advancement of sectional interests. The Madras High Court’s criticism of the petition and the Supreme Court’s refusal to interfere with that assessment reflect this judicial trend.
At the same time, the Court’s modification of the costs order demonstrates that even where a litigant is unsuccessful, judicial responses must remain measured and proportionate. The legal system seeks not only to discourage unmeritorious litigation but also to ensure fairness in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, upheld the Madras High Court’s refusal to grant the relief sought by the petitioner organisation, and reduced the costs from ₹50,000 to ₹5,000. The judgment reinforces the principles of judicial restraint, proportionality, and careful handling of disputes involving religious sensitivities while affirming the limited scope of intervention under Article 136 of the Constitution.