Introduction:

In the landmark case The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu and Another [W.P.(C) No. 1239/2023] and its connected petition The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Vice Chancellor and Others [W.P.(C) No. 1271/2023], the Supreme Court of India dealt with a critical constitutional controversy involving the prolonged inaction and subsequent withholding of assent by Tamil Nadu Governor Dr. R.N. Ravi on ten legislative bills, some of which had been pending since January 2020. The matter arose when the Governor, after a long delay of nearly three years, chose to withhold assent to ten bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly and, upon their re-enactment by the State Legislature in a special session, sent them for Presidential consideration. This action prompted the Tamil Nadu Government to move the Supreme Court, arguing that such conduct by the Governor was constitutionally impermissible, arbitrary, and amounted to a violation of Article 200 of the Constitution. The Court, in a resounding affirmation of constitutional morality and legislative supremacy, held that the Governor’s actions were illegal, erroneous, and an abuse of his constitutional powers. It declared that the ten bills would be deemed to have received assent once they were re-enacted and represented by the State Assembly and any subsequent action taken by the President on the matter was declared non-est in law. The case exposed deep tensions between elected governments and appointed constitutional heads, raising significant questions regarding federalism, constitutional duties, and the limits of gubernatorial discretion.

Arguments:

The petitioners, represented by Senior Advocates Mukul Rohatgi, Rakesh Dwivedi, and P. Wilson, argued that the Governor’s conduct of sitting over the bills for years without taking any constitutionally mandated action was a blatant misuse of the powers vested in his office under Article 200 of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, Article 200 confers only three options to the Governor when a bill is presented: to grant assent, to withhold assent, or to reserve it for the President’s consideration. Importantly, the State emphasized that if the Governor wished to reserve a bill for the President, he must do so at the first instance. The Tamil Nadu government contended that in this case, the Governor chose none of the three legitimate constitutional routes initially but instead kept the bills in abeyance. It was only after the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Punjab Governor’s case—which held that Governors cannot simply sit over bills without any action—that the Governor decided to declare withholding of assent and subsequently sent the re-enacted bills to the President. This, the petitioners argued, was a clear case of mala fide exercise of power and a dereliction of constitutional duty. They further submitted that the re-enactment of the bills was necessitated due to the unconstitutional silence of the Governor, and once they were re-presented by the Assembly, the Governor had no authority to send them to the President. They dismissed the argument of repugnancy to Central laws, pointing out that if the Governor had any such concerns, he was obligated to return the bills to the Assembly with a message, as required by the first proviso to Article 200. The Governor failed to do this, and hence, the re-enactment was perfectly valid. The petitioners also pointed out that there was no communication of the Governor’s objections to the Assembly, and therefore, the withholding of assent lacked any basis in law or procedure.

On the other hand, the Respondents, represented by Attorney General R. Venkataramani, sought to justify the Governor’s actions by contending that the bills in question had elements of repugnancy with Central laws and were thus not in the best interest of the country. He argued that the Governor, being concerned with the larger national interest, was within his rights to withhold assent and later refer the re-enacted bills to the President. The Attorney General asserted that withholding assent served as a communication of this repugnancy and thereby precluded the State legislature from re-enacting the bills. He maintained that the Governor acted well within his constitutional role and that any judicial review of his discretion in such matters would be unwarranted. The Respondents emphasized that the Governor’s conduct was driven not by political considerations but by constitutional concerns surrounding legislative competence and harmony between Union and State laws. However, during the hearing, the Court openly questioned this defense, asking why the Governor had failed to inform the legislature of the grounds of repugnancy if that was indeed the basis for his action. The Court also expressed concern that the Governor had effectively devised his own extra-constitutional method for handling legislation, in clear violation of established constitutional principles.

Judgement:

Delivering the judgment authored by Justice J.B. Pardiwala and concurred by Justice R. Mahadevan, the Supreme Court held that the Governor’s actions were legally untenable and fundamentally flawed under the constitutional framework. The Court categorically ruled that there is no concept of “absolute veto” or “pocket veto” under the Indian Constitution. Article 200 requires the Governor to act within a definite structure: to either assent, withhold assent, or reserve the bill for Presidential consideration. The Court emphasized that the reservation of a bill for the President must be done at the first instance and not after a bill has been reconsidered and re-enacted by the legislature. It clarified that the only exception to this rule is if the second version of the bill is materially different from the original version. Since, in the present case, the re-enacted bills were substantially the same, the Governor had no authority to reserve them for the President. The Court went on to declare that the declaration of withholding of assent and the act of reservation were not only erroneous in law but also devoid of bona fides, especially given the timing—coming immediately after the Punjab Governor’s ruling. It also noted that the Governor’s prolonged delay of nearly three years in acting upon the bills showed a complete disregard for constitutional duty and democratic processes.

The Court laid down definitive timelines to ensure that such constitutional impasses do not occur again. It held that the Governor must act on bills “forthwith,” and failure to do so within prescribed periods would subject the Governor’s actions to judicial review. Specifically, if a bill is to be reserved or assent withheld upon the advice of the Council of Ministers, it must be done within one month. If such action is taken contrary to the advice of the Council of Ministers, then the bill must be returned with a message within three months. Similarly, when bills are reserved for Presidential consideration after reconsideration, the Governor must act within one month. These timelines, the Court noted, are essential to maintain the federal structure and ensure the smooth functioning of State governments. The Court underscored that the Governor, while acting under Article 200, has no discretion and must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except in the limited situations envisaged under Article 200’s second proviso, which involves bills affecting the powers of the High Court or Supreme Court.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court declared that the ten bills in question would be deemed to have received the Governor’s assent as of the date they were re-enacted and represented by the Assembly. Consequently, any actions taken by the President on those bills were declared non-est in law. The Court exercised its inherent powers under Article 142 to enforce this outcome, noting that the Governor’s conduct showed “scant respect” for its previous rulings and amounted to obstructionism. The judgment offered a strong reminder to Governors about their constitutional role. The Court stated that Governors must not act as political agents or inhibitors of the democratic process but rather as facilitators who act in the spirit of the Constitution. Highlighting the foundational principles of parliamentary democracy, the Court observed that the will of the people, as expressed through their elected representatives, must take precedence. The Governor must not attempt to override this will under the guise of constitutional authority. The judgment ended with a powerful quote from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, stating that even a good Constitution can fail if those entrusted with its implementation act in bad faith.

This decision is a significant reaffirmation of the supremacy of the legislature in a democracy and sets strong boundaries against misuse of gubernatorial discretion. It also reflects the judiciary’s growing emphasis on accountability of all constitutional functionaries, not just elected representatives. The verdict serves as a stern warning against using constitutional offices to create roadblocks for political or ideological purposes and reinforces the principle that no constitutional authority, however high, is above the will of the people expressed through democratic means.