Introduction:

In the case of Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 875, the Supreme Court of India, in a judgment delivered by a Division Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, resolved a critical legal question relating to the maintainability of petitions for quashing of FIRs and charge-sheets once cognizance has been taken by a magistrate. The case arose out of a writ petition filed before the Bombay High Court by the petitioner, Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni, who sought the quashing of an FIR and subsequent proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — the successor provision to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The High Court dismissed her plea as infructuous, holding that since the charge-sheet had been filed and cognizance taken by the magistrate during the pendency of the writ petition, the remedy under Article 226 was no longer available.

Challenging this dismissal, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court, which clarified the legal position and drew a fine distinction between writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS. The apex court held that while Article 226 cannot be invoked once cognizance is taken, the High Court retains jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS to quash not only the FIR and charge-sheet but also the order of cognizance, provided proper pleadings are made and a strong case for quashing is demonstrated.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

On behalf of the petitioner, learned counsel Mr. Kisalaya Shukla (AOR) along with advocates Mr. Satyam Pandey, Mr. Sandeep Kumar Dwivedi, Mr. Krishna Kant Shukla, and Mr. Awadhesh Kumar, argued that the Bombay High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition as infructuous merely on the ground that a charge-sheet had been filed and cognizance taken during its pendency. The petition, according to counsel, was expressly filed under both Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 528 of BNSS, thereby invoking the High Court’s dual jurisdiction. While it is correct that judicial orders such as cognizance orders are not amenable to challenge under Article 226, the petitioners pointed out that under Section 528 BNSS, which corresponds to Section 482 CrPC, the High Court possesses inherent powers to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice.

It was further argued that the ratio of Neeta Singh v. State of UP (2024), relied upon by the High Court to dismiss the petition, had been misunderstood and misapplied. In Neeta Singh, the petition was filed solely under Article 226 after cognizance had already been taken, and therefore the Court rightly held that writ jurisdiction could not be exercised against judicial orders. However, in the present case, the petitioner had specifically invoked Section 528 BNSS, which empowered the High Court to examine not only the FIR and charge-sheet but also the subsequent cognizance order, provided the pleadings were adequate. The High Court, according to the petitioner, failed to appreciate this crucial factual difference and wrongly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.

Counsel for the petitioner also stressed that the High Court’s approach had caused serious prejudice and miscarriage of justice. Dismissing the petition as infructuous effectively foreclosed the petitioner’s remedy, even though a valid challenge under Section 528 BNSS was maintainable. This amounted to abdication of jurisdiction vested in the High Court. It was submitted that the Supreme Court should restore the writ petition and direct the High Court to decide it afresh on merits.

Arguments of the State:

On behalf of the State of Maharashtra, it was argued that once a magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence based on a charge-sheet, the matter enters the judicial domain, and writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be exercised to quash such judicial orders. Reliance was placed on Neeta Singh v. State of UP to emphasize that Article 226 jurisdiction is not available against judicial orders, including orders taking cognizance. The State contended that the filing of the charge-sheet and cognizance taken by the magistrate during the pendency of the writ petition rendered the relief sought under Article 226 infructuous.

However, the State conceded that Section 528 BNSS does empower the High Court to quash proceedings, including FIRs, charge-sheets, and even cognizance orders, in appropriate cases. The State’s submission was that since the petitioner had invoked both Article 226 and Section 528, the High Court should have considered whether relief could be granted under the latter provision, subject to the satisfaction of legal requirements. Nevertheless, the State emphasized that the inherent power to quash proceedings is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, only where continuing the proceedings would amount to abuse of process or result in miscarriage of justice.

Supreme Court’s Analysis:

The Supreme Court carefully examined the legal issue, beginning with the interplay between Article 226 jurisdiction and the inherent power under Section 528 BNSS. The Court observed that under established constitutional principles, judicial orders passed by courts of competent jurisdiction are not ordinarily amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Therefore, once a magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence upon submission of a charge-sheet, a writ petition solely under Article 226 seeking to quash such an order is not maintainable. This principle was affirmed in Neeta Singh v. State of UP.

However, the present case was distinguishable from Neeta Singh because the petitioner had not relied solely on Article 226 but had also invoked Section 528 BNSS. This provision, the Court noted, vests the High Court with wide inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. Such jurisdiction includes the power to quash FIRs, charge-sheets, and even cognizance orders, provided the petitioner lays proper pleadings and demonstrates a strong case for quashing.

The Court emphasized that the High Court, in its impugned order, had wrongly concluded that the filing of a charge-sheet rendered the writ petition infructuous. This view, the Court held, stemmed from a misreading of Neeta Singh, which dealt with a different factual matrix. In the instant case, the High Court had overlooked the petitioner’s reliance on Section 528 BNSS, which meant that the Court retained jurisdiction to examine the validity of the FIR, charge-sheet, and cognizance order.

The Supreme Court further observed that the High Court’s “sitting list” authorized its roster bench to entertain petitions under both Article 226 and Section 528 BNSS for quashing FIRs, charge-sheets, and related proceedings. By ignoring this jurisdiction, the High Court had inadvertently failed to discharge its judicial duty, resulting in failure of justice.

The Court clarified the law in categorical terms:

So long as cognizance has not been taken by a magistrate, a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable for quashing of FIRs and charge-sheets.

Once cognizance is taken, Article 226 jurisdiction is no longer available, but the High Court retains jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS to quash FIRs, charge-sheets, and even the cognizance order itself, provided proper pleadings are made.

The scope of Section 528 BNSS is wide, but its exercise must be cautious, limited to cases where continuing the proceedings would amount to abuse of process or miscarriage of justice.

The bench underscored that this interpretation balances two competing concerns — preventing abuse of criminal process on the one hand, and respecting the sanctity of judicial orders on the other.

Supreme Court’s Judgment:

Applying the above principles, the Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s order and revived the petitioner’s writ petition for fresh consideration. It held that the High Court had misapplied the ratio of Neeta Singh and wrongly treated the writ petition as infructuous. The apex court directed that the matter be heard afresh by the roster bench of the High Court, which has jurisdiction to consider quashing petitions under Section 528 BNSS.

Importantly, the Court clarified that while it was reviving the writ petition, it had not expressed any view on the merits of the petitioner’s case for quashing the FIR, charge-sheet, or cognizance order. These issues were left open for determination by the High Court in accordance with law. The appeal was accordingly disposed of at the admission stage itself, without issuing notice to the respondents.

The judgment thus lays down a clear framework for litigants and High Courts dealing with quashing petitions. It resolves the confusion created by the High Court’s reading of Neeta Singh and reiterates that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS remains available to challenge criminal proceedings even after cognizance is taken, provided the petition is properly framed and justified.