Introduction:

The case titled Sagar versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, bearing citation 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1155, emerged from a challenge to an order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to certain accused persons solely on the ground of parity without due consideration of the specific roles attributed to them in the alleged commission of a serious criminal offence. The matter was adjudicated by a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh, who were seized with the responsibility of evaluating whether the High Court had appropriately exercised its discretion while granting bail or whether such discretion was exercised mechanically, bypassing the crucial parameters necessary under criminal jurisprudence. The prosecution’s narrative disclosed that an altercation between the complainant’s family and a group of accused escalated into fatal violence when the complainant’s path was allegedly obstructed by the accused persons. In the course of this confrontation, Respondent No. 2, Rajveer, allegedly played a pivotal role as an instigator by exhorting co-accused Aditya to fire upon the deceased. While Aditya’s bail application had been rejected owing to his suspected direct role in the homicide, the High Court earlier granted bail to Suresh Pal, father of Aditya, a decision later reversed by the Supreme Court for being bereft of adequate reasoning. Notwithstanding this reversal, the High Court subsequently extended bail to Rajveer and another co-accused Prince solely on the premise that bail had once been granted to Suresh Pal, without a fresh and independent assessment of individual culpability. This mechanistic approach, devoid of legal reasoning and oblivious to the critical distinction in roles, invoked the Supreme Court’s intervention. The apex court scrutinised the manner in which the High Court conflated similarity in charges with similarity in roles and failed to appreciate precedents such as Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana (Koli) & Another, (2021) 6 SCC 230, which categorically mandate that parity in bail jurisprudence has no application unless the accused seeking bail shares not only identical charges but also an identical role. The Supreme Court emphasised that roles in crimes are often layered and differentiated, involving instigators, active participants, conspirators, and mere bystanders, each carrying a distinct shade of criminal intent. The court thus reiterated that it is judicially impermissible to grant bail simply because another accused has been favoured when factual nuances and individual participation warrant independent judicial scrutiny. With this legal foundation, the Supreme Court proceeded to examine whether Respondent No. 2, whose alleged actions were of an instigatory nature, could legitimately claim parity with an accused who had a peripheral or lesser role, thereby setting the stage for a decisive pronouncement on the contours of parity in bail jurisprudence under Indian criminal law.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

The petitioner, represented by seasoned counsel Mr. Praveen Swarup along with advocates Mr. Anshul Sharma, Mr. Krishan Kumar, Ms. Sakshi Chahar, Mr. Devesh Maurya, Mr. Rohit Swarup, and Mr. Ravi Kumar, vehemently assailed the High Court’s decision granting bail to Respondent No. 2 on the purported ground of parity, asserting that the High Court had abdicated its judicial responsibility by mechanically extending bail without discerning the distinct and aggravated role attributed to the said respondent. The petitioner contended that the concept of parity is not a tool of universality but a principle contingent upon strict similarity in role, conduct, and degree of participation in the alleged crime, none of which existed between Respondent No. 2 and the previously bailed accused. The counsel argued that Respondent No. 2 was the fulcrum of the crime, for he instigated the shooter to commit the fatal act, thus functioning not as a mere bystander or passive participant but as a direct enabler whose verbal exhortation was the proximate cause of the death. It was emphasised that instigation constitutes an independent offence and is treated with severity in criminal jurisprudence, often equated with the act itself since it triggers the mens rea of the primary perpetrator. The petitioner highlighted that the High Court overlooked material evidence including witness statements and investigative reports demonstrating that Rajveer’s inducement was deliberate, targeted, and malicious. The counsel further submitted that the Supreme Court in multiple cases, notably Ramesh Bhavan Rathod and Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar (2022) 4 SCC 497, has enunciated that bail orders require articulation of cogent reasoning reflecting an assessment of relevant factors such as the nature of allegations, gravity of offence, likelihood of tampering with evidence, impact on witnesses, and antecedents of the accused. In the instant case, the High Court failed to examine these considerations, rendering its order perverse and susceptible to judicial interference. The petitioner also underscored the potential threat to witnesses if Respondent No. 2 remained free, given his influential social standing in the locality and apparent willingness to resort to intimidation. The petitioner warned that granting bail to the instigator encourages a culture of impunity and undermines the deterrent function of criminal law by equating primary actors with peripheral accomplices. Thus, according to the petitioner, the impugned order was not merely erroneous but posed a grave miscarriage of justice warranting reversal.

Arguments of the Respondent:

The respondent, represented by counsel Mr. Vikas Bansal along with Dr. Vijendra Singh, Ms. Ashwina Lakra, and Ms. Arushi Singh, urged the Supreme Court to sustain the High Court’s order, arguing that bail is the norm and incarceration is the exception under Indian criminal jurisprudence. The respondent contended that the High Court exercised its discretion judiciously, taking cognizance of the fact that the accusations against Respondent No. 2 rested largely on oral statements without unimpeachable corroboration, thereby positing that the prosecution’s case was tenuous and manufactured to entangle individuals beyond those directly involved in the firing. The respondent submitted that parity constitutes a well-established principle ensuring uniformity of judicial treatment in like circumstances, and since the High Court had already granted bail to another co-accused earlier, it was justified in extending similar relief to Respondent No. 2. It was argued that the prosecution’s attempt to elevate instigation to the same level as direct execution was doctrinally flawed, for instigation requires conclusive proof of intention and a causal link, both of which were doubtful at the pre-trial stage. The counsel insisted that the complaint itself was embellished with improvements and belated allegations introduced only after the arrest of the primary accused, thereby demonstrating malafide intent. The respondent further argued that continued incarceration without trial would violate his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and reiterated that bail jurisprudence, especially in cases lacking direct physical participation, mandates a liberal approach. The respondent dismissed concerns about tampering with evidence or intimidating witnesses, asserting that no such acts had occurred during the period he was free, and the prosecution’s apprehensions were speculative rather than real. The defence concluded by asserting that the High Court’s reasoning, though concise, was sufficient to justify its decision and did not warrant interference under Article 136 of the Constitution, which is invoked sparingly and only in cases of glaring illegality.

Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court, in a meticulously reasoned judgment authored by Justice Sanjay Karol, emphatically overturned the bail order passed by the Allahabad High Court, holding that the High Court had adopted an erroneous and superficial approach in granting bail solely on the ground of parity without evaluating the distinct and critical role attributed to Respondent No. 2. The Court held that parity is not an inflexible doctrine nor a mathematical rule enabling automatic bail merely because another accused received similar relief; rather, it is a principle conditioned upon similarity of roles and circumstances. The Supreme Court relied upon its decision in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod (2021) 6 SCC 230, wherein it was held that parity cannot be invoked when the roles of co-accused are dissimilar or their degree of participation varies, and reiterated that courts must undertake a role-based analysis, not merely offence-based comparison. The Court observed that criminal acts often involve multiple tiers of participation—instigators, executors, facilitators, and intimidators—and it is neither rational nor legally permissible to treat them alike when assessing bail. The apex court stressed that instigation is a substantive offence that triggers the formation of intent in the principal offender, and therefore, an instigator cannot claim immunity under the guise of parity with someone whose participation was peripheral. The Supreme Court found that the High Court failed to apply the criteria laid down in Brijmani Devi (2022) 4 SCC 497, which mandates courts to independently evaluate factors such as the gravity of allegations, probability of conviction, potential impact on trial, nature of evidence, likelihood of tampering, and antecedents before granting bail. The absence of such an assessment rendered the High Court’s order legally unsustainable. The Court clarified that granting bail in offences involving homicide demands heightened judicial circumspection, given the irreversible nature of the harm and the societal need for accountability. The Supreme Court held that Respondent No. 2’s acts of exhortation were not innocuous but constituted a catalyst for the firing that caused death, thereby making his role central rather than incidental. Consequently, the order granting bail was set aside, Respondent No. 2 was directed to surrender forthwith, and the appeal was allowed. The Court thus reaffirmed that bail jurisprudence must be anchored in principled discretion, not mechanical parity, and that individual culpability, not collective accusation, dictates entitlement to liberty.