Introduction:
In a significant ruling that refines the evidentiary scope of expert opinion and signature verification, the Supreme Court of India, in Hussain Bin Awaz v. Mittapally Venkataramulu & Ors. (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1083), has emphatically held that the power under Section 45 read with Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, can be invoked only in relation to an admitted document and not for documents whose authenticity itself is in dispute. The bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma delivered this ruling while setting aside a Telangana High Court judgment that had directed the forensic examination of a disputed signature in a 50-year-old land ownership case.
The dispute, which dates back to nearly half a century, involved a contested parcel of land that had been the subject of multiple litigations. The respondent, Mittapally Venkataramulu, had instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration of ownership and consequential injunction based on a prior suit decided in 1975. The cornerstone of his claim was a written statement purportedly filed by the appellant’s grandfather in that earlier proceeding, which was said to contain an admission supporting the respondent’s ownership. However, the appellant, Hussain Bin Awaz, representing the family’s interest, alleged that the said written statement had been forged and that the signature appearing on it did not belong to their grandfather.
After the trial was completed and the evidence closed, the defendants (the appellants before the Supreme Court) moved an application under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, seeking to send the disputed written statement to a forensic expert for examination and comparison of handwriting and signature. They argued that only a scientific analysis could determine whether the document relied upon by the respondent was genuine or fabricated. The trial court, however, refused to allow the request, noting that the written statement in question was a very old record from 1975 and that the defendants had not produced any prima facie material to justify sending it for expert verification at such a belated stage. The court observed that the application appeared to be an afterthought, aimed at delaying the final adjudication of the case. Dissatisfied with the trial court’s refusal, the defendants approached the Telangana High Court, which took a different view. The High Court, invoking the principle of doing “complete justice,” allowed the request for forensic examination. It directed that the disputed document be referred to a handwriting expert to ascertain the genuineness of the signature purportedly belonging to the appellant’s grandfather, observing that such a step was necessary “in the interests of justice” and to ensure that the truth was established.
This order of the High Court was then challenged before the Supreme Court by the plaintiff, Hussain Bin Awaz, who contended that the High Court had misconstrued the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and had expanded their scope beyond what the law permits.
Arguments of the Appellant (Hussain Bin Awaz):
Senior Advocate Mr. L. Narasimha Reddy, appearing on behalf of the appellant, argued that the High Court’s order was legally unsustainable and contrary to the settled principles of evidence. He submitted that Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act do not authorize the comparison or examination of disputed or unadmitted documents. Section 45, which deals with expert opinion, applies only to situations where the court considers it necessary to form an opinion upon handwriting or signature in a document that is otherwise admitted or proved to be genuine. Section 73, which empowers the court to compare a disputed signature or handwriting with an admitted one, also presupposes that there exists some admitted document that can serve as a reliable standard for comparison. Mr. Reddy emphasized that in the present case, the very authenticity of the written statement was in dispute, and therefore, invoking these provisions to verify the signature would amount to putting the cart before the horse. The burden of proof, he contended, lay upon the plaintiff to prove his case, and it was not open to the defendants to reopen concluded proceedings merely on the pretext of forensic examination after the trial had been completed. He further highlighted that the application was filed only after the conclusion of the trial, and thus, it was clearly a delaying tactic intended to frustrate the disposal of the case.
Arguments of the Respondent (Mittapally Venkataramulu):
On the other hand, the respondents, represented by Advocate Mr. D. Manohar Rao, argued that the High Court had correctly exercised its discretion to ensure the ends of justice. It was submitted that the defendants had consistently questioned the genuineness of the written statement since the beginning and that sending it for expert examination would not cause any prejudice but would, in fact, assist the court in ascertaining the truth. The respondents contended that the Indian Evidence Act allows the court to seek the opinion of experts in matters involving handwriting or signature disputes and that denying such examination would amount to suppressing material evidence that could potentially expose a forgery. They also submitted that the age of the document or the delay in seeking such examination should not come in the way of discovering the truth, especially in cases involving family properties and old records where authenticity is often contested. According to them, the High Court’s order was guided by equitable considerations and aimed to secure substantial justice rather than procedural rigidity.
Court’s Analysis and Judgment:
After carefully examining the facts and the rival submissions, the Supreme Court began its analysis by revisiting the object and scope of Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 45 deals with expert opinions and enables the court to obtain assistance from experts on matters such as handwriting, signatures, or fingerprints, where the court’s own knowledge might be insufficient. Section 73 empowers the court to compare a disputed handwriting or signature with an admitted one. However, the Court emphasized that both provisions have to be read harmoniously and in a limited context — they cannot be used to authenticate a document whose genuineness is itself in question unless there exists some admitted material to form a basis for comparison.
The bench observed that the invocation of Section 45 presupposes the existence of a document whose authorship is admitted or established. The expert’s role is confined to comparing the handwriting or signature of a disputed portion with an admitted or proved sample. The Court held that in the absence of any admitted signature of the deceased grandfather that could serve as a reliable benchmark, a forensic examination of the disputed written statement would be meaningless and speculative. Similarly, under Section 73, the comparison must be between a disputed and an admitted signature — the provision does not permit comparison when both are under suspicion.
The Court further clarified that in civil suits for declaration and injunction, the burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff to substantiate his claim with cogent evidence. The defendants cannot shift that burden or prolong the proceedings by invoking forensic examination after the trial has concluded. The bench observed, “Section 45 read with Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act can only be invoked for an admitted document for the purpose of comparison of signatures or handwriting. The same cannot be extended to a disputed document, the authenticity of which is not accepted by the parties.” The Court reasoned that permitting such examination at a late stage would set a wrong precedent and open floodgates for litigants to endlessly prolong old cases by seeking expert opinions on decades-old records.
The Supreme Court also took note of the fact that the written statement in question dated back to 1975, making it almost 50 years old. The bench noted that given the passage of time, the reliability of the ink, paper, and handwriting samples would be significantly compromised, rendering any expert opinion uncertain or inconclusive. Furthermore, the Court observed that the High Court had erred in invoking “interests of justice” as a ground to override the statutory limitations imposed by the Evidence Act. Justice Sundresh, speaking for the bench, remarked that the principle of “interest of justice” cannot be applied in isolation from the provisions of law — it must operate within the legal framework, not beyond it.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Telangana High Court and restored the order of the trial court rejecting the application for forensic examination. The appeal was accordingly allowed, reaffirming the principle that Sections 45 and 73 cannot be stretched to encompass documents whose very existence or authenticity is under challenge.
The judgment not only clarifies the evidentiary boundaries of expert opinion but also reiterates the responsibility of litigants to establish their claims within the parameters of law and evidence. It underscores the Court’s consistent stance that expert evidence is merely an opinion, not proof in itself, and must be anchored to admitted facts and materials.