Introduction:

In Shruti Jain & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., the Punjab and Haryana High Court delivered a landmark ruling affirming that Assistant Advocate Generals (AAGs) and Deputy Advocate Generals (DAGs) engaged by the State of Haryana are entitled to essential service benefits such as Leave Travel Concession (LTC), medical reimbursement, and earned leave. Justice Sandeep Moudgil held that the State cannot deny these fundamental entitlements merely by describing the engagement as “contractual,” particularly when the nature of duties, responsibilities, and service conditions mirror those of regular government officers.

The petitioners were appointed pursuant to a public advertisement dated 29 December 2017 and were issued engagement letters on 30 June 2018. Their appointments were initially for one year, extendable annually, and they were placed in revised pay scales under the 6th Central Pay Commission along with Non-Practicing Allowance and usual allowances sanctioned by the State Government. Subsequently, their pay was revised in accordance with the 7th Central Pay Commission Pay Matrix.

However, audit objections led the State to attempt re-fixation of pay and recovery of alleged excess salary. Although most of the reliefs sought by the petitioners were conceded during the pendency of proceedings, the State persisted in denying them LTC, medical reimbursement, and earned leave on the ground that they were contractual appointees governed by the Haryana Law Officers (Engagement) Act, 2016. The Court was thus called upon to decide whether nomenclature alone could justify withholding core service benefits from full-time law officers discharging constitutional responsibilities.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioners:

The petitioners mounted a multi-pronged challenge to the State’s denial of benefits.

1. Appointment Against Sanctioned Posts Through Public Advertisement

It was emphasized that the petitioners were appointed through a public advertisement process against sanctioned posts. Their selection was neither ad hoc nor casual. The engagement letters placed them in regular pay scales under the Haryana Revised Pay Rules, 2016, with annual increments and dearness allowance.

This, according to the petitioners, demonstrated institutional integration within the State framework rather than a mere contractual consultancy arrangement.

2. Salary Charged to Consolidated Fund

The petitioners argued that their remuneration was charged to the Consolidated Fund of the State under the “Salary” head. Income tax was deducted at source in the same manner as for regular government employees. These financial attributes signified substantive parity with regular officers.

3. Prohibition on Private Practice

A critical submission was that the petitioners were expressly prohibited from engaging in private legal practice. By foregoing independent professional opportunities, they devoted themselves exclusively to representing the State.

The denial of LTC, earned leave, and medical reimbursement, despite imposing full-time obligations and barring private practice, was alleged to be discriminatory and violative of principles of fairness.

4. Nature of Duties

The petitioners highlighted that their responsibilities extended far beyond routine court appearances. They were required to:

• Represent the State in constitutional courts.
• Provide legal opinions.
• Vet pleadings and written statements.
• Consult with departmental officers.

Undertake administrative assignments assigned by the Advocate General.

Justice Moudgil noted that the petitioners performed duties involving higher responsibility and quantum of work than several other law officers posted in government departments.

5. Parity with Other Law Officers

The petitioners argued that similarly situated law officers such as Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs), Deputy District Attorneys (DDAs), and District Attorneys (DAs) deputed in government departments were receiving the very benefits being denied to them.

Selective exclusion based solely on nomenclature amounted to hostile discrimination.

6. Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation

The engagement letters stipulated entitlement to “usual allowances as sanctioned by the Haryana Government from time to time.” The State’s consistent practice of granting revised pay scales and allowances created a legitimate expectation that core benefits would not be withheld.

Deviation from established practice, it was argued, required justification based on reasonableness, which was absent.

7. Inapplicability of the 2016 Act

The petitioners contended that their appointments predated the effective enforcement of the Haryana Law Officers (Engagement) Act, 2016, which was implemented in 2019 for fresh appointments. Their original engagement in June 2018 continued through renewals and was not made under the 2016 Act framework.

Thus, reliance on the Act to deny benefits was misplaced.

Arguments on Behalf of the State of Haryana:

The State defended its position primarily on the ground of contractual engagement.

1. Engagement Under the 2016 Act

The State contended that the petitioners were engaged under the Haryana Law Officers (Engagement) Act, 2016. Their appointments were contractual, terminable, and did not confer the status of government employees.

2. Absence of Regular Employment Status

It was argued that contractual appointees cannot claim parity with regular employees. LTC, medical reimbursement, and earned leave were benefits attached to regular service conditions and not to contractual engagements.

3. Acceptance of Engagement Terms

The State submitted that the petitioners had accepted their engagement terms knowingly and could not later claim benefits inconsistent with the contractual framework.

4. Limited Scope of Relief

The State pointed out that it had already conceded several reliefs, including restoration of higher pay scales and increments. However, it maintained that the remaining benefits were not legally enforceable.

Court’s Analysis and Judgment:

Justice Sandeep Moudgil undertook a comprehensive constitutional and institutional analysis of the nature of engagement of law officers.

1. Constitutional Dimension of Representation

The Court observed that when lawyers represent the State, the relationship transcends ordinary professional engagement. While engagement may not automatically equate to regular employment, the institutional responsibility is heavy and imbued with constitutional significance.

When the client is the State, the lawyer becomes an instrument in the administration of justice affecting the public at large. Thus, the responsibility acquires a constitutional dimension.

2. Substance Over Form

The Court rejected the State’s reliance on nomenclature. Merely labeling engagement as “contractual” cannot be used as a shield to deny fairness.

Public employment—even when contractual—is subject to constitutional discipline. Where the substance of the relationship reveals exclusivity, continuity, and institutional integration, courts must look beyond labels to reality.

3. Institutional Nature of Duties

The Court emphasized that the petitioners’ duties were:

• Full-time.
• Continuous.
• Exclusive.

Integral to constitutional governance.

Their role was neither transient nor ornamental but structural to the functioning of the State.

4. Parity and Equality

Justice Moudgil held that once the State treats the petitioners as regular salaried officers for substantive purposes such as pay scales, increments, and dearness allowance, it cannot selectively deny essential benefits.

Such selective parity violates constitutional principles of equality and legitimate expectation.

5. Prohibition of Private Practice

The Court noted that the petitioners had foregone independent professional opportunities. To impose the rigours of public service without affording minimal securities such as earned leave and medical reimbursement would be inequitable.

Denying such benefits would undermine the dignity of the legal profession and treat law officers as inferior functionaries despite their higher constitutional responsibilities.

6. Inapplicability of the 2016 Act

The Court found that the petitioners were appointed prior to the effective enforcement of the 2016 Act and that their engagements were merely renewed. Therefore, the Act did not govern their appointments.

7. Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation

The Court applied the doctrine of legitimate expectation, holding that consistent extension of pay revisions and allowances created a reasonable expectation of equitable treatment.

Deviation from this established course required rational justification, which the State failed to demonstrate.

8. Final Directions

The Court held that the petitioners were entitled to:

• Leave Travel Concession (LTC)
• Medical reimbursement
• Earned leave
• Other related emoluments

The State was directed to release these benefits within four weeks from receipt of a certified copy of the order.