Introduction:
The Allahabad High Court, in Satyendra Nath Shukla v. State of U.P. through Additional Chief Secretary, Home, U.P., Lucknow and Another, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 401, has clarified the scope of a Sessions Judge’s power under Section 408 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Justice Subhash Vidyarthi held that a Sessions Judge has the discretion to transfer a part-heard criminal trial from one court to another within the same Sessions Division if such transfer is considered expedient for the ends of justice and the transferee court has the jurisdiction to try the case.
The controversy arose from a criminal trial pending before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, ATS, Lucknow. During the course of the trial, the then Presiding Officer, Judicial Officer Abhinay Kumar Mishra, recorded the evidence of nine prosecution witnesses, including all the material witnesses of fact. Before the trial could conclude, the officer was transferred to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 4/Special Judge, Gangsters Act, which was also situated within the Lucknow Sessions Division.
Following the transfer, another Judicial Officer assumed charge of the ATS Court and recorded the testimony of the tenth prosecution witness. Thereafter, the complainant moved an application under Section 408 CrPC before the Sessions Judge seeking transfer of the trial to the new court of the previous Presiding Officer. The complainant argued that the earlier judge had already heard most of the prosecution evidence and had personally observed the demeanour of the witnesses, making him better placed to appreciate the evidence fairly and consistently.
Accepting the request, the Sessions Judge transferred the case to the predecessor judge’s new court. The accused challenged this order before the Allahabad High Court, contending that the transfer was contrary to law. The case therefore required the High Court to determine whether a Sessions Judge could exercise powers under Section 408 CrPC to transfer a part-heard criminal trial to the new court of a transferred judicial officer within the same Sessions Division.
Arguments of the Parties:
The accused-petitioner challenged the transfer order primarily on the ground that Section 326 of the CrPC expressly permits a successor judge to continue and conclude a trial after the transfer of the previous Presiding Officer. According to the petitioner, once the original Presiding Officer had been transferred, the newly posted judge lawfully acquired jurisdiction to proceed with the trial and decide the matter.
The petitioner further argued that the successor judge had already commenced recording evidence by examining the tenth prosecution witness. Since there was no allegation of bias, prejudice, or inability on the part of the new judge, there existed no valid reason to transfer the case to another court. It was contended that the transfer unnecessarily interfered with the regular judicial process.
The petitioner also questioned the legality of the Sessions Judge’s exercise of power under Section 408 CrPC, submitting that the continuation of proceedings before the successor judge was fully consistent with the statutory framework governing criminal trials.
The complainant, on the other hand, supported the transfer order by emphasizing that the original Presiding Officer had recorded the testimony of nine prosecution witnesses, including all the important witnesses of fact. Since the judge had personally observed their demeanour during examination, allowing him to complete the trial would promote judicial continuity, consistency in appreciation of evidence, and fairness in adjudication.
It was argued that transferring the case to the predecessor judge’s new court would not prejudice either party because both courts possessed competent jurisdiction to try the offence. Rather, such transfer would serve the ends of justice by enabling the same judicial officer, who had already heard the substantial part of the prosecution evidence, to complete the trial.
The State also supported the legality of the transfer, contending that Section 408 CrPC confers wide discretionary powers upon the Sessions Judge to transfer criminal cases within the Sessions Division whenever such transfer is necessary in the interest of justice.
Court’s Judgment:
The Allahabad High Court dismissed the petition and upheld the transfer order passed by the Sessions Judge. At the outset, Justice Subhash Vidyarthi observed that the petition itself had been filed under an incorrect statutory provision. The Court explained that where an application under Section 408 CrPC is rejected by the Sessions Judge, the aggrieved party may approach the High Court under Section 407 CrPC. However, where a transfer application has been allowed by the Sessions Judge, the legality of that order cannot be challenged through another transfer petition under Section 407 CrPC. Instead, such an order can be examined only by invoking the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (corresponding to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita).
Although the petition suffered from this procedural defect, the High Court chose to examine its merits in exercise of its inherent powers rather than dismissing it solely on technical grounds.
On the substantive issue, the Court held that both the ATS Court and the transferee court possessed lawful jurisdiction to try the criminal case. The Bench clarified that jurisdiction is vested in the court as an institution and not in the individual Presiding Officer. Therefore, the transfer of a judicial officer from one competent court to another within the same Sessions Division does not affect the legal competence of either court to conduct the trial.
The Court observed that Section 408 CrPC grants the Sessions Judge discretionary authority to transfer criminal proceedings whenever such transfer appears expedient for the ends of justice. This discretionary power includes transferring a part-heard matter to the new court of a transferred judicial officer, provided that court has jurisdiction to try the case.
Justice Vidyarthi further emphasized the importance of witness demeanour in criminal trials. The Court reiterated the settled principle that while appreciating oral evidence, a judge derives valuable assistance by personally observing the conduct, manner of answering, confidence, hesitation, and overall demeanour of witnesses during their examination. Such observations often assist the court in assessing the credibility and reliability of testimony.
In the present case, the original Presiding Officer had recorded the statements of nine prosecution witnesses, including all the material witnesses of fact. Consequently, he possessed the advantage of personally observing their demeanour throughout the trial. The Court held that preserving this advantage by transferring the case to his new court was a legitimate consideration that advanced, rather than defeated, the ends of justice.
Rejecting the petitioner’s contention based on Section 326 CrPC, the Court clarified that although the successor judge undoubtedly had the legal authority to continue the proceedings, that statutory provision does not curtail or override the independent power of the Sessions Judge under Section 408 CrPC to transfer cases when circumstances so require. Both provisions operate harmoniously within their respective fields.
The Court concluded that the Sessions Judge had exercised the statutory discretion reasonably and lawfully. The transfer was intended to preserve judicial continuity, facilitate proper appreciation of evidence, and ensure a fair trial. It neither caused prejudice to the accused nor amounted to an abuse of the judicial process.
Finding no illegality, arbitrariness, or jurisdictional error in the transfer order, the Allahabad High Court dismissed the petition. The judgment reinforces that the discretionary power under Section 408 CrPC is broad enough to permit transfer of a part-heard criminal trial to the new court of a transferred Presiding Officer within the same Sessions Division when such transfer promotes the ends of justice. It also underscores the importance of judicial continuity and the evidentiary value of a judge’s personal observation of witness demeanour in criminal adjudication.