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The Legal Affair

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The Legal Affair

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Scheduled Areas Can Be Included in Municipal Limits Without Losing Constitutional Protection, Rajasthan High Court Clarifies

Scheduled Areas Can Be Included in Municipal Limits Without Losing Constitutional Protection, Rajasthan High Court Clarifies

Introduction:

In Anil Kumar Meena & Another v. State of Rajasthan & Others, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Raj) 10, a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court comprising Dr. Justice Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Justice Sanjeet Purohit dismissed a batch of petitions challenging a State Government notification issued under Section 3 read with Section 329 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009, by which several villages and Gram Panchayat areas falling within Scheduled Areas notified under Paragraph 6(2) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution were included within municipal limits, with the petitioners contending that once an area is declared a Scheduled Area, it attracts a special constitutional regime under Article 244 read with the Fifth Schedule, thereby excluding the application of municipal law and allegedly stripping the State Legislature of competence to impose municipal governance, and further arguing that Article 243-ZC creates an express constitutional bar against municipal administration in Scheduled Areas; the State, on the other hand, defended the notification by asserting that Scheduled Areas are not constitutionally insulated from all State legislation and that unless the Governor issues a specific notification under Paragraph 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule excluding or modifying the application of a statute, State laws continue to operate, subject always to the protective constitutional framework of the Fifth Schedule, and therefore municipal inclusion does not extinguish tribal safeguards nor does it violate constitutional structure.

Arguments:

The petitioners primarily argued that the Fifth Schedule establishes an exclusive constitutional field for governance of Scheduled Areas, designed to protect the social, economic, and cultural interests of Scheduled Tribes, and that once an area is notified as a Scheduled Area, it must be governed only through institutions and mechanisms compatible with tribal self-governance, thereby excluding municipal administration which is designed for urban governance under Part IX-A of the Constitution; they relied heavily on Article 243-ZC(1), which provides that nothing in Part IX-A shall apply to Scheduled Areas, contending that this constitutional exclusion automatically prohibits municipal governance and renders any State legislation extending municipal limits into Scheduled Areas unconstitutional; they further submitted that municipalisation alters land governance, taxation, regulatory frameworks, and development planning in ways that could erode tribal rights and customary practices, and that such structural changes cannot be imposed without constitutional sanction, especially when the Governor has not exercised powers under Paragraph 5(1) to modify laws but the State has unilaterally extended municipal boundaries; according to them, the absence of gubernatorial modification cannot be treated as approval, because the very existence of Scheduled Area status should itself trigger constitutional exclusion of municipal regimes, and they also argued that inclusion within municipal limits practically displaces Panchayati Raj institutions operating under the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, thereby weakening community participation and violating the spirit of tribal autonomy; the State responded by asserting that Article 244(1) read with the Fifth Schedule does not place Scheduled Areas beyond the reach of State legislation, but rather subjects governance to a supervisory constitutional mechanism where the Governor is empowered to exclude or modify laws, and in the absence of such exclusion, statutes validly enacted by the State Legislature continue to apply, though always subject to Fifth Schedule safeguards; the State emphasized that Article 243-ZC merely excludes the automatic constitutional mandate of Part IX-A but does not invalidate State municipal laws, and that municipal administration can function within Scheduled Areas so long as constitutional protections, Tribal Advisory Council oversight, and developmental obligations under Articles 46 and 275(1) continue to operate; it was further argued that municipal inclusion does not change the constitutional identity of land as Scheduled Area nor does it affect entitlements, reservations, or tribal welfare schemes, and that development needs of semi-urbanising tribal regions require flexible governance models rather than rigid insulation from municipal frameworks, particularly where population growth and infrastructure demands necessitate structured civic administration.

Court’s Judgment:

The High Court framed core constitutional issues and answered them through a harmonious reading of Articles 244(1), 243-ZC, and the Fifth Schedule, first holding that Scheduled Areas are not constitutionally immune from the application of all State laws, and that Paragraph 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule expressly contemplates that laws of the State Legislature shall apply unless the Governor, by public notification, directs otherwise or modifies their application, thereby establishing that exclusion is not automatic but conditional upon gubernatorial intervention; the Court held that in the present case no such exclusionary or modificatory notification had been produced, and therefore the Rajasthan Municipalities Act continued to operate within Scheduled Areas by its own force, subject to constitutional supervision, and that mere notification of an area as Scheduled does not create an absolute embargo on legislative application; addressing Article 243-ZC, the Court clarified that the provision only disables the constitutional compulsion of Part IX-A and does not suspend or invalidate municipal statutes enacted by the State Legislature, meaning that while the constitutional template for municipalities does not automatically apply, municipal governance can still be introduced through legislation operating under the Fifth Schedule’s protective umbrella; the Court explained that Article 243-ZC functions as a protective filter preventing automatic urban governance structures from displacing tribal safeguards, but it does not fossilise Scheduled Areas into permanent rural administrative zones immune from civic evolution; the Bench emphasized that constitutional interpretation must balance protection with development, observing that Scheduled Areas are constitutionally guarded but not constitutionally frozen, and that governance models may evolve provided constitutional safeguards remain intact; on the third issue, the Court categorically rejected the contention that municipal inclusion denudes Scheduled Areas of constitutional protection, holding that all safeguards under the Fifth Schedule, including the role of the Tribal Advisory Council, special responsibilities of the Governor, and developmental obligations flowing from Articles 46 and 275(1) including Tribal Sub-Plan mechanisms, continue to operate fully regardless of whether the area is governed by a Panchayat or a Municipality, because these duties attach to the territory and its people by constitutional command and are not contingent upon the form of local self-government; the Court further observed that municipalisation changes the civic administrative structure but does not change constitutional status, and therefore cannot dilute protective land regimes, welfare entitlements, or supervisory mechanisms, and concluded that the impugned notification was constitutionally valid, legally sustainable, and did not violate the Fifth Schedule, leading to dismissal of all connected petitions; in doing so, the Court also acknowledged policy concerns and earlier judicial observations about governance gaps in Scheduled Areas undergoing urbanisation, but clarified that such concerns cannot override constitutional text and statutory operation, and that any perceived policy vacuum must be addressed through legislative or executive calibration rather than judicial invalidation of valid statutory notifications.