Introduction:

In a significant ruling touching upon the intersection of electoral rights and statutory restrictions, the Madras High Court adjudicated a writ petition filed by Hari Nadar (Petitioner) against the Election Commission of India and State Authorities (Respondents). The petitioner, who was lodged in Puzhal Central Prison, sought directions to be allowed to exercise his right to vote in the 2026 Tamil Nadu Assembly Elections, either through postal ballot or by being physically taken to a polling station.

The plea raised an important constitutional question: whether a person under detention in prison, particularly under preventive detention laws, retains the right to vote, and whether such a right can be enforced despite statutory restrictions contained in the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

The petitioner contended that his detention, which had not culminated in conviction, should not deprive him of his democratic rights. He invoked Article 326 of the Constitution, asserting that his fundamental right to vote was being unjustly curtailed. However, the respondents relied on Section 62(5) of the Representation of the People Act, which imposes a clear bar on voting by persons confined in prison, subject to a limited exception.

The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice S.A. Dharmadhikari and Justice G. Arul Murugan was thus tasked with balancing constitutional ideals of universal suffrage against explicit statutory prohibitions.

Arguments by the Petitioner:

The petitioner advanced a detailed and rights-based argument, focusing on the fundamental nature of the right to vote.

At the outset, he submitted that he had been remanded to custody on January 8, 2026, and was currently lodged in Puzhal Central Prison. He claimed that the cases against him were false and politically motivated, and that his detention under the Tamil Nadu Goondas Act was arbitrary.

The petitioner emphasized that he had not been convicted of any offence, and therefore, there was no justification for depriving him of his right to vote. He argued that the presumption of innocence must operate in his favour, and mere detention should not result in the loss of fundamental rights.

Relying on Article 326 of the Constitution, the petitioner contended that the right to vote is a fundamental democratic right and forms the basis of representative governance. Denying him this right, he argued, amounted to a violation of constitutional principles.

The petitioner further submitted that Section 62(5) of the Representation of the People Act contains an exception for persons under preventive detention, allowing them to vote. He argued that since he was detained under the Goondas Act, he should fall within this exception and be permitted to cast his vote.

Additionally, the petitioner informed the Court that he had made representations to the jail authorities requesting permission to vote, but these were rejected. He also alleged that his nomination papers were not forwarded to the Returning Officer, resulting in rejection of his candidature.

The petitioner argued that these actions collectively infringed not only his right to vote but also his right to contest elections, thereby undermining the democratic process.

Arguments by the Respondents:

The respondents, including the Election Commission of India and the State authorities, opposed the petition and defended the statutory framework.

The primary argument advanced was based on Section 62(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which clearly states that no person shall vote at any election if he is confined in a prison or in police custody, whether under a sentence or otherwise.

While acknowledging the exception for persons under preventive detention, the respondents contended that the petitioner’s case did not fall within this exception. It was submitted that, apart from the preventive detention order, the petitioner was also in custody in connection with two other criminal cases, which were under investigation.

The respondents argued that this additional custody placed the petitioner squarely within the category of persons barred from voting under Section 62(5), thereby excluding him from the benefit of the exception.

The standing counsel for the Election Commission further emphasized that the statutory bar is absolute in nature, except for the limited exception explicitly provided. Courts, it was argued, cannot override such a clear legislative mandate.

The State authorities also denied any wrongdoing in relation to the petitioner’s nomination papers, maintaining that all procedures were followed in accordance with law.

Court’s Judgment:

After considering the submissions and examining the legal framework, the High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was not entitled to vote in the circumstances of the case.

1. Interpretation of Section 62(5) of the Representation of the People Act

The Court began by analyzing Section 62(5), which imposes a bar on voting by persons confined in prison or in police custody.

The provision reads:

• No person shall vote if he is confined in prison or in police custody,
• The only exception is for persons under preventive detention.

The Court noted that this provision reflects a clear legislative intent to restrict the voting rights of persons in custody, subject to a narrowly defined exception.

2. Applicability of the Exception for Preventive Detention

The Court acknowledged that persons under preventive detention are ordinarily allowed to vote under the proviso to Section 62(5).

However, it emphasized that the petitioner’s case was not confined to preventive detention alone. The petitioner was also in custody in connection with two other criminal cases, which were under investigation.

This additional custody, the Court held, brought the petitioner within the general prohibition under Section 62(5), thereby disqualifying him from voting.

3. Right to Vote: Statutory, Not Absolute

The Court reiterated the settled legal position that the right to vote is a statutory right, not an absolute fundamental right.

While Article 326 provides for adult suffrage, the exercise of this right is subject to laws made by Parliament, including the Representation of the People Act.

The Court held that statutory restrictions, such as those contained in Section 62(5), are valid and enforceable.

4. No Scope for Judicial Intervention

The Court observed that where the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no scope for judicial intervention to carve out additional exceptions.

It held that permitting the petitioner to vote despite the statutory bar would amount to rewriting the law, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.

5. Dismissal of the Petition

In light of the above findings, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s case did not fall within the exception provided under the Act.

Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.