Introduction:
In a constitutionally significant ruling balancing democratic dissent with public order, the Calcutta High Court dismissed an intra-court appeal filed by an elected legislator challenging the denial of police permission to hold a sit-in demonstration directly in front of Nabanna, the administrative headquarters of the Government of West Bengal. The appeal was preferred by Sankar Ghosh, a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly, against the State of West Bengal and its authorities, after police authorities refused permission for a proposed peaceful protest by around fifty MLAs on 16 January 2026 at Nabanna, citing prevailing law and order concerns and an operative prohibitory order under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Earlier, the Single Judge of the High Court had partly allowed the writ petition by permitting the demonstration to be held at Mandirtala Bus Stand, an alternative location, for a limited duration and subject to regulatory conditions. Aggrieved by the refusal to allow the protest at Nabanna itself, the appellant invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Sujoy Paul and Justice Partha Sarathi Sen examined whether the constitutional right to protest under Article 19 of the Constitution includes an unfettered right to demonstrate at a place of one’s choosing, particularly at the seat of government, and whether the Court could interfere with administrative restrictions imposed in the presence of an unchallenged prohibitory order. Upholding the Single Judge’s order, the Division Bench reiterated that while dissent is the lifeblood of democracy, it is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, safety, and governance.
Arguments:
On behalf of the appellant, it was forcefully contended that the right to protest peacefully is a core component of the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution, encompassing freedom of speech, expression, and assembly. The appellant argued that the proposed sit-in demonstration was intended to be entirely peaceful, limited in numbers, and symbolic in nature, involving elected representatives rather than a large public gathering, and therefore posed no real threat to law and order. Heavy reliance was placed on landmark Supreme Court judgments such as Himmat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ramlila Maidan Incident (In Re), and Shaheen Bagh (In Re) to submit that the State cannot arbitrarily curtail the right to protest and that executive authorities are under a constitutional obligation to facilitate peaceful assemblies rather than suppress them. It was further argued that prohibitory orders under Section 144 CrPC, now replaced by Section 163 BNSS, cannot be imposed mechanically or indefinitely, and that such orders must withstand strict judicial scrutiny when they curtail fundamental rights. The appellant also sought to draw parity with earlier instances where political protests were allegedly permitted near Nabanna, contending that denial in the present case amounted to discriminatory and unequal treatment violative of Article 14. It was submitted that shifting the protest to a distant or less visible location diluted the very purpose of democratic protest, which is to convey dissent to the seat of power, and that allowing the demonstration at Mandirtala Bus Stand was an inadequate substitute for the symbolic and political significance of Nabanna.
Opposing the appeal, the State, represented by the Advocate General, argued that there is no absolute or unfettered fundamental right to protest at any particular place or at any particular time. It was submitted that reasonable restrictions on assemblies are constitutionally sanctioned under Articles 19(2) and 19(3), especially when imposed in the interest of public order and administrative functioning. The State placed reliance on Constitution Bench judgments such as Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh, and Ramlila Maidan Incident, to contend that executive authorities are fully empowered to regulate the time, place, and manner of assemblies, including by prohibiting protests in sensitive zones like government headquarters. A critical submission of the State was that a prohibitory order under Section 163 BNSS was in force in the Howrah metropolitan area, including the vicinity of Nabanna, and that the appellant had consciously chosen not to challenge the validity of that order through appropriate legal remedies. In the absence of such a challenge, the State argued, the Court could not indirectly nullify or bypass the prohibitory order by granting permission to protest at a prohibited location. The State further submitted that the Single Judge had struck a fair balance by permitting the protest at an alternative site, thereby respecting democratic rights while maintaining public order, and that no case for appellate interference was made out.
Judgment:
After an exhaustive consideration of constitutional principles and binding precedent, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the Single Judge. The Court held that the jurisprudence on the right to protest is well settled: while the right to assemble peacefully is a fundamental right, it does not include the right to assemble at any and every place of choice. The Bench emphasised that reasonable restrictions on the exercise of Article 19 rights are an inherent part of the constitutional scheme, particularly when assemblies are sought to be held in sensitive or high-security areas such as the seat of government. A crucial factor that weighed with the Court was the existence of a prohibitory order issued under Section 163 BNSS covering the Howrah metropolitan area. The Court noted that the appellant had not challenged this prohibitory order, either independently or within the writ proceedings, despite the availability of statutory and constitutional remedies to do so. Relying on Babulal Parate, the Bench observed that where the legality of a prohibitory order is not under challenge, the Court cannot sit in appeal over the administrative satisfaction underlying such an order. The Bench further held that the Single Judge had adopted a legally sustainable and balanced approach by permitting the protest at an alternative location for a limited time and subject to conditions, thereby ensuring that the appellant’s right to protest was not extinguished but merely regulated. Distinguishing earlier decisions relied upon by the appellant, including Debranjan Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, the Court clarified that those cases did not involve an operative prohibitory order and were therefore factually distinguishable. Reiterating that democratic dissent must coexist with civic order, the Division Bench concluded that regulation of protests near Nabanna did not amount to a violation of Article 19, and dismissed the appeal along with the connected application.