Introduction:

In Pooja (as Guardian of Baby Devanshi Jaisawar) v. Aadharshila Vidyapeeth & Anr., the Delhi High Court delivered an important ruling delineating the scope and limitations of the right to education under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act). The matter was adjudicated by a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice D. K. Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia, who were called upon to examine whether a child could claim admission in a particular private school under the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) category after the relevant academic year had already concluded.

The case arose from an appeal filed by a mother acting as the guardian of her minor child, challenging the refusal of a single judge to grant admission to her ward in a specific private school despite allotment under the EWS category. The controversy stemmed from the interplay between the beneficial objectives of the RTE Act and the practical constraints of academic timelines and administrative processes.

The appellant’s child had applied for admission to Class I under the EWS/DG category for the academic year 2023–2024 and was allotted a seat through a computerized draw of lots conducted by the Directorate of Education (DoE). However, the school in question did not grant admission immediately, citing internal procedural reasons. Instead of accepting an alternative allotment provided by the authorities, the appellant chose to litigate the matter. By the time the case was adjudicated, the academic year had concluded, raising the question of whether the Court could grant retrospective or compensatory relief.

This case thus required the Court to balance the statutory right to education with principles of administrative feasibility, judicial restraint, and the doctrine that courts should not create rights or remedies that disrupt established systems, particularly after the lapse of time.

Arguments by the Appellant (Mother/Guardian):

The appellant, representing her minor child, advanced arguments grounded in statutory rights, fairness, and administrative accountability.

1. Entitlement Under RTE Act

The appellant contended that the Right to Education Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at ensuring access to quality education for children belonging to economically weaker sections. She argued that once her child had been allotted a seat in a particular school through a lawful and transparent process, the school was under a legal obligation to grant admission.

2. Arbitrary Refusal by the School

It was submitted that the concerned private school had acted arbitrarily in refusing admission despite the allotment. The reason cited by the school—that EWS admissions would be processed only after general category admissions—was argued to be contrary to the spirit and scheme of the RTE Act.

The appellant maintained that such a stance effectively defeated the purpose of ensuring equal access to education for disadvantaged children.

3. Legitimate Expectation

The appellant invoked the doctrine of legitimate expectation, arguing that once the Directorate of Education had allotted a seat in a specific school, the child had a reasonable expectation of being admitted to that institution. Denial of admission, therefore, amounted to a breach of this expectation.

4. Right to Choose School

While not explicitly framed as an absolute right, the appellant’s submissions implied that the right to education should include the right to avail admission in the school allotted through the official process, particularly when it was one of the preferred choices indicated in the application.

5. Delay Not Attributable to Appellant

The appellant argued that the delay in securing admission was not attributable to her but was caused by the school’s refusal and the time taken in judicial proceedings. Therefore, she should not be penalized for circumstances beyond her control.

Arguments by the Respondents (School and Authorities):

The respondents, including the private school and the Directorate of Education, opposed the appeal and defended the decisions taken.

1. Completion of Academic Year

A central argument was that the academic year 2023–2024 had already concluded, and therefore, the relief sought by the appellant had become infructuous. It was contended that courts cannot grant admission for a past academic year or create retrospective rights.

2. Alternative Allotment Provided

The respondents pointed out that the child had been allotted an alternative school by the Directorate of Education, which was among the preferred options selected in the application form. Despite this, the appellant chose not to avail of the opportunity and instead pursued litigation.

This, according to the respondents, demonstrated that the appellant was insisting on admission to a specific school rather than seeking education per se.

3. No Interim Protection

It was emphasized that during the pendency of the writ petition, no interim order had been passed directing provisional admission or reservation of a seat in the desired school. In the absence of such protection, the seat could not be kept vacant indefinitely.

4. Administrative Constraints

The respondents argued that granting admission after the conclusion of the academic year would disrupt the academic calendar and administrative processes. It would also create an unfair precedent, leading to similar claims by others.

5. Limits of Judicial Intervention

It was contended that while courts have the power to enforce rights, they must exercise restraint and avoid interfering in matters that involve policy decisions and administrative feasibility, particularly when the relief sought would require creation of additional seats.

Court’s Judgment:

After carefully considering the submissions, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the single judge and dismissed the appeal.

1. Nature and Scope of Right to Education

The Court began by acknowledging that the RTE Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at promoting social inclusion and ensuring that education is accessible to all children, irrespective of their socio-economic background.

However, it clarified that the right to education does not extend to a right to choose a particular school. The Court emphasized that the objective of the Act is to provide access to education, not to guarantee admission in a specific institution of choice.

2. No Right Survives After Academic Year Ends

A key finding of the Court was that once the academic year has concluded, the right to seek admission for that year ceases to exist. The Court held that in the absence of any interim order preserving the seat or granting provisional admission, the claim becomes untenable after the lapse of time.

This principle ensures certainty and stability in the education system, preventing disruption of academic schedules.

3. Importance of Interim Relief

The Court underscored the significance of interim orders in such cases. It observed that if the appellant had obtained an interim direction for provisional admission or reservation of a seat, the situation might have been different.

In the absence of such protection, however, the Court could not grant relief retrospectively.

4. Alternative School Allotment

The Court noted that the child had been offered admission in an alternative school, which was one of the preferred choices indicated by the appellant. The failure to accept this allotment weakened the appellant’s case and indicated that the grievance was not about lack of access to education but about preference for a particular institution.

5. Judicial Restraint in Creating Seats

The Court categorically held that it does not have the power to create additional seats in a school for a past academic year. Such an action would not only be impractical but would also interfere with the autonomy of educational institutions and administrative authorities.

6. Upholding the Single Judge’s Decision

Finding no infirmity in the reasoning of the single judge, the Division Bench upheld the impugned order and dismissed the appeal.