Introduction:

In the case of Nivritti Pandurang Nale vs. Uttam Ganu Nale & Anr (Second Appeal No. 13 Of 1994), the Bombay High Court was called upon to evaluate the validity and legal standing of an alleged adoption claimed by the appellant, who sought exclusive ownership over certain ancestral properties on the basis of being the adopted son of one Pandurang and his wife (Defendant No. 1). The plaintiffs (respondents herein) had earlier filed a suit for partition and separate possession of the suit properties, which was dismissed by the Trial Court but allowed in part by the First Appellate Court. The core legal issue was whether the adoption of the appellant could be presumed under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, solely on the basis of a registered adoption deed not signed by the person giving the child in adoption.

Arguments of Both Sides and Court’s Judgement:

The appellant-defendant no. 2 contended that he was the lawfully adopted son of Pandurang and his wife (Defendant No. 1), and on that basis, claimed exclusive rights in the ancestral suit properties. He relied primarily on a registered adoption deed to support his claim and argued that this deed alone sufficed to trigger the presumption of a valid adoption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The respondents/plaintiffs, on the other hand, disputed the validity of the alleged adoption, pointing out that neither the specific date nor year of the adoption was pleaded or proved and that the deed itself lacked the signature of the person who gave the child in adoption, namely the appellant’s biological mother, who was alive at the time. They further submitted that no corroborative oral or documentary evidence had been provided to substantiate the adoption claim. The Trial Court had initially dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for partition and separate possession, but the First Appellate Court, while not entirely accepting the adoption claim, still awarded equal 1/4th shares to each party. The Bombay High Court, presided by Justice Gauri Godse, revisited the evidence and statutory requisites under Section 16. The Court categorically held that the mere registration of an adoption deed is not sufficient to attract the presumption of valid adoption under Section 16 unless the deed is duly signed by both the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption. As the deed in the present case lacked the signature of the biological mother of the appellant, who was still alive at the time of execution, the Court ruled that no presumption of valid adoption could be drawn. The High Court emphasized that the burden of proof of adoption was on the defendants and that this burden was not discharged either by oral testimonies or by documentary proof. Noting these deficiencies, the Court concluded that the claim of exclusive inheritance by the appellant was untenable. The Court, however, modified the First Appellate Court’s order slightly and declared that the respondents/plaintiffs and the appellant/defendant no. 2 were each entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit properties. The appeal was thereby partly allowed with the necessary changes in the division of property, but the principal claim of exclusive entitlement based on alleged adoption was rejected due to non-fulfilment of statutory requirements.