Introduction:
In Hussain Md. Rijuan v. State of Assam (Crl.Pet./800/2021), the Gauhati High Court was called upon to examine whether the mere refusal to marry a minor girl, with whom the accused was allegedly in a romantic and physical relationship, could by itself constitute the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Court, speaking through Justice Anjan Moni Kalita, partly allowed the petition filed by the accused and set aside the cognizance taken under Section 306 IPC, holding that there was no prima facie material to suggest instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid, as required under Section 107 IPC. However, the Court upheld the cognizance taken under Sections 417 and 376 IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, finding that the allegations and materials disclosed a sustained sexual relationship that allegedly began when the deceased was a minor. The ruling draws a clear legal distinction between emotional distress caused by relationship breakdown and the much higher threshold required to establish criminal liability for abetment of suicide, while simultaneously reaffirming that sexual exploitation of a minor, even in the garb of a romantic relationship, attracts the strict rigour of POCSO.
Arguments of Both Sides:
The petitioner assailed the order of the Special Judge, Nagaon, which had taken cognizance of offences under Sections 306, 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, contending that the order suffered from serious legal infirmities. The primary thrust of the petitioner’s argument was that the essential ingredients of abetment under Section 107 IPC were wholly absent, and therefore the invocation of Section 306 IPC was legally unsustainable. It was argued that for an offence of abetment of suicide to be made out, there must be clear evidence of instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aiding, and that mere emotional consequences of personal decisions such as refusal to marry cannot be equated with criminal instigation.
The petitioner submitted that the materials on record, including WhatsApp messages exchanged between him and the deceased, only showed that he had declined to marry her two days prior to her suicide and had informed her of his intention to marry someone else. According to the petitioner, such conduct, however morally questionable, does not satisfy the legal requirement of mens rea to drive the deceased to suicide, nor does it establish that the accused placed the deceased in a situation where suicide was the only option. It was argued that criminal law cannot punish individuals for failed relationships unless accompanied by conduct that actively pushes the victim towards self-destruction.
With respect to the rape and POCSO charges, the petitioner attempted to argue that the FIR merely used the expression “physical relations”, which, according to him, was vague and insufficient to conclude sexual intercourse or penetrative sexual assault. It was contended that the prosecution had not produced concrete medical or forensic evidence at the stage of cognizance to conclusively establish sexual assault, and therefore the continuation of proceedings under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act amounted to abuse of process of law.
The petitioner also sought to challenge the age of the deceased, suggesting that she was not a minor at the relevant time, and therefore POCSO provisions would not apply. On this basis, the petitioner prayed for complete quashing of the criminal proceedings.
The State opposed the petition and supported the order of cognizance, submitting that at the stage of taking cognizance, the Court is only required to see whether prima facie materials exist to proceed with trial, not to conduct a mini trial or weigh the evidence in detail. It was argued that the FIR and the materials collected during investigation disclosed that the petitioner had been in a relationship with the deceased for about two years, had promised marriage, and had established a physical relationship with her, which later culminated in his refusal to marry, causing severe mental trauma to the girl.
Regarding the charge of abetment of suicide, the prosecution argued that the emotional devastation caused by betrayal and refusal to marry, especially after sustained physical exploitation, could amount to indirect instigation, particularly when the deceased was young and emotionally vulnerable. It was submitted that these aspects should be examined in trial rather than being quashed at the threshold.
As far as the POCSO charge was concerned, the State relied upon the date of birth certificate, which prima facie showed that the deceased was a minor at the time when the alleged sexual relationship began. It was contended that once minority is established, consent becomes irrelevant under POCSO, and the offence of penetrative sexual assault is attracted regardless of whether the relationship was consensual in nature.
The prosecution further argued that the expression “physical relations” in common parlance and vernacular usage ordinarily implies sexual intercourse, and at the stage of cognizance, such terminology is sufficient to infer sexual exploitation, especially when supported by surrounding circumstances and witness statements. Therefore, it was urged that the Court should not interfere with the cognizance taken under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
Court’s Judgment:
After carefully examining the FIR, the case diary, the WhatsApp communications, and the materials collected during investigation, the Gauhati High Court undertook a detailed legal analysis of what constitutes abetment of suicide under criminal law. The Court reiterated that Section 306 IPC can be invoked only when the acts of the accused fall within the scope of Section 107 IPC, which contemplates three distinct forms of abetment: instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aiding of the act of suicide.
Justice Anjan Moni Kalita emphasized that in cases of abetment, there must be direct or indirect acts of incitement which are proximate and closely linked to the suicide, and such acts must reflect a clear mens rea to push the victim towards self-destruction. The Court observed that criminal liability for abetment cannot be fastened merely because the deceased was emotionally affected by the conduct of the accused, unless such conduct was intentionally aimed at provoking suicide.
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court noted that although the petitioner had refused to marry the deceased and had informed her of his impending marriage with another person shortly before her suicide, there was no material indicating that he instigated, provoked, or encouraged her to take her life. The Court found no evidence of continuous harassment, threats, humiliation, or coercive conduct that could reasonably compel a person to commit suicide. It further observed that there was no allegation of conspiracy or any act of intentional aid facilitating the suicide.
The Court also considered the behavioral history of both the accused and the deceased and observed that while the deceased was distressed, there was no material to show that she was subjected to such unbearable circumstances by the accused that suicide became the only perceived option. The Court held that mental agony due to failed relationships, however tragic, cannot automatically translate into criminal abetment unless supported by legally recognizable elements of instigation or intentional provocation. Consequently, the Court set aside the cognizance taken under Section 306 IPC.
However, on the charges under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the Court took a very different view. It noted that the materials on record disclosed a sustained sexual relationship over a period of about two years, and the date of birth certificate prima facie established that the deceased was a minor during the relevant period. The Court clarified that if the deceased was a minor at the time of the alleged sexual acts, the offence squarely falls within the definition of penetrative sexual assault under POCSO, and consent, if any, becomes legally irrelevant.
Rejecting the argument that the term “physical relations” was vague, the Court held that in ordinary usage, especially in the socio-linguistic context of FIRs, the phrase commonly denotes sexual intimacy, and when read along with other materials in the case diary, it sufficiently discloses sexual exploitation. The Court also observed that at the stage of cognizance, detailed proof is not required, and the presence of foundational facts is enough to allow the prosecution to proceed to trial.
The Court further held that allegations of deceitful promise of marriage, followed by exploitation and eventual refusal, prima facie also attracted Section 417 IPC (cheating), which justified continuation of proceedings under that provision as well.
In conclusion, the High Court partly allowed the petition, quashing the proceedings only with respect to Section 306 IPC, while directing that the trial shall continue for offences under Sections 417 and 376 IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.